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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study is to examine the relation between accounting 
measures of total firm risk and the magnitudes of IPO initial returns. The existing 
explanations of the underpricing of IPO's suggests that the extent of underpricing is 
positively related to ex ante uncertainty about the issues. This study argues that 
accounting risk measures are related to the ex ante uncertainty. Since ex ante 
uncertainty is positively related to IPO underpricing, accounting risk measures are 
also arguably related to IPO underpricing. An event methodology is employed in this 
study. 
Five accounting risk measures are examined: financial leverage, operating 
leverage, firm size, firm growth, and profitability. The model is tested using a sample 
of 149 Indonesian IPOs that went public during the period of 1989-1997. Three 
accounting measures of total risk: financial leverage, size, and firm growth, are found 
to be consistently related to the degree of underpricing. Financial leverage, measured 
as the ratio of total debt to total assets plus the market value of the issue in the first 
day, is positively and significantly associated with the degree of underpricing. A 
negative and significant association is found between firm size, measured as the size 
of the issue, and the degree of underpricing. In contrast to my expectations, growth is 
negatively related to the degree of underpricing. The coefficients of the other two 
accounting risk measures: operating leverage and profitability, are mixed. Overall, 
the results allow rejection of the null hypothesis that accounting measures of total 
firm risk are not related to the degree of underpricing. 
iii 
Consistent with previous studies, this study finds that the portion of shares 
retained by the initial owners and the state of the market are significantly related to 
the extent of underpricing. Other findings reveal that underpricing is positively 
related to aftermarket standard deviation of return and is negatively related to the 
IPO's number of years in operation and the quality of underwriter. Further 
investigation suggests that the model fits better in the situation where more firms are 
making IP0s (hot periods). Tests on the pricing of IPOs provide additional evidence 
that the IP0s' accounting information is value relevant to the market price of the 
IPO. In particular, the IPOs' accounting information explains a large part of the 
variation of the offering price and first week market price. 
Two important implications pertaining to the findings of this study are 
identified. Firstly, the study has provided further evidence that the degree of 
underpricing is positively related to the ex ante uncertainty about the aftermarket 
price of the issue. Secondly, the results give additional support to the proposition that 
accounting information is value relevant to the pricing of IPOs. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Going public through selling equity securities to the stock market for the first 
time, known as an initial public offering (IPO), is considered an important method for 
private companies to raise capital. The important functions of an IPO in providing 
additional finance to companies were shown by a massive growth of the number of 
companies making IPOs in Indonesian stock market, particularly, since the last market 
deregulation introduced in late 1988 and early 1989. The number of firms listed on the 
market has risen 26-fold during 1981-1994, from only eight firms in 1981 to 217 firms in 
1994, which has made it the fastest growing emerging market in the world (Jenkinson & 
Ljungqvist, 1996). The funds raised in the new issues market were in excess of Rp. 14 
trillion during the period. By the end of 1998 the number of firms listed in the stock 
market stood at 288 with market capitalisation of Rp. 176 trillion. 
One aspect of IPOs that is of interest is that the offering prices have to be set 
without the benefit of an observable market price. The issuers and underwriters must set 
the offering price using non-price information since there are no adequate and reliable 
market price determinants for IP0s until trading of the securities begins. This makes the 
setting of the offering price difficult and critical because it will affect either the response 
of the market or the issuers' wealth (Ibbotson, Sindelar, & Ritter, 1988, 1994). Thus, 
uncertainty concerning the true value of IPO stocks is greater than that pertaining to 
already traded ones. 
One source of information relevant to pricing an IPO is accounting information. 
Accounting information plays an important role in determining the price of an IPO given 
only limited, if any, information available about the issuing firm prior to the listing date. 
It is common that prior to the offering a company, as a privately held corporation, has 
less or even no obligation to reveal its information to the public. The literature has also 
recommended the incorporation of accounting numbers in determining at what price the 
stock of an IPO should be sold (Perez, 1984; Bloch, 1986; Sutton & Benedetto, 1988; 
Buck, 1990). In addition, accounting numbers have been used as a standard practice in 
many IPO valuation case studies (See for example Varaiya, Bergmark, & Taylor, 1997). 
Rosenberg and Marathe, cited in Downes and Heinkel (1982), suggest that the 
characteristics of a firm's risk and return are affected by its attributes, which could be in 
terms of indices (e.g., firm's industry group and size) or signals (e.g., the level of share 
ownership and the auditing firms). These attributes can be used to predict the risk and 
value of a firm's equity. As accounting information represents one of the attributes, it can 
also be of potential use as a predictor of risk and value and serve to reduce the 
uncertainty of a firm's security. 
Analytical and empirical evidence of the association between accounting numbers 
and the value of IPOs are provided in numerous papers, for example, Downes and 
Heinkel (1982), Hughes (1986), Titman and Trueman (1986), Krinsky and Rotenberg 
(1989a, 1989b), Kim, Krinsky, and Lee. (1993, 1994, 1995a), and Klein (1996), amongst 
others. Kim et al. (1995a) and Klein, in particular, show that information in the 
prospectus is value relevant concerning the IPO. The value of IPOs is also related to the 
signals taken by the entrepreneurs, such as the level of ownership retention or the quality 
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of underwriters and auditors. These suggest that, despite the uncertainty surrounding the 
IPO, the value of an IPO is somewhat predictable. 
Theoretical and empirical evidence has indicated that certain accounting measures 
can be used as proxies for total firm risk, that is, they could determine the riskiness of a 
corporation (Lev, 1974; Bowman, 1979; DeAngelo, 1990, among others). The literature 
also suggests that accounting information is relevant in determining the value and thus 
the riskiness of a corporation through the use of accounting analysis (Brealy & Myers, 
1996; Benninga & Sarig, 1997; White, Sondhi, & Fried, 1998, among others). Since most 
of the information available in the prospectus is accounting information, it is arguable 
that this information represents a potential source for assessing the issuing firm. Some 
scholars have also advocated the possibility of using accounting information in assessing 
the value of firm making an IPO (Beaver, Kettler, & Scholes, 1970; Foster, 1986; Lev, 
1989; Berstein & Wild, 1998; Noland & Pelvik, 1998). Moreover, Ryan (1997), based on 
his survey relating accounting numbers and company risk, notes the possibility of 
incorporating accounting information for measuring the risk of a firm making an IPO in 
the absence of ex post risk measures prior to the offering. Thus, the focus of the current 
study is to examine whether accounting measures of total firm risk are associated with 
the uncertainty surrounding an IPO. 
There is a considerable and growing body of empirical evidence suggesting that 
the IPOs of common stocks are underpriced, on average. This underpricing is a 
widespread phenomenon and is evidenced across many capital markets (Loughran, Ritter, 
& Rydqvist, 1994). A number of theoretical models have been proposed to explain why 
IPOs of common stock are on average underpriced. For example, Baron (1982) develops 
an underpricing model based on information asymmetry between the issuing firm and 
3 
underwriters, while Rock ( 1986) and Beatty and Ritter ( 1986) model underpricing as a 
result of information asymmetry between investors. Others develop underpricing theories 
based on signalling hypothesis arguing that the underpricing is a means of conveying 
good quality IPO (Allen & Faulhaber, 1989; Grinbaltt & Hwang, 1989; Welsch, 1989). 
The general notion of these theories is that the pre-trading or ex ante uncertainty about 
the aftermarket price is the driving factor for the IPO's underpricing. 
The existing underpricing theories come to a similar implication that underpricing 
is positively related to the ex ante uncertainty about the aftermarket price of the issue. In 
other words, the expected amount of underpricing increases as the uncertainty about the 
aftermarket of the issue increases. Empirical support for this positive association has 
been shown in many research papers. Yet, little attention has been given to the possible 
association between accounting information, in particular accounting measures of firms' 
total risk, and the underpricing of IPOs. While two studies (Kim et al., 1995a; Klein, 
1996) have examined the pricing of IPOs, they do not investigate the relation between 
specific accounting risk measures and the degree of underpricing. Further, although some 
studies have examined the underpricing of Indonesian IP0s (Rizka, 1995; Indrajati, 1997; 
Hanafi, 1998, amongst others), none of these studies finds convincing support that ex 
ante uncertainty is positively related to the degree of underpricing. The current study is 
expected to provide more evidence about IPO underpricing and ex ante uncertainty, more 
specifically, it examines the association between accounting measures of total firm risk 
and the degree of underpricing in Indonesian IPOs of common stocks. Five accounting 
risk measures are examined: financial leverage, operating leverage, size, growth, and 
profitability. In addition, five control variables are examined. 
4 
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A sample of 149 Indonesian IPO firms that went public during the period 1989-
1997 is examined and is used to test the null hypothesis that the IPO' s initial return is not 
related to firm specific accounting risk measures. The sample firms exclude those in the 
real estate, property and construction industries, finance and insurance industries, and 
investment companies. The findings show that three accounting measures of total risk: 
financial leverage, size, and firm growth, are found to be consistently related to the 
degree of underpricing. To check the robustness of the model, alternate measures for each 
of the proxies are used. Financial leverage, measured as the ratio of total debt to total 
assets plus the market value of the issue in the first day, is positively and significantly 
associated with the degree of underpricing. A negative association is found between firm 
size, measured as the size of the issue, and the degree of underpricing. Growth is 
negatively related to the degree of underpricing, which is in contrast to the expectation. 
The coefficients of two other accounting risk measures: operating leverage and 
profitability, are mixed. Overall, the results allow rejection of the null hypothesis that 
accounting measures of total firm risk are not related to the degree of underpricing. 
Consistent with previous studies, this study documents that the portion of shares 
retained by the initial owners and the state of the market are significantly related to the 
extent of underpricing. Other findings reveal that underpricing is positively related to 
aftermarket standard deviation of return and is negatively related to the IPO's number of 
years in operation and the quality of the underwriter. Further investigation suggests that 
the model fits better in the situation where more firms are making IP0s (hot periods). 
Additional tests on the pricing of IPOs provide further evidence that the IPOs' accounting 
information is value relevant about the market price of the IPO, which is in support to 
that of Kim et al. (1995a) and Klein (l 996). 
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Two important implications pertaining to the findings of this study are identified. 
First, the study has provided further evidence that the degree of underpricing is positively 
related to the ex ante uncertainty about the aftermarket price of the issue. Second, the 
results give additional support to the proposition that accounting information is value 
relevant about the pricing of IPOs (Kim et al., 1995a; Klein, 1996). The presence of 
multicollinearity among independent variables has made it difficult to draw inferences 
about the importance of the individual variables, in particular the accounting variables. 
However, as some accounting variables are found to be significantly related to the degree 
of underpricing, the general conclusion that accounting measures of total risk are 
associated with the initial returns is unaffected. 
1.1 Objectives of the Study 
This study has three objectives. Firstly, it examines the existence of underpricing 
phenomenon in Indonesian new issues of common stocks. Previous studies, such as 
Husnan (1993) and Hanafi (1998), have shown that on average Indonesian IPOs are 
underpriced. The current study extends the size of the sample, and uses different 
measures of the level of underpricing. Secondly, it examines the association between the 
degree of underpricing and accounting measures of total firm risk. The accounting risk 
measures used here serve as proxies for ex ante uncertainty. In particular, this study tests 
the predictive ability of the quality of (accounting) information disclosed in the issue 
prospectus. Thirdly, this study complements the findings of previous studies and expands 
the underpricing literature by examining this phenomenon in an emerging market. 
Loughran et al. (1994) suggest that short-run underpricing could be explained by 
6 
differences in the contractual mechanism governing the listing and the composition of 
firms going public. 
1.2 Motivations of the Study 
This study is motivated by suggestions made by some authors regarding the role 
of financial (accounting) variables in the valuation of company, in particular, in the case 
of IP0s. In addition to this, there have been a number of empirical studies suggesting the 
consistent and significant role of accounting numbers as a determinant of stock returns, 
known as fundamental analysis (see for example, Lev & Thiagarajan, 1993; Bernard, 
1995; Abarbanell & Bushee, 1998, among others). Also, recent theoretical explanation 
has shown that accounting numbers indeed have value properties in explaining the value 
of companies, i.e., its stocks (Ohlson, 1995; Feltham & Ohlson, 1995). Moreover, an 
investor could earn abnormal returns by performing fundamental analysis (See for 
example, Chan, Hamao, & Lakonishok, 1991; Lev & Thiagarajan, 1994; Setiono & 
Strong, 1998; Chung & Kim, 1994; Ballester & Livnat, 1997). Bauman (1996) provides a 
review of the recent interest in the role of fundamental analysis. 
The literature suggests that accounting numbers are potentially useful in the 
process of price determination of IPOs. Foster (1986) asserts that financial statement 
information is useful for the valuation of privately held companies, as he describes "there 
are many contexts in which estimates need to be placed on the value of companies that 
are not traded on organized markets, for example ... (b) when determining the price at 
which a company could go public ... " (p. 422). Berstein and Wild (1998) express their 
view by asserting "Reliable estimates of value enable us to make buy/sell/hold decisions 
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regarding securities, ... determine prices for public offerings of a company's securities" 
(p. 641). Berstein and Wild also suggest the use of financial fundamental ratios in 
estimating equity values of companies whose stocks are not traded in active markets. 
Supports for the potential use of accounting information in the price 
determination of IP0s are provided in many empirical studies. For example, Beaver et al. 
( 1970) argue that accounting data off er superior forecasts of the market determined risk 
measures and conclude " ... accounting risk measures can be applied to decision-settings 
where market determined risk measures are not available. Two such situations 
immediately come to mind: privately held firms 'going public' for the first time ... " (p. 
680). Lev (1989) challenges researchers by asking "What is the role of financial variables 
in unusual circumstances when market variables are nonexistent or are of limited 
usefulness. These include the role of financial variables in the valuation of new public 
firms (initial public offerings) ... " (p. 179, emphasise added). Finally, Nolland and Pavlik 
(1998) also call for accounting researchers to examine the value relevance of accounting 
numbers as the determinants of IPO offer price, as they question "How are market prices 
determined for private stock, and, in particular, what is the role of accounting numbers in 
the valuation estimate" (p. 94). 
In summary, there have been numerous suggestions about the potential use of 
accounting information in the price determination of IPO of common stocks. This study 
is expected to examine that suggestion. There is no previously study attempting to 
examine the role of accounting information in the pricing of IP0s in Indonesia. Close in 
spirit are Kim et al. (1995a) and Klein (1996) who provide evidence on the importance of 
accounting variables contained in the issue prospectus in the pricing of Korean and US 
IP0s, respectively. Other studies appear to not specifically examine the association 
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between accounting information and the degree of underpricing, although many of them 
have included accounting numbers in their models. 
1.3 Contributions of the Study 
This study makes contributions in the following aspects. First, it contributes to a 
better understanding of the underpricing phenomenon, particularly, in an emerging 
capital market. Second, this study examines the firms' specific factors, i.e. accounting 
measures of total firm risk, in relation to the systematic underpricing of IPOs. The 
findings of the study are expected to enable us to distinguish risky firms from less risky 
ones, which consequently can be used as a trading strategy in the IPO market. 
In addition, understanding the market price of newly issued shares is important 
for various parties, such as the issuers, underwriters, potential investors, market 
regulators, financial managers, and the like. In particular, understanding the factors that 
influence the level of underpricing is important for the issuers and prospective 
shareholders since underpricing results in a wealth transfer between these two parties. 
Further, studying Indonesian IPOs is important for the following reasons. First, 
there is no previous study examining the role of accounting information in Indonesian 
IPO pricing. Second, the Indonesian capital market has played an important role in 
supporting the Indonesian economy particularly in providing capital to finance its 
economic growth, as shown by a significant increase both in terms of the number of 
listed companies and their market capitalisation. Third, the market governing body, that 
is the Capital Market Supervisory Agency (Badan Pengawas Pasar Modal or Bapepam), 
has committed to regularly improve market regulations giving more confidence among 
market players and the listed companies as well as potential private companies (Ruru, 
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1994). Fourth, the regulatory body estimates that there are more than ten thousand firms 
eligible for listing at the stock market which could make the Indonesian stock market the 
largest in the region. These facts have shown how important is the role of the stock 
market in sustaining Indonesian economic development (Ruru, 1994, p.150). Thus, this 
study is expected to provide an understanding of the nature of the Indonesian capital 
market in which they could be used as reference for market regulators in developing 
market regulations. 
1.4 Dissertation Organisation 
The rest of this dissertation is organised as follows. Chapter Two outlines the 
institutional background of the Indonesian capital markets and the process of going 
public. Chapter Three presents a review of the relevant literature and provides the 
rationale for the use of accounting information as measures of total firm risk. Chapter 
Four describes the study's research methodology which covers the selection of the 
sample and the definition and measurement of the variables. The Chapter also provides 
the model used for the data analysis. Chapter Five contains the results of the study and 
the statistical analysis. Included in Chapter Five are the sensitivity analyses, discussions 
of the research findings, and the examination on the pricing of IPOs. Chapter Six 
summarises the findings, relates the conclusion to the objectives of the study, outlines the 
limitations of the study, and provides recommendations for future study. 
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CHAPTER2 
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
This chapter presents the institutional background of the Indonesian stock markets 
and the process of going public in Indonesia. Section 2.1 outlines briefly the historical 
development of the Indonesian stock markets, in particular the Jakarta stock exchange. 
Section 2.2 presents the process of going public in Indonesian stock markets. The process 
of going public consists of three stages: the pre-filing period, waiting period, and post-
effective period. The final section summarises the chapter. 
2.1 A Historical Perspective of the Jakarta Stock Exchange 
2.1.1 Early History 
The existence of a stock exchange in Indonesia can be traced back to the early 
1900s; a time when Indonesia was under Dutch rule. It was in 1912 that the first stock 
exchange was established in Batavia, the former name of the Indonesian capital Jakarta. 
The stock exchange was closed during the First World War and reopened in 1925 
operating alongside parallel burses in Surabaya, East Jawa, and in Semarang, Central 
Jawa. The stock exchanges were again closed during the Second World War, following 
Japanese occupation of the country in 1942. 
In 1952, seven years after the declaration of Indonesia's independence, the Jakarta 
stock exchange was reactivated with its main purpose of trading the pre-war issues of 
stocks and bonds of the Dutch corporations. The nationalisation of a large number of 
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Dutch corporations launched in 1956 had resulted in inactivity of the stock exchange. 
This continued up to the 1970s. 
2.1.2 The Reopening of the Stock Exchange 
It was in the early 1970s that the Indonesian government considered the need for a 
well-regulated stock exchange. The exchange is expected to accommodate an increased 
demand for capital to finance its growing economy during the economic boom as a result 
of oil price increase. In 1976 the government established the Capital Market Operations 
Board (Badan Pelaksana Pasar Modal, or Bapepam) with the main duty of supervising 
and managing the Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX) and the state owned national investment 
company, known as PT. Danareksa. 
The JSX first formally commenced operations in 1977, with the listing of the 
cement manufacturer PT. Semen Cibinong. Unfortunately, faced with regulatory 
constraints, only a few firms were sufficiently attracted to list their stocks on the JSX. 
Not surprisingly, up to 1988 (twelve years since its re-establishment) only 24 firms had 
listed on the stock exchange, with a daily trading activity averaging below US$ 50,000. 
The lack of interest of corporations in listing on the JSX forced the government to 
deregulate the stock exchange's rules. In the meantime, there was an increase in the 
demand for capital to finance Indonesia's growing economy, as shown by a growth in 
Gross Domestic Product of 7.4% and 7.3% for 1988 and I 989, respectively. The 
government's concern, at that time, was of how to mobilise funds kept by Indonesian 
households. The 1988 deregulation, and subsequent deregulation in 1989 introduced by 
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the government, have increased most of the stock market's activities, such as the number 
of firms and trading volumes. 
The significant increase in the number of firms trading on the stock market, and 
in the trading activities during 1989-1990, could be attributed to three factors. First, 
Bapepam has lifted its interference in share price formation in the new issue market. The 
first issue price is now fully determined by the parties involved in price quotation (the 
firm and the underwriter). Second, the maximum of four-percent price changes has been 
revoked, allowing the market to determine the price. Third, the government introduced 
two policies that have had a direct impact on the upswing of the market. These policies 
are (1) income from term deposits is no longer exempted from taxes and now is subject 
to 15% income tax, and (2) foreign investors are allowed to purchase up to 49 percent of 
the issued stocks. The government also permits private exchanges to be established, and 
allowed the establishment of over-the-counter (OTC) market or parallel bourse. The OTC 
was established in an attempt to provide more opportunity for small corporations not 
qualified for listing on the main board. The first private bourse in Surabaya (Surabaya 
Stock Exchange or SSE) was established in 1989. 
The widespread endorsements of these initial reforms has resulted in a surge in 
new company listings and share issues, an increase in new investment, and rapid growth 
in market capacity. However, the so-called 'tight money policy', imposed by the 
government in late 1990 to control the money supply was followed by an increase in 
interest rates, and resulted in a downturn of market activities. The JSX index fell 
significantly, from as high as 680 in 1990 to 380 in 1991. The number of new listings 
also decreased sharp I y, from 65 in 1990 to only 14 in 1991. 
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Realising that the market is so sensitive to new government regulations, the 
management of the JSX introduced various measures aiming at increasing responsibilities 
in various capital market operations. Such measures include the management of the JSX 
being divested from the Bapepam, allowing foreign investors to establish joint ventures, 
and also simplifying procedures for the listing of companies. During 1991 (and in 
subsequent years) there were some new rules introduced with the aim of refining and 
improving market efficiencies. 
2.1.3 Privatisation of JSX 
The other significant improvement of the capital market is the privatisation of the 
JSX, which commenced in December 1991 and was effectively in operation by July 
1992. The Bapepam was no longer the operation board of the capital market, but became 
the supervisory board, a role similar to the US' s Security and Exchange Commission. 
Since the privatisation, the JSX has introduced some positive changes into the market. 
Such changes include enhancing the efficiency, professionalism, public awareness, and 
international recognition of the JSX. To improve efficiency, the JSX has simplified the 
transaction system and, since early 1993, the transference of clearing and settlement 
activities has been managed by a new private clearing agency, PT. Kliring Deposit Efek 
Indonesia. A new rating agency was established, PT. Pemeringkat Efek Indonesia, with 
its main aim of improving the ability to rate the quality of stocks and bonds, which will 
also enhance the reputation of Indonesian capital market. 
The year 1993 was recognised as the second turning point of the market. During 
the year JSX recorded one of the best market performances among capital markets in the 
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world. The market index recorded a staggering increase of 113% and the market 
capitalisation tripled from the figure of the previous year. The strong and positive growth 
in 1993 resulted in an increase of firms making IP0s in 1994. The figure shows that 4 7 
IP0s entered the market a two and a-half fold increase over the figure for 1993 (See 
Table 2.1 for the descriptive statistics about the Jakarta Stock Exchange). 
The Indonesian stock market has taken a new step forward with the merger of the 
OTC and SSE in July 1995 and the introduction of the new Capital Market Law in late 
1995. The new Law, which took effect in 1996, was intended to provide a comprehensive 
legal foundation and opportunities for several instruments and media. The year 1995 also 
marked a new beginning for the JSX as it moved to a new and modem building, and 
introduced JATS (Jakarta Automatic Trading System). The introduction of JATS has 
resulted in significant market improvement, especially in terms of trading settlement. By 
the end of 1995, the number of listed firms had grown nearly ten-fold to reach 239 
compared to only 24 in 1988. 
The so-called "Asian Economic Crisis", which started in the middle of l 997, has 
hit the market severely. Just before the crisis, the market index stood at its highest ever 
level of 740. Following the crisis, it started to plummet and reached its lowest ever level 
since 1993 of 339 before recovering to 402 by the end of the year. The impact of the 
crisis was so severe that more than half of all listed firms recorded losses mainly due to 
currency depreciation in the following financial year (mid 1998). However, the market 
appeared to slowly recover from the crisis as indicated by a gain of just over 10%, in 
terms of the market index in 199 8 compared to 1997. Another direct impact of the 
economic crisis was that some companies were subjected to possible delisting due to 
consecutive losses for the previous two financial years. 
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Table 2.1 
Descriptive Statistics of the Jakarta Stock Exchange 
Year Listed New Market # New Shares New Funds Index 
Firms IPOs Cap. (tril.)3 Offered (mil.) Raised (bill.) 3 Closed 
1977 I 0 0.0 0.18 1.79 NA 
1978 I 0 0.0 0.18 1.79 NA 
1979 3 2 0.0 6.71 17.14 NA 
1980 6 3 0.0 7.53 16.50 NA 
1981 8 2 0.0 5.20 8.29 NA 
1982 14 6 0.0 19.89 45.87 NA 
1983 19 5 0.1 4.28 7.65 85 
1984 24 5 0.1 9.25 13.66 67 
1985 24 0 0.1 0 0 66 
1986 24 0 0.1 0 0 69 
1987 24 0 0.1 0 0 82 
1988 24 0 0.5 0 0 503 
1989 56 32 4.4 199.25 2,001.25 399 
1990 122 66 12.4 540.32 5,025.73 417 
1991 139 17 16.4 154.15 968.82 247 
1992 153 14 24.8 146.80 602.95 274 
1993 172 21 69.3 269.26 1,290.75 588 
1994 217 47 103.8 1,054.55 4,330.73 469 
1995 239 22 152.2 2,346.82 4,097.18 513 
1996 253 15 215.0 2,020.24 2,439.60 637 
1997 281 30 160.0 3,314.27 3,521.04 402 
1998 288 7 176.0 717.00 579.20 398 
TOTALb 287 293 10,815.7 24,968.30 
Data are sununarised from various sources. 
NA is not available. 
a The value is expressed in Indonesian Rupiah. 
b The differences in the number of listed firms and the number of total firm making IPOs are due to some 
firms being delisted from the exchange. 
2.2 The Process of Going Public 
An IPO is set up in a highly-regulated environment. The process for going public 
in the Indonesian capital market is principally similar to other capital markets. Following 
the market deregulation in 1987-1988, the Head of Bapepam issued a number of 
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regulations in anticipation of the need for a well-regulated market. The regulations that 
elaborate the general process required for firms wishing to make an IPO were arranged in 
the Head of Bapepam's Decree No. 1/1988 and No. 5/1989. The guidance on the form 
and content of prospectus was based on the Decree No. 23/ 1987. Both the President's 
Decree No. 53 of 1990 and the Ministry of Finance's Decree No. 1548 of 1990 
concerning the capital market were used as the guidance for ruling the market as well as 
some follow-up Decrees issued by the Head of Bapepam. The capital market law issued 
in 1995 (which took effect in 1996) was a replacement for the existing market rules. 
Table 2.2 shows the general listing requirements of common stock issued at the Jakarta 
Stock Exchange. 
The process of going public can be broadly divided into three stages, namely the 
preparation or pre-filing stage, the waiting period, and the post-effective stage. Before 
proceeding to the discussion of each of these stages, the importance of the underwriter is 
first discussed. 
2.2.1 The Role of Underwriter 
Perez (1984) suggests that there are at least five major services provided by the 
underwriter to a firm making an IPO. Such services include (1) negotiating the terms of 
the issue with the firm, including the issue price determination, (2) supervising and 
assisting in the preparation of the registration statement, (3) arranging for information 
meetings, known as the 'road show', (4) managing the public distribution, and (5) 
finalising statement and delivery of the securities on the closing day. This attests the 
importance of the role of underwriter for a successful offering. 
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Table 2.2 
Basic Listing Requirements of Common Stock Issues on the Jakarta Stock Exchange 
l. Bapepam declares that the registration statement becomes effective; 
2. The financial statement must be audited by a public accountant, registered at 
Bapepam with an unqualified opinion for the most recent financial year(s); 
3. Minimum shares to be offered are 1 million shares; 
4. Minimum number of shareholders is 200, each owning a minimum of 500 shares; 
5. The company has been established and in operation for at least three years. 
"Established" means the company has been founded during a fiscal year by virtue of 
approval by the Ministry of Justice. "In operation" means the company must satisfy 
one of the following criteria: 
a. Issued with a permanent license from the Investment Coordinating Board; 
b. Issued with an operating license from the Ministery of relevant business sectors; 
c. In accounting terms has posted income or loss from operations; 
d. In economic terms has earned revenues or posted expenses upon its operations. 
6. Has posted net earnings and operating profits during the past two fiscal years; 
7. The company must have a minimum asset of Rp 20 billion, minimum shareholders' 
equity of Rp 7.5 billion, minimum paid up capital of Rp 2 billion, and minimum 
market capitalisation after public offering of Rp 4 billion; 
9. The company must have board members with good reputation. 
Rp stands for Indonesian Rupiah, the official currency of Indonesia. 
Issuers of IPOs usually rely heavily on the expertise of the underwriter given the 
fact that it is the underwriter who knows the market best. Issuers may use higher quality 
underwriters to underwrite the issue. Underwriters with more experience in terms of the 
frequency of underwriting and market capitalisation, usually act as the lead underwriter, 
which is regarded as more prestigious and thus is associated with a better quality service. 
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The selection of the undeiwriter therefore appears to be a crucial decision that affects the 
success of an IPO. 
The undeiwriting agreement usually consists of two forms, 'best effort' and 'firm 
commitment'. In a best effort agreement, the underwriters have no obligation to take 
responsibility for the unsold shares: they act as the agent for selling the shares. In other 
words, the undeiwriters use their best effort to sell the shares. Under a firm commitment 
agreement, the undeiwriters assume full responsibility for the issue given they have 
agreed to purchase the shares at a determined price. In other words, it is the undeiwriter' s 
risk for taking any unsold shares. Thus, the risk faced by the issuers of unsold shares is 
greater in best effort than in firm commitment offering. The Indonesian authority 
recognises these two forms of IPO agreement, yet, so far, there appears to have been no 
best effort contract that has taken place in an Indonesian IPO. 
In underwriting the issue, the undeiwriter may form a syndicate of underwriters. 
A syndicate is usually undertaken in an attempt to reduce the litigation and distribution 
risk. Thus, the forming of syndicate will not only spread the risk of taking unsold shares, 
but also help in marketing and distributing the issue. 
2.2.2 The Preparation or Pre-filing Stage 
The preparation of going public may take three to six months or even longer. 
Once the management of a firm has decided to go public, they face a stressful and tiring 
ongoing effort. The firm's first task, after it has decided to go public, is to hire advising 
agents, such as undeiwriter(s), an auditor, and/or a legal adviser. 
The undeiwriter is usually chosen months before the IPO to ensure that it has had 
sufficient time to conduct a thorough investigation. The undeiwriter, in cooperation with 
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other advising agents, conducts a due diligence and in-depth investigation of the firm, 
preparing and writing the prospectus, and filing the necessary documents with the 
Bapepam. The due diligence and in-depth investigation are intended to ensure that all 
material information has been included. The firm and its underwriters are responsible for 
the truthfulness and completeness of the registration statement submitted to Bapepam 
(article 73, para 3 of 1995's CML). No statement about the proposed public offering can 
be made without clearance from the firm and the advising agents. Once all the documents 
are ready, the next step is filing the statement registration form and submitting to 
Bapepam. Table 2.3 outlines the procedures of filing the statement of registration for 
public offering of common stock in Indonesia. 
2.2.3 The Waiting Period 
There is a statutory forty-five day waiting period given to the firm after the 
registration has been filed with the Bapepam before the registration becomes effective. 
The forty-five day period is expected to give Bapepam sufficient time to conduct an 
administrative examination, and to allow information contained in the registration to be 
distributed to the interested parties. Article 74 of the 1995 CML describes, among other 
things, that the statement of registration becomes effective after the forty-five day waiting 
period, or an earlier date if declared effective by Bapepam unless: (1) Bapepam asks for 
amendments and/or additional information from the firm; or (2) the firm files an 
amendment to the registration statement, which means that the firm starts the waiting 
period over again. Registration statements cannot become effective until additional 
information or amendments are received. 
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No 
Table 2.3 
Procedures for Filing the Statement of Registration for a Public Offering of 
Common Stocks in Indonesian Stock Exchanges 
Description 
1 The company (issuer) must first file the Statement of Registration and other 
supporting document. 
2 If Bapepam does not require additional documents within 30 days from the filing of 
the registration, the Statement of Registration is declared complete and assessment 
will follow. 
3 If Bapepem requires the issuer to submit additional/supplementary information, the 
Statement of Registration is said to be refiled as at the issue date of the required 
information. 
4 The Statement of Registration becomes effective if either of the following 
conditions is satisfied: 
1. The passing of time: 
a. forty five days since the filing of the complete Statement of Registration, or 
b. forty five days since the last date of the submitted amendment or additional 
information required by Bapepam. 
2. Bapepam has declared the Statement of Registration as being effective. 
5 Prior to the commencement of the public offering, the following requirements must 
have been satisfied: 
a. The prospectus must have been publicly distributed. 
If the issuer intends to use mass media in a public offering, the short version 
prospectus must have been published at least in one of the national newspapers for a 
minimum of three days prior to the commencement of public offer. 
6 The public offer must be carried out in a minimum of three working days. 
7 The public off er is not allowed to exceed 180 days of the last audited financial 
report or 60 days since the Statement of Registration is declared effective. 
8 Rationing will be conducted if the demand for the shares exceeds the offer. 
9 Shares rationing must be finalised within six days of the completion of the offering 
period. 
10 The offered shares must have been registered with Bapepam within ninety days after 
the commencement of the offering period or thirty days after the closing of the 
offering period. 
The Table is summarised from the Head of Bapepam's Decree No. 44/PM/1991, Regulation No. IX.A.2. 
This Decree replaced the old Decrees on similar issues (011/PM/1987, 012/Pm/1987, 013/PM/1987, 
OI/PM/1988, and 05/PM/1989) 
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Once the registration statement becomes effective, the firm has to disseminate its 
prospectus to the public to allow potential investors to examine the firm and make 
necessary evaluations. It usually takes one week for the firm to produce and start 
distributing the issue prospectus, while the offering period varies from three to forty 
working days. The offering price is usually set up after the registration statement is 
declared effective and is printed clearly on the front page of the issue prospectus. It is 
uncommon to use a tender offer in determining the offering price in Indonesian IPOs. 
Article 78 of CML states clearly that the prospectus shall be prohibited from 
containing false information on material facts or from failing to publish truthful 
information on material facts required so that it does not provide misleading information. 
There are two forms of prospectus: (1) the short version, which is usually published in 
newspapers, and (2) the long version. Table 2.4 outlines the information that should be 
contained in a prospectus. As can be seen in the Table, a prospectus usually consists of 
nineteen sections. It starts with the cover page and ends with the list of the trust agents. If 
the firm uses newspapers to advertise the shorter version prospectus, the prospectus must 
be published in at least one newspaper having national distribution and issued at least 
three days before the commencement of the public off er. 
During the waiting period, any attempt to sell the stock is strictly prohibited. The 
public offering must be conducted over three working days, at least. 
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Table 2.4 
Type of Information Contained in a Prospectus* 
No Description 
1 Cover Page 
Effective date, offering periods, rationing date, listing date. 
N rune and address of the firm. 
Major business line of the firm. 
Name of Burse(s). 
Type of offering. 
Nominal value of share, offering price and number of shares being offered. 
Name of underwriter(s). 
Statement, if any, concerning major risk relating to the issue. 
Place and date of prospectus issuance. 
2 Prospectus summary 
Information specific to the firm: line of business and major risk factor(s) 
Ownership structure, before and after the offering, number of outstanding shares, if 
any, and number of shares to be outstanding, and description of ownership (those 
with ownership of 5% and more). 
3 Uses of Proceeds 
Statement of the purpose and use of the proceeds from the issue: either in the form 
of a description or breakdown of the intended use. 
4 Statement of Debt 
Description of debt owned by the firm as at the last financial report. 
5 Management's Analysis and Overview 
Analysis of the company business. 
Analysis of financial positions including any risk associated with currency 
fluctuation. 
Analysis of any material changes in company's financial position and operations. 
If required, forecast financial performance may also be included. 
6 Business risk 
Presented in order, based on the weight of the risk inherent in each of the aspects. 
Usually it is ranked as follows: competition, supply of materials, national or 
international regulations, and government policy. 
7 Information about the company 
Short history, significant changes in ownership structure, significant events related 
to past operating performance, brief description of company's facilities, relation to 
other companies, especially in terms of ownership. 
Composition of the members of the board of directors followed by a description of 
their position and expertise. 
Description of human resources, which covers details of the number of employees, 
position, education, foreign expatriates, and, if any, welfare facilities. 
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Table 2.4 (continued) 
8 Activities and Company Business Prospects 
Production and operations, which include a description and analysis of risk related 
to supply of materials, production capacity, products and services, marketing, and 
risk related to products. 
9 Description on Significant Financial Information 
Statement of whether the data are audited or not and whether the financial reports 
comply with the existing accounting regulations. 
Comparison of financial ratios with industry ratios. 
Financial information for the last five years or since the incorporation of the 
company. 
10 Equity 
Description of company's equity as in its last financial report. 
Chronological description of capital structure prior to the IPO date. 
Pro forma capital structure. 
11 Dividend Policy 
Information on company's dividend policy including the percentage range of cash 
dividend in the near future. 
12 Taxation 
Description of the tax system applied specifically to the firm. 
13 Underwriting Agreement 
Description of the underwriting agreement, such as type of underwriting, the 
amount shares being offered, and the methods used to determine the offer price. 
14 Capital Market Supporting Institutions. 
Name and address of trust agents, legal consultant, accountant, and valuer. 
15 Legal Consultant's Reports 
16 Financial Report 
Report of independent accountant. 
Financial reports of the last three fiscal years or since the incorporation of the 
company. The reports consist of balance sheets, income and loss statement, 
changes in retained earnings, cash flow statements, notes to the financial reports, 
and other significant information. 
17 Valuer's Reports, if any 
18 Requirements for Subscription of the Shares 
19 Management of the Distribution of the Prospectus 
*The type of information covered in this table is for a public offering of common stocks. Different contents 
are presented for debt offerings. Note also that not all prospectuses are structured identically and thus 
differences between prospectuses are apparently present. 
The Table is summarised from the Head of Bapepam's Decree No. 15/PM/1996, Regulation No. IX.C.2. 
This Decree replaces the old ones (23/PM/1991 and 23/PM/1987). 
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2.2.4 The Post-effective Period 
The firm's securities can only be sold when the registration statement has been 
declared effective. As soon as the registration becomes effective, the prohibition against 
selling the securities is lifted. The firm can then sell the securities to investors provided 
the investors have previously received a prospectus. The market price will be established 
once the initial purchasers of the IPO shares trade the shares in the secondary market. The 
firm is now entering its new environment as a public company. 
2.3 Chapter Summary 
This Chapter has discussed the institutional background of the Indonesian stock 
markets. The first section described the early history of Indonesian stock exchange 
followed by the latest development of the exchange. The process of going public, which 
consists of three stages, was then briefly presented in Section two. The next chapter 
provides a review of the literature. 
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CHAPTER3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter presents a review of the literature. The first section evaluates the 
importance of the issue prospectus in providing information for valuation of an IPO. 
Section two presents evidence about IPO underpricing, reviews the existing underpricing 
models, and explains why ex ante uncertainty is related to the extent of underpricing. The 
section also discusses the nature of ex ante uncertainty and its association with total firm 
risk. Section three provides arguments that accounting risk measures can be used as 
proxies for total firm risk. Section four outlines studies of IPOs, with reliance given to 
studies examining the cross-sectional variation of initial excess returns. Section five 
presents the study's research questions. The final section summaries the chapter. 
3.1 The Role of the Issue Prospectus in IPO Valuation 
It is mandatory for a firm wishing to issue common stocks through going public 
to provide a prospectus. The issuing firm uses the prospectus as one of the main legal 
means to convey information about the firm. The Indonesian capital market law (CML) 
asserts that a prospectus should provide information relevant for potential investors for 
their investment decision analysis, and that issuers are responsible for the information 
they give. It should contain information about, among other things, the firm, its business 
and prospects, and the latest financial positions (Refer to Table 2.3 for information 
contained in a prospectus). Thus, the issue prospectus is seen as a mechanism by which 
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prospective investors are provided with information useful for valuation purposes, 
although the available information may not capture all the required information. 
Unlike a seasoned offering where information about the firm is already available, 
in the case of an IPO very little information is available prior to the issuance of a 
prospectus as the firm is privately held. Since potential investors generally do not gather 
information in the periods prior to the offering, they may rely on accounting information 
about the past performance of the firm disclosed in the prospectus. As a large part of the 
information contained in the prospectus is financial accounting information, we may 
argue that this information represents a reliable source of information for valuing the 
issuing firm. 
Financial accounting information is believed to play an important role in IPO 
valuation. Perez (1984 ), Bloch (1986), Sutton and Benedetto (1988), and Buck (1990) 
present anecdotal evidence suggesting that underwriters conduct a careful comparison of 
various factors in determining the offer price of an IPO. These factors include some key 
financial ratios, current price-earnings ratios, and other key qualities of comparable firms 
trading in the market. This suggests that financial information available in the issuing 
firm prospectus is crucial and, because such information must comply with regulations 
required by stock market governing bodies, it must be regarded as accountable. 
Historical financial statement data may provide outside investors with a measure 
of the firm's success in initiating and managing operations. Empirical evidence shows 
support for the claim of the use of accounting information as a means of valuing an IPO. 
For example, Downes and Heinkel (1982) find that sales and earnings are highly 
significant in explaining the market value of a firm making an IPO. Also, there is 
evidence that additional accounting information, such as earnings forecasts, is perceived 
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to be a credible signal by market participants (Buckland & Davis, 1990; Clarkson, 
Dontoh, Richardson, & Sefcik, 1994; How, 1996). Kim et al (1995a) and Klein (1996) 
provide a direct test that accounting information contained in the prospectus is value 
relevant. 
Apart from financial information, the issuers of an IPO also reveal certain 
information that could be useful to the valuation by potential investors. This information 
could be certain actions and/or signals taken by the issuers which could be used to 
communicate and thus act as a means of conveying the firm's future prospects. These 
include, amongst others, the portion of ownership retained by the issuers, the investment 
bankers that underwrite the issue, the auditors that audit the issue, and the use of the 
proceeds of the issue. Thus, to be able to rationally justify the value of the issuing firm, 
potential investors must not only evaluate the observable information as disclosed in the 
prospectus, but must also interpret any direct actions or signals of the entrepreneurs. 
To summarise, the information available in the issuing firm's prospectus, 
particularly accounting information and certain signals taken by the issuers, appears to be 
useful for valuation of an IPO given no market price information available prior to the 
offering. The investment community has less ability to gather information on privately 
held firms because disclosure requirements are limited for these firms. This has resulted 
in market participants possessing little, if any, information about the IPO firms compared 
to information they possess about the publicly traded ones. Thus, it seems that reliance on 
the issue prospectus is a must. Accordingly, potential investors in the IPO market must 
utilise information available in the issue prospectus to make their investment decision 
about the IPO in order to make a proper judgement. 
28 
3.2 Underpricing, Theories about IPO Underpricing, and Ex Ante Uncertainty 
3.2.1 Underpricing in an IPO 
There has been mounting evidence indicating that IPOs of common stocks are on 
average underpriced. That is, the initial aftermarket price is significantly higher than the 
offer price. Underpricing is a widespread phenomenon and is apparent in almost every 
capital market in the world. 1 (See the summary of underpricing phenomenon in various 
countries in Ibbotson et al., 1988, 1994; Loughran et al., 1994; Ibbotson & Ritter, 1995; 
Ritter, 1998). Some theories have been advanced to explain the phenomenon. However, 
researchers still consider that the issue is a mystery, which requires further investigation. 
Table 3.1 presents comparative evidence about IP0s of common stock and 
underpricing in various countries. The Table complements the existing summaries 
presented in various papers. As can be seen from the Table, underpricing is a widespread 
phenomenon, regardless of the measures used to calculate the degree of underpricing. 
Panel A presents evidence of underpricing among developed markets, while Panel B 
presents evidence for emerging markets. The magnitudes of IPO initial returns vary 
across countries with more underpricing experienced in emerging markets and less 
underpricing in more established markets. For example, among developed markets, the 
highest initial return of 51.9% is found in Japan, while for emerging markets the highest 
initial return of 289.2% is found in China. Some factors were found to have an impact on 
the level of underpricing differences between countries, which include institutional 
arrangements, offering price determination methods, and selling methods (Loughran et 
al., 1994). 
1 Apart from the underpricing phenomenon, an IPO of common stock is also associated with hot issue 
markets and the extent of underpricing phenomenon and long-run under-performance (Ritter, 1991 ). 
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Table 3.1 
Comparative Evidence about IPOs of Common Stock and Underpricing 
in Various Countries" 
Country Study Sample Sample Initial 
Period Size Return %3 
Panel A: Research in /PO Underpricing in Developed Markets 
Australia Finn & Higham (1988) 1966-1978 93 29.2 
How & Low (1993) 1979-1989 523 16.4 
How et al. ( 1995) 1980-1990 340 19.7 
How (1996) 1979-1990 266 21.8 
Belgium Rogiers et al. (1993l 1984-1990 28 10.1 
Canada Jog & Riding ( 1987) 1971-1983 100 9.3 
Jog & Srivastava (1995) 1971-1992 254 7.4 
Clarkson & Merkley ( 1994) 1984-1987 180 6.4 
Finland Keloharju (1993) 1984-1992 91 14.4 
France Husson & Jacquillat ( 1989) 1983-1986 131 4.2 
Germany Steib & Mohan (1997) 1988-1994 103 6.8 
Italy Cherubini & Ratti (1992l 1985-1991 75 27.1 
Japan Kaneko & Pettway (1994) 1989-1993 37 12.0 
Pettway & Kaneko (1996) 1981-1993 147 49.5 
Dawson & Hiraki ( 1985) 1979-1984 106 51.9 
New Zealand Firth (1997) 1979-1987 143 25.9 
Singapore Dawson (1987) 1978-1983 39 39.4 
Koh and Walter (1989) 1973-1987 66 27.0 
Lee et al. ( 1996b) 1987-1992 132 31.4 
Spain Rahnema et al. (1992l 1985-1990 71 35.0 
Sweden Rydqvist (1993) 1970-1991 251 34.l 
Switzerland Kunz & Aggarwal ( 1994) 1983-1989 42 35.8 
The Netherlands Wessels ( 1989) 1982-1991 72 7.2 
U.K. Davis & Yeomans (1976) 1965-1971 174 8.5 
Buckland et al. (198 l) 1965-1975 297 9.7 
Levis (l 993) 1980-1988 712 14.3 
Jenkinson ( 1990) 1985-1989 227 11.9 
U.S.A. Louge (1973) 1965-1969 250 41.7 
Ibbotson (1974) 1960-1969 120 11.4 
Ibbotson & Jaffe (1975) 1960-1970 2,650 16.8 
Reilly (1977) 1972-1975 486 10.9 
Ritter ( 1984) 1960-1982 5,126 18.8 
Ritter (1987) 1977-1982 664 14.8 
Chalk & Peavy (1987) 1975-1982 649 21.7 
Miller & Reilly ( 1987) 1982-1983 510 9.9 
Carter & Manaster ( 1990) 1979-1983 501 16.8 
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Table 3.1. (Continued) 
Country Study Sample Sample Initial 
Period Size Return %a 
Panel A (continued) 
U.S.A. Ibbotson, Ritter & Rydqvist ( 1994) 1960-1992 10,626 15.3 
Ibbotson, Sindelar & Ritter (1994) 1975-1984 2,439 20.7 
Jain & IGni (1994) 1976-1988 682 7.25 
Clarkson ( 1994) 1976-1985 420 13.9 
Chishty et al. ( 1996) 1979-1984 599 10.8 
Panel B: Researches in /PO Underpricing in Emerging Markets 
Brazil Aggarwal et al. ( 199 3) 1979-1990 62 78.5 
Chile Aggarwal et al. (1993) 1982-1990 19 16.3 
China Mok & Hui (1998) 1990-1993 87c 289.2 
1990-1993 22d 26.0 
Hong Kong McGuinness ( 1992) 1980-1990 80 17.6 
McGuinness (1993) 1980-1990 92 16.6 
Dawson (1987) 1978-1983 21 13.8 
Greece Kazantzis & Thomas (1996) 1987-1994 129 50.9 
India Krishnamurti & Kumar (1994)b 1992-1993 98 35.3 
Korea Dhatt et al. (1993) 1980-1990 347 78.l 
IGm et al. (1993) 1988-1990 177 57.5 
Malaysia Dawson (1987) 1978-1983 21 166.6 
Paudyal et al. ( 1998) 1984-1995 18e 104.7 
1984-1995 77 53.7 
Mexico Aggarwal et al. (1993) 1987-1990 37 33.0 
Portugal Alpalhao (1992)' - - 54.0 
Taiwan Chen (1992) 1971-1990 168 45.0 
Huang (1999) 1971-1995 311 42.6 
Thailand Wethyavivom & Koo-smith (1991) 1988-1989 32 58.1 
x The classification between developed and emerging markets is based on the International Finance 
Corporation ( 1997). 
1 The measure of initial returns varies considerably across studies and is generally defined as the percentage 
increase from the offer price to a closing price shortly after the start of the trading. The length of the 
period used in these studies varies considerably. Some take the difference between the first closing price 
and the offer price, some adjust for market returns, and also some take the average price and/or the first 
week closing price. The initial returns reported here do not consider the measures used to calculate the 
initial returns. 
b This indicates a study quoted either from Loughran et al. (1994), or Ibbotson and Ritter (1995) or Ritter 
(1998). 
cThis sample is for type A-share offering. 
d This sample is for type 8-share offering. 
e This sample represents the privatisation IPOs. 
r As cited in Kazantzis and Thomas ( 1996). 
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Research in IPOs has also been conducted in Indonesia. Table 3.2 presents a 
summary of Indonesian studies on IPO underpricing. The Table shows that Indonesian 
IPOs are also on average underpriced. Evidence from seven studies examining the 
underpricing phenomenon in Indonesia suggests the magnitudes of underpricing vary 
from 2.9 to 20.9%. The studies cover the periods from 1989 (the early booming of the 
market) to 1998. An early study by Husnan (1991) showed that IPO firms going public in 
1989 (24 firms) and 1990 (22 firms) were significantly underpriced by 20.9% and 2.9%, 
respectively, at the end of their first week of trading. Rizka (1995) found that a sample of 
114 IPO firms going public in 1989 to 1994 was subject to a significant underpricing of 
12.5%. A more recent study, examining 106 firms representing seven industries, also 
showed a significant, and even greater, underpricing of 15. l % in the first day of trading 
(Hanafi, 1998). 
Table 3.2 
Indonesian Studies on IPO Underpricing 
Study Sample Period 
Husnan (1991) 1989 
1990 
Husnan ( 1994) 1989 
1992 
Hanafi & Husnan ( 1991) 1990 
Rizka ( 1995) 1989-1994 
Indrajati ( 1997) 1994-1997 
Hanafi (1998) 1989-1994 
Sautma ( 1998) 1992-1996 
a Based on market adjusted one week returns. 
b Based on the first day closing price. 
c Based on market adjusted first day returns. 
NR stands for not reported. 
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Sample Initial 
Size Return% 
22 20.ga 
22 2.93 
24 19.83 
10 9.88 
38 2.93 
114 12.5b 
65 4.4b 
106 15.lc 
153 IO.lb 
Stand. Dev. 
of Return% 
NR 
NR 
NR 
NR 
NR 
22.93 
8.74 
NR 
17.23 
The evidence of significant underpricing reported in Table 3.2 interestingly shows 
that Indonesian IPOs experience a lower level of underpricing compared to IPOs in other 
emerging capital markets as reported in Table 3.1. This lower level of underpricing raises 
some questions. For ex.ample, are there any specific factors inherent in the issuing firms 
that affect the extent of underpricing in the Indonesian IPO market, or is this lower level 
of underpricing attributable to the Indonesian market regulation constraints or 
institutional arrangements? The current study is expected to provide answers to these 
questions. In addition, the figures on the standard deviation, which is almost double the 
figure of mean values, may require further examination. 
3.2.2 Explanation for Underpricing of an IPO 
The finding of systematic underpricing in the IPOs of common stocks has led to 
the development of theoretical models designed to explain this phenomenon. These 
models, among others, include the information asymmetry hypothesis (Baron, 1982; 
Rock, 1986; Beatty & Ritter, 1986), the signalling hypothesis (Grinblatt & Hwang, 1989; 
Allen & Faulhaber, 1989; Welch, 1989), the litigation or lawsuit avoidance hypothesis 
(Tinic, 1988; Hughes & Thakor, 1992), and the reputation effect hypothesis (Titman & 
Trueman, 1986; Beatty, 1989; Balvers, McDonald & Miller, 1988). Each of these 
theories is briefly reviewed next (Some writers have presented the theories in more detail. 
See for ex.ample Anderson et al., 1995 and Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 1996). Note also 
that different writers term each of the theories differently. 
Baron (1982) develops a theory, known as the investment banker monopsony 
power hypothesis or principal agent hypothesis, arguing that underpricing exists as a 
result of information asymmetry between issuers and underwriters. Baron assumes that 
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the underwriters possess better information about the demand from the market than the 
issuers do. Issuers, as the principal, must compensate the underwriters, as the agent, for 
their superior information. Baron argues that the more uncertain the value of the issuing 
firm the greater is the asymmetry of information between issuers and underwriters. This 
makes the service provided by the underwriters more valuable, resulting in the 
underwriters demanding greater discounts as the risk of the issue increases. 
One testable implication of Baron's model is that underwriting firms who want to 
go public will experience lower underpricing given that they do not have asymmetry 
problems. Empirical evidence, however, does not strongly support Baron's model. 
Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989) examine the initial return behaviour of investment 
bank IP0s. In this self-marketed IPO, which is arguably no information asymmetry, an 
investment bank. promoted and distributed its own shares, Muscarella and Vetsuypens 
found that these IP0s underprice their shares by as much as other IP0s of similar size. 
Rock (1986) develops a model of underpricing equilibrium by assuming that 
there is asymmetric information between investors. Rock's model is known as the 
adverse selection or winner's curse hypothesis. In this model, the issuing firm, 
investment bankers, and investors are assumed to be uncertain about the true value of the 
issue. This is termed as ex ante uncertainty. However, by incurring certain costs some 
investors became informed about the true value of the issue. Those investors who are 
assumed to possess perfect or superior information are termed "informed investors", 
while those who have less or no information advantages are termed "uninformed 
investors". Informed investors will only subscribe when an issue is underpriced and will 
avoid subscribing to an issue they expect to be overpriced whereas uninformed investors 
will subscribe to all issues because they don't know which issues are going to be 
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underpriced or overpriced. As a result, uninformed investors will be allocated all of the 
least desirable shares and they will be allocated a fraction of the most desirable shares. 
Uninformed investors face a winner's curse, that is, they receive all the shares they 
demand because the informed investors don't want them. To compensate uninformed 
investors for their expected loss on subscription to new issues and to make them stay in 
the market, the issue must be on average underpriced. Beatty and Ritter (1986), Koh and 
Walter (1989), Levis (1990), Keloharju (1993), and Lee et al. (1996b) empirically 
support Rock's winner's curse model. However, McGuinness (1993) does not find 
support for Rock's model in Hong Kong IP0s. 
Beatty and Ritter (1986) extend Rock's model. Beatty and Ritter argue that there 
is a positive relation between the degree of uncertainty over the issuing firm's share value 
and the extent of underpricing. (Note that share value is measured in terms of the 
distribution of its value). Given that there is more uncertainty about the value of the 
issuing firm, indicated by more widely dispersed value, it is more important to know the 
probabilities of getting good rather than bad shares since bad shares become even worse. 
Thus, for more highly speculative offerings, the adverse selection becomes a more 
serious problem. In other words, as the winner's curse problem intensifies, the 
uninformed investors will submit the order to purchase the offer if the issue is 
underpriced, on average, which in tum increases the ex ante uncertainty of the issue.2 
2 Beatty and Ritter (1986) provide an intuitive illustration to support their argument. They contend that an 
investor who decides to gather information is in a similar position to investing a call option on an IPO. 
He/she will exercise if the true price exceeds the strike price (i.e., the offering price). As the value of this 
option increases in the extent of uncertainty, there will be more investors who are willing to become 
informed. As the winner's curse intensifies and more investors are getting informed, there is a greater need 
that the issue must be underpriced to compensate their information acquisition. 
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The implication of the Rock model and its extension by Beatty and Ritter ( 1986) 
is that the underpricing of new issues is related to the extent of ex ante uncertainty 
concerning the value of the issue. This suggests that the greater the number of investors 
who are willing to become informed, the greater will be the winner's curse problem faced 
by the uninformed investors. Thus, ex ante uncertainty and the level of underpricing 
should be positively correlated. Ritter (1984) and Beatty and Ritter (1986) empirically 
support this proposition. Ritter finds that there is a positive relation between two proxies 
for risk measures, sales and age, and the degree of underpricing. Beatty and Ritter use 
two proxies for ex ante uncertainty, the number of uses of proceeds listed in the 
prospectus and the issue size, and find that the degree of underpricing is positively related 
to the selected proxies. These findings confirm their prediction that the greater the ex 
ante uncertainty the greater the degree of underpricing.3 
Tinic (1988) proposes the litigation or lawsuit avoidance hypothesis. Tinic argues 
that the risk of legal liabilities and potential damages to the underwriters' reputation are 
related to the performance of due diligence examinations of the IPO. He hypothesises that 
underpricing serves as a means of reducing insurance against any possible damages, that 
is, investors' lawsuit risks. Tinic provides support for his theory, but Drake and 
Vetsuypens (1993) and Jenkinson (1990), among others, do not find evidence that 
underpricing is necessary in order to avoid legal liability for misstatement in the IPO 
prospectus. 
3 Other proxies for ex ante uncertainty known to be positively related to the degree of underpricing, among 
others, are the standard deviation of early daily aftermarket returns (Ritter, 1984), daily trade volume in 
early aftermarket (Miller & Reilly, 1987), the inclusion of earnings forecasts (Clarkson & Merkley, 1994; 
How, 1996), and the implicit role of bank lending and/or credit relationships (James & Wier, 1990; Slovin 
& Young, 1990; Garfinkel, 1993; Hedge & Miller, 1996). 
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Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) and Allen and Faulhaber (1989) advance the 
signalling hypothesis proposed initially by Leland and Pyle (1977). Leland and Pyle 
argue that the level of ownership held by the initial owners reflects the quality of an 
issue. The intuition behind this hypothesis is that issuers are willing to sell their shares at 
a discount (i.e., at a lower price than actual value) upon the expectation that investors 
will justify the firm as having a high quality project. The theory assumes that the issuers 
have a valuable project and they intend to demonstrate it via the level of shares they 
retain. As holding higher ownership is risky and since issuers are risk averse, discounting 
the offer price is necessary to demonstrate the worth of the signal, shown by a. which is 
the proportion of the shares retained by the issuers, although it is costly. Empirical 
evidence, however, provides mixed results. For example, while Hedge and Miller (1996) 
and Lee et al. (1996b) find negative and significant relationships between the level of 
ownership retention and the degree of underpricing, Keasy and Short ( 1992) and Lee et 
al. ( 1996a) find a significant positive relationship. 
Welch (1989) also develops a theory based on the signalling approach. Welch's 
theory follows the dynamic issue strategy in which an unseasoned offering will be 
followed immediately by a seasoned offering. Welch argues that a high quality IPO firm 
is willing to underprice the issue upon the expectation that they can conduct a second 
issue with a better price. Welch finds that about one-third of IPO firms covered in his 
study made a seasoned offering within the next three years, a finding that would be 
supportive of his model. Other studies, however, find no support of Welch's proposition. 
Garfinkel ( 1993 ), Michaely and Shaw (1993 ), and Jain (1995) do not find that initial 
returns and subsequent offering are related. 
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Titman and Trueman (1986), followed by Balvers et al. (1988) and Beatty (1989), 
present the reputation effect hypothesis. Titman and Trueman, argue that issuers will hire 
more prestigious auditors to credibly signal the quality of the firm. Larger firms and less 
risky firms tend to hire prestigious auditors in an attempt to show their low risk 
characteristics to the market and thus avoid greater underpricing. Titman and Trueman 
assert that their model of auditor quality can be extended to the quality of underwriter. 
Carter and Manaster ( 1990), borrowing Titman and Trueman's concepts, develop a 
testable model in which an offering firm signals its quality via its choice of an 
underwriter's quality. Empirical evidence shows that the degree of underpricing is 
negatively related to the quality of the auditors (Balvers et al., 1988; Affleck-Graves et 
al., 1993, among others) and is negatively related to the quality of the underwriters 
(Johnson & Miller, 1988; Carter & Manaster, 1990; How et al., 1994, among others). 
McGuinnes (1993), however, does not find evidence that either the quality of auditor or 
underwriter is negatively related to initial excess returns in Hong Kong IPOs. 
Apart from the above models, Klein and Leffler (1981) and Johnson and Miller 
(1988) propose the certification hypothesis, Chalk and Peavy (1987) and Finn and 
Higham ( 1988) focus on the institutional nature of the IPO bidding process, Welch 
(1992) advocates the cascades hypothesis, and Ruud (1993) advances the stabilisation or 
price support hypothesis. Ibbotson and Ritter (1995) provide a review for each of these 
hypotheses as well as other hypotheses. 
The existing underpricing equilibrium models come to similar implications that 
the degree of underpricing is positively related to the extent of uncertainty about the 
value of the IPO, a proposition that is generally confirmed in most empirical research. 
However, Anderson et al. (1995) pointed out that there is one potential problem arising 
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from testing the IPO underpricing models. That is the problem of selecting a 
representative proxy. Because asymmetric information is not directly observable, 
researchers must infer certain observable proxy variables that closely represent the 
assumptions of the underlying models.4 The implication of this problem is that 
researchers must carefully select the appropriate proxies for ex ante uncertainty so he/she 
can test the model more precisely. Yet, empirical evidence showed that this is not an easy 
task, which obviously has provided mixed results amongst several studies. 
3.2.3 Ex Ante Uncertainty and Total Firm Risk 
It has been shown that there are a number of models directed to explain the 
underpricing equilibrium. Each of the models comes to a similar implication that the 
extent of underpricing is positively related to ex ante uncertainty. That is, the greater the 
ex ante uncertainty surrounding the IPO the greater is the level of underpricing of the 
issue. Because ex ante uncertainty is explicitly unobservable, researchers must use 
proxies. The current study argues, as shown later, that accounting measures of total firm 
risk can be used as proxies for ex ante uncertainty and therefore they could explain the 
extent of underpricing. This section will discuss the nature of ex ante uncertainty 
followed by the interaction between total firm risk and ex ante uncertainty. 
Ex ante uncertainty is defined as the variance of the distribution of initial returns 
of an IPO, that is the uncertainty about its aftermarket price (Beatty, 1989). In this case, 
ex ante uncertainty is a pre-trading concept and disappears once the market price is 
4 Anderson et al. (1996) identify two dissimilar paths of efforts that attempt to test the underpricing 
theories. The first path attempts to seek proxy variables that best represent the model. Thus, the success of 
the test depends on the success in selecting the proxies. The second path avoids the use of proxy variables 
and restricts the analysis of the observable magnitudes indicated by the models. Anderson et al. note that 
there is little, if any, effort testing the latter path. 
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known. The central issue for investors in IPO markets is how to reduce ex ante 
uncertainty. The uncertainty of the aftermarket prices makes investors use their 
knowledge to predict the distribution of aftermarket prices. Individual investors, 
however, have difficulties in aggregating information into a single price due to 
differences in their weights given to each item of information. As each potential investor 
possesses different knowledge and information acquisition on a particular IPO, there will 
be a disparity in their ability to estimate the distribution of aftermarket prices, which 
could lead to a greater variance of the distribution of aftermarket prices. Thus, if the 
variance of the distribution of aftermarket prices increases, the ex ante uncertainty of the 
IPO will also increase indicating a positive relationship between them. 
Ex ante uncertainty is different from total firm risk (total risk, hereafter). Note 
that total risk is the variance of aftermarket returns and it contains systematic and 
unsystematic components. Unlike total risk or systematic risk, ex ante uncertainty is not a 
temporal concept. This means that ex ante uncertainty does not reflect the expected 
variability of return over time instead it reflects the variance of the distribution of 
possible aftermarket prices. Unlike the situation with the already traded stocks where the 
trading strategies merely involve a change when new information becomes available, in 
an IPO setting investors do not know all the exact information they need to value the 
offered stocks. Investors in the IPO market must incorporate a large amount of 
information, given there is no clear direction on how the market aggregates the 
information. Thus, investors in the IPO market are faced with greater uncertainty 
compared to those in the already traded stocks. Hence, it can be argued that total risk and 
ex ante uncertainty can independently exist. 
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Total risk and ex ante uncertainty, however, may correlate with each other when 
there is different interpretation of financial accounting information among investors. This 
interpretation difference results in perception differences among investors about the 
probability of receiving future cash flows based on their assessment of financial 
accounting information.5 Such differences occur when each investor interprets the 
available financial accounting information differently resulting in different probabilities 
of their expectations about future cash flows (See the detail in Beaver, 1986). Thus, there 
is heterogenous belief among investors. This is in line with the winners' curse 
explanation, which requires both uncertainty about the true value of the IPO and potential 
investors who are heterogeneously informed about that value. Thus, each investor would 
interpret and weight the firm's available financial statements differently. 
Recall that total risk is defined as the variance of aftermarket returns. Returns are 
defined as a function of price, while price itself is dependent on the estimation of future 
cash flows. This relationship can be expressed as if(Ri) = f [if(Pi)] = f { if[E(CF,)]}, 
where R is the return, P is price, and CF is cash flow, all in period i. This equation 
implies that the variability of future cash flows determines the variability of stock prices 
which in tum determines the variability of stock returns. This means that the greater the 
variance of the firm's stock price the greater will be the variance of returns. This suggests 
that the variance of returns is sensitive to the changes in a firm's stock price. Thus, as a 
firm's cash flow sensitivity determines the variability of its stock prices we can argue that 
total risk is also sensitive to the variability of expected future cash flows. 
5 This assumption is important because if investors have homogenous beliefs, they will have similar risk 
perception, which is almost impossible in the real world. 
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In other words, the variability of the distribution of expected future cash flows 
detennines total risk. 
Like total finn risk, ex ante uncertainty is also sensitive to the variability of 
expected future cash flows. Recall that investors must predict the distribution of 
aftennarket prices by aggregating all possible sets of infonnation. Unlike investors in 
previously traded stocks, investors in the IPO market must estimate the aftennarket price 
before the trading of the IPO begins. It is more difficult for investors in the IPO market to 
estimate the distribution of aftennarket price given that there is no price infonnation prior 
to the listing. This could lead to a greater variance in investors' estimation of the 
distribution of expected future cash flows. Thus, when the variance of the distribution of 
expected future cash flows is more uncertain, individual investors will face greater 
uncertainty about the aftennarket prices resulting in higher ex ante uncertainty. Similarly, 
it is easier for individual investors to estimate the aftennarket p1ice when there is a low 
variability in his/her expectation about the distribution of future cash flows resulting in 
lower ex ante uncertainty. Thus, ex ante uncertainty is clearly dependent on the 
variability of investors' estimation on expected future cash flows. In other words, the 
variability of the distribution of expected future cash flows detennines ex ante 
uncertainty. 
To summarise, it is now clear that either ex ante uncertainty or total risk depends 
on the expectation of future cash flows, although the estimation about future cash flows 
between them is somewhat different. Since either total risk or ex ante uncertainty relies 
on the estimation of expected future cash flows, we can argue that a positive correlation 
might exist between them. Accordingly, total risk could be used as an appropriate proxy 
for ex ante uncertainty. The question now is "can accounting numbers be used as proxy 
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for total risk and accordingly as the proxy for ex ante uncertainty?". The next section will 
discuss this possibility. 
3.3 Accounting Risk Measures as Proxies for Total Firm Risk 
It has been argued that total risk and ex ante uncertainty have a positive 
correlation. As this study investigates the association between accounting measures of 
total risk and the magnitudes of underpricing, it is necessary to identify accounting risk 
measures that can be used as proxies for total risk and thus ex ante uncertainty. But, 
before doing so, I will discuss the role of accounting information in the business 
enterprise, particularly in the case of corporate valuation, and follow this by asserting that 
accounting information can proxy total risk. 
The Statement uf Financial Accounting Concept (SFAC) No. 1 of Accounting 
Principles Board (1978, p. 5) posits that the primary objective of accounting is to provide 
information useful for investment decision-making. Thus, accounting information per se 
is aimed at understanding the performance of a company, which later can be used to 
make rational judgments for any investment decision-making. The SFAC No. 1 (p. 5-8) 
also postulates that accounting information can be useful in changing or refining the 
beliefs and expectations of individual investors or interested parties since accounting data 
measures the economic fundamentals of a company (reporting entity). Beaver (1986) also 
asserts that accounting data could alter the beliefs of individuals regarding their 
perception of the performance of the companies. 
The accounting literature suggests that one of the major roles of accounting is to 
provide information on the structure and functional behaviour in performance evaluation 
of a business corporation that is useful for all types of users. For example, empirical 
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studies have shown that accounting information is used to predict bankruptcy, determine 
bond rating, and evaluate equity risk (See the review in Watts & Zimmerman, 1986; 
White et al., 1998). In addition, accounting information has also been used in the 
performance evaluation of corporate contracts. For example, DeAngelo ( 1990) asserts 
that accounting information plays a crucial role in the equity valuation of a buy-out offer. 
This suggests that accounting information has been widely used in corporate valuation. 
Furthermore, Kaplan (1978) and Watts and Zimmerman (1986), in a review of the 
information content of financial accounting numbers, conclude that accounting numbers 
do have information content and are useful in determining stock returns. Kaplan asserts 
that there are two important roles of accounting data: they affect the unexpected security 
returns and they affect the riskiness of a security. Brennan (1995) also suggests that 
accounting information is considered as value relevant for determining stock prices. 
Thus, at this stage, it appears that the usefulness of accounting information in 
determining the riskiness of a security (and thus the corporation) has been confirmed 
theoretically and empirically. Next, I will present further empirical research giving 
support to the notion that accounting information is useful for corporate valuation. 
Following Ball and Brown's (1968) seminal paper that finds a significant 
association between earnings and returns, there has been a long debate concerning the 
relative role of accounting variables for stock price valuation. Among those who appear 
to be pessimistic is Lev ( 1989), arguing that, although there is a statistically significant 
relationship between earnings and returns, the explanatory power is still low, indicating a 
lack of economic significance. Lev's comment has challenged accounting researchers. 
Equipped with refined research designs, accounting researchers have further provided 
evidence that some accounting variables, taken from the firm's financial statements, are 
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value relevant and could be used to predict stock prices (See for example, Ou & 
Penmann, 1989; Ou, 1990; Holthausen & Larker, 1992; Lev & Thiagarajan, 1993; Chung 
& Kim, 1994; Ballester & Livnat, 1997; Setiono & Strong, 1998).6 This line of research 
is known as fundamental analysis research. Fundamental analysis involves the 
determination of the value of securities with particular reliance on accounting 
information. 
Attempts to further refine the possible relation between accounting numbers and 
the value of a firm are proposed by Ohlson (1995) and Feltham and Ohlson (1995). 
Ohlson and Feltham and Ohlson argue, theoretically, that basic accounting variables, 
such as earnings, return on equity, and book values could be used to express firm value 
and thus are relevant for stock price valuation. Bernard (1995), who empirically supports 
the model, has acknowl~lged it as being the breakthrough in fundamental analysis 
research. This theoretical analysis appears to underpin the notion that some accounting 
variables are value relevant and accordingly are regarded as important factors for 
determining the true value of a firm and, thus, the riskiness of the firm. Bauman ( 1996), 
based on a review of fundamental analysis research in accounting, concludes that 
financial statements contain information useful for prediction of firm value. Ryan (1997) 
also advocates a similar conclusion. 
To summarise, it is clear that accounting information is value relevant for 
securities price determination. Thus, given that there is support for the usefulness of 
6 Black, Chavis, and Elmendorf ( 1997) find strong evidence of the usefulness of financial statement 
information in explaining future profitability for emerging-growth firms. Note that as one of the basic 
characteristics of IPO firms is as growing company, Black's et al. findings could be representative and be 
generalised to IPO firms. Amir and Lev ( 1996) find that accounting information has little, if any, relevance 
in stock price prediction in their study of wireless communications industry. Amir and Lev, however, point 
out that their study is based on a single type of industry that could not be generalised to other types of 
industries. 
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accounting information as a risk determinant in corporate valuation, it is therefore 
necessary to identify which accounting information is persistently related to risk. 
The first empirical study examining the relationship between accounting 
information and total and systematic risk would be Beaver et al ( 1970). Unlike previous 
studies, which suggest that beta is the appropriate measure for determining the riskiness 
of a security, Beaver et al. posit that accounting information also has value relevance 
given that the accounting system generates information that could be considered as a 
measure of risk. They further argue that accounting risk measures can be employed as 
surrogates for total variability of returns that reflect either the systematic or individual 
risk components. As accounting information can reflect a firm's risk, it is reasonable to 
use them as surrogates for firms' systematic risk. 
Beaver et al. (1970) run regressions between market determined systematic risk 
and selected accounting risk measures. Beaver et al. find that their selected accounting 
measures of risk, which include dividend pay-out ratio, assets growth, financial leverage, 
liquidity, assets size, earning variability, and earnings covariability, are related to the 
market-based risk measure. They conclude that accounting numbers provide superior 
forecasts of the market determined risk measure, giving support for the potential 
usefulness of accounting data to investors. Beaver et al. go on to assert that accounting 
information implicitly supplies assistance for risk assessment. Following Beaver et al., 
Eskew (1979) and Dhingra (1982) find that their selected accounting measures have 
superior ability in predicting systematic risk. 
Other studies have focused on the examination of single or certain accounting 
variables. Lev (1974) finds that there is an association between total risk and operating 
leverage. Ben-Zion and Shalit (1975) also find that firm size, financial leverage, and the 
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dividend record determine systematic equity risk. Hamada (1969) and Brealey and Myers 
(1996) assert that financial leverage is related to security returns because the introduction 
of new debt may cause investors to believe that the firm is more risky leading them to ask 
for higher returns. Foster (1986) and Christie (1982) support this proposition. Further, 
Christie posits that the variance of equity returns is a function of financial leverage. 
Beaver and Manegold (1975) show that accounting measures of systematic risk appear to 
be only one of the explanatory factors determining systematic risk. Belkaoui (1978) 
reported that selected accounting ratios are related to the systematic risk of common 
stocks. Elgers ( 1980) however reports that accounting risk measures do not have ability 
to predict market based systematic risk. 
Other studies also document an association between market risk measures and 
accounting risk measures, which include financial leverage, size, and growth (Rosenberg 
& McKibben, 1973; Thompson, 1976). Ryan (1997), in a survey of research relating 
accounting numbers to systematic equity risk, concludes that the variables that 
consistently relate to systematic equity risk are earnings variability, sources of operating 
risk, financial leverage, and operating leverage. 
Based on extensive survey literature, Myers (1977) identifies four accounting 
measures that are related to the measures of market systematic risk (beta). They are the 
covariance of earnings, earnings variability, financial leverage, and growth (p. 60-64). In 
addition, Myers asserts that size is also a measure of total risk, i.e. large firms will have 
lower total risk. Myers also notes that the theory predicting that large firms will have 
lower systematic risk is not rigorously developed (p. 52). However, this notion is 
empirically supported by Barry and Brown ( 1984 ), among others. 
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As argued earlier, given that accounting risk measures can proxy for total firm 
risk and given also that systematic risk and total risk are correlated, accounting risk 
measures that are related to systematic risk must also relate to unsystematic risk. Thus, it 
can be argued that accounting variables, in particular accounting risk measures, are 
potential determinants for the riskiness of a security, and thus a company. 
In addition to this, it appears that financial analysts in various countries regard 
accounting information as potentially useful in explaining the systematic risk of common 
stocks. This evidence is found in the US (Farrelly et al., 1985), New Zealand (Mear & 
Firth, 1988), Japan (Ferris et al., 1989; Hall, Hamao, & Harris, 1994), the UK (Arnold 
and Moizer, 1984; Capstaff, 1991, 1992), and Hong Kong (Selva, 1995). Interestingly, 
Japanese investors do not hl!avily rely on accounting infonnation, particularly earnings 
reports, in assessing the riskiness of certain common stocks (Ferris et al., 1989). 
The Indonesi:m studies also indicate that some accounting variables are 
significantly related to systematic risk. Tandelilin (1997a, 1997b) examines the 
association between some accounting variables and the systematic risk of common stocks 
of Indonesian public firms. He finds six variables, namely long-term debt to total assets, 
net worth to total assets, the quick ratio, current asset to total assets, firm total assets, and 
net profit margin, are significantly related to the systematic risk of common stocks. Other 
studies also find significant relationships between selected accounting ratios and stock 
prices or stock returns (Purwantoro, 1997; Muharyani, 1998; Prawirohartono, 1998). This 
empirical finding appears to confirm that accounting information is regarded as value 
relevant to determine the riskiness of Indonesian securities and thus corporations. 
In addition to the above findings, there is a suggestion that a number of selected 
financial ratios based on the published financial statements of Indonesian public firms 
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can adequately be used to predict future earnings (Machfoedz, 1994 ). This finding, 
ceteris paribus, shows that certain accounting variables are informative for investors in 
the Indonesian capital market and are useful for the valuation of a security suggesting that 
the systematic risk of Indonesian public corporations is related to financial accounting 
information. 
Despite evidence that accounting numbers are related to the systematic risk of 
common stock, Harianto and Sudomo (1998) reported that, during the early market boom 
of 1989, investors' decisions to buy and sell was not affected by the available 
information. Instead, a speculative, or nafve, behaviour seems to drive investors' 
decisions (p.322). However, a later report suggests that accounting information is taken 
into consideration in investors' buy and sell decisions (p.314). This later evidence 
suggests that accounting information is useful for the valuation of a security. 
In summary, it has been shown that accounting information is a potential 
determinant of the riskiness of a corporation. Among accounting numbers that have 
consistently been related to company risk are financial leverage, operating leverage, 
company size, earnings or profitability ratios, and growth. The evidence suggests that 
earlier studies investigating the relationship between accounting risk measures and total 
or systematic risk have been mostly based on intuition and are supported by empirical 
evidence. However, recent theoretical development and empirical evidence has shown 
that accounting numbers are related to market measures of risk (Ohlson, 1995; Feltham & 
Ohlson, 1995; Bernard, 1995). Recent empirical studies have also provided evidence that 
investors could earn abnormal returns by performing fundamental analysis (See for 
example, Chan et al., 1991; Lev & Thiagarajan, 1994; Chung & Kim, 1994; Ballester & 
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Li vnat, 1997; Setiono & Strong, 1998). Thus, the association between accounting risk 
measures and market measures of risk has been theoretically and empirically supported. 
Recall that the IPO literature has suggested that accounting numbers, such as 
earnings, sales, and book value, are useful in the pricing and valuation of an IPO (Perez, 
1984; Bloch, 1986; Sutton & Benedetto, 1988; Buck, 1990; Benninga & Sarig, 1997). 
Ryan (1997) notes that in the absence of ex post measures of risk, such as in the case of 
IPO, the firm's risk is estimated through the use of (mostly current) accounting variables. 
This asserts the potential role of accounting information in the risk estimation of an IPO. 
In addition to this, Beaver et al. (1970), Foster (1986), Lev (1989), Berstein and Wild 
(1998), and Noland and Pelvik (1998) also suggest a possible use of accounting 
information for the valuation of privately held firms wishing to go public. 
Outside investors who do not actively engage in a firm's corporate governance 
may rely on the issuing firm's financial statements, as in its prospectus, to value their 
claims because accounting data potentially reflects issuers' proprietary business 
information. However, the accuracy of accounting information, in particular in the case 
of an IPO, may be subject to the issuers' incentive to bias the numbers in their best 
interest. 7 This problem eventually could be reduced by the existing accounting 
regulations that restrict the issuers' ability to distort financial data. Auditor's verification 
could also increase the reliability of financial statements (Healy & Palepu, 1993; Palepu, 
Bernard, & Healy, 1996; White et al., 1998). As financial information available in the 
issuing firm prospectus must be audited, this makes such information an accountable and 
reliable source with relevance in reflecting the firm's financial position. 
7 Accounting information of the US IP0s of common stocks has been subject to earnings manipulation (See 
for example, Friedlan, 1994; Magnan & Cormier, 1997). Aharony, Lin, and Loeb (1993), however, do not 
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In summary, it is likely that investors, who are engaged in the new issue market, 
use their judgment by utilising information available in the issue prospectus. The absence 
of publicly available information about the issuing firms makes information available in 
the issue prospectus as one potential information source for the valuation of the IPO. The 
available accounting information, along with the signals shown by the issuers, may serve 
as a key factor in determining the price and thus the value of an IPO. It also appears that 
certain accounting variables can be used as a proxy for total firm risk and thus can be 
used as a surrogate for ex ante uncertainty which accordingly are appropriate for testing 
the IP0s underpricing equilibrium. 
In addition, it has also been known that the level of accuracy of accounting 
information has been a primary concern for investors in the IPO market. Beatty ( 1989) 
provides strong evidence on the notion that investors in the IPO market regard an IPO 
with more precise information, as it is audited by prestigious auditors, of being related to 
lower ex ante uncertainty. That is, accounting information is useful in assessment of ex 
ante uncertainty. Beatty argues that high quality auditors provide more precise audit 
services allowing market participants to make more precise estimates of the distribution 
of firm value. Beatty shows that IPOs audited by high quality auditors experience lower 
underpricing. Beatty's claim is supported by Affleck-Graves et al. (1993), How et al. 
(1994), and How (1996), amongst others. Michaely and Shaw (1998) also find that the 
selection of underwriter and auditor is related to the financial performance of the IPO 
firms. Thus, other things being equal, more prestigious auditors could reduce the ex ante 
uncertainty. This implies that there is an inverse relation between more precise 
support this evidence. There is also no evidence that issuers of lndonesian lPOs manage their accounting 
earnings in the periods prior to the offering (Gumanti, 1996). 
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accounting information and ex ante uncertainty suggesting that accounting numbers 
supply information about the ex ante uncertainty on an IPO. 
Thus, certain accounting numbers appear to be useful for the assessment of the 
riskiness of a security. Finally, because total risk is positively correlated to ex ante 
uncertainty, and given accounting risk measures are potential proxies for total firm risk, 
we can argue that they can be used as proxies for ex ante uncertainty. 
3.4 Empirical Research on IPOs 
The puzzling phenomenon of the IPO has attracted significant interest among 
researchers. Even, two well-recognised journals have provided special issues on IP0s 
(Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 34, Issue 2, 1993; Financial Management, Spring 
1993 ). Most of the existing research on IPOs examines the cross-sectional differences of 
initial returns and most are designed to test the theories of underpricing. Other IPO 
studies include the valuation study, the short and long run performance of IPOs study, 
and the IPO pricing study. In this section, I will briefly provide reviews of these studies. 
Early studies on the valuation of IPOs generally depart from the signalling 
hypothesis proposed by Leland and Pyle ( 1977). Leland and Pyle argue that issuers of 
IPO use the level of ownership they retained as a signal of firm value. Issuers with higher 
quality future projects are likely to sell a lower portion of their ownership. Some studies 
provide strong support for this hypothesis. For example, Downes and Heinke! (1982) test 
Leland and Pyle's model and conclude that firm value is an increasing function of the 
issuers' ownership retention. Clarkson, Dontoh, Richardson, and Sefcik (1991) document 
a significant association between ownership retention and the value of IP0s. 
Furthermore, How and Low (1993), using Australian IPOs, find support for such an 
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association. However, other studies do not find a significant relationship between the 
level of ownership retention and the value of the IP0s (Krinsky & Rotenberg, 1989a, 
1989b). Thus, the empirical results concerning the association between ownership 
retention and the value of IP0s are still inconclusive. 
Other IPO valuation studies extend their examination beyond the ownership 
retention with inclusions of other explanatory variables, such us auditor and underwriter 
prestige and some accounting variables contained in the prospectus. These studies have 
generally supported the notion that the accounting variables are partly or jointly 
associated with the value of IPOs (Downes & Heinkel, 1982; Ritter, 1984; Krinsky & 
Rotenberg, 1989a, 1989b; Clarkson et al., 1991; Keasey & McGuinness, 1992~ 
McGuinness, 1993; How & Low, 1993; Kim et al., 1994). Most of the studies find that 
the value of the IP0s is significantly related to the level of ownership retention, the level 
of debt, the quality of underwriters or investment bankers, the propose.cl use of the 
proceeds, firm size, excess returns, and accounting earnings. This evidence indicates that 
some characteristics of IPO firms are value relevant. 
Research examining the short and long run performance of IPOs generally finds 
that, despite the positive initial returns in the short-term, IPO firms tend to perform 
poorly in the long-term. Ritter (1991), for example, finds that, in the time span of three 
years, IPO firms covered in his study generated returns of 34.47% compared to 
companies of similar size and industry of 61.86%. The IPO long-term underperformance 
has been documented in many other countries, such as the United Kingdom, Germany, 
and Finland. However, this is not always the case for some other countries. For example, 
Kim et al. ( 1995b) report that Korean IPO firms perform better in the long-term (See 
Loughran et al., 1994, for evidence in other countries). Other studies also examine the 
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determinants of IPO long-run under-performance (See for example, Lee et al., 1996; Kim 
et al., 1995b ). 
Included in the research examining the pricing of IPOs are Kim et al. ( 1995a) and 
Klein (l 996). Kim et al. and Klein are probably the only studies that explicitly provide 
direct tests of the pricing of IP0s using information available in the issue prospectus, 
with reliance more on accounting information. Unlike most IPO studies that use the level 
of underpricing as the dependent variable, these two studies use the offer price and 
perform regressions using various variables obtained from the prospectus. Kim et al. and 
Klein conclude that the IPO firms' financial variables significantly affect the market price 
of the issue. This finding supports the notion suggested in the literature that accounting 
information is used as input into the pricing of an IPO. 
Most recent IPO studies pay attention more to the first phenomenon of the IPO 
market; that is, significant underpricing. These studies examine the cross-sectional 
variance of the level of underpricing and most are designed to test existing underpricing 
theories. Anderson et al. (1995) and Jenkinson and Ljungqvist ( 1996) provide 
comprehensive summaries of studies testing the underpricing equilibrium theories. 
Nolland and Palvik ( 1998) also provide a summary and review of the underpricing 
theories and related studies. 
Recall that the underpricing theories suggest that the magnitude of underpricing is 
positively related to the ex ante uncertainty surrounding the issue. Taking the raw or 
adjusted initial returns as the dependent variable and regressing over various proxies for 
ex ante uncertainty, the studies find that some proxies are consistently related to the 
degree of underpricing. Table 3.3 provides a summary of studies relating initial IPO 
returns and various proxies for ex ante uncertainty. 
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Table 3.3 
Summary of Studies Relating IPO Initial Returns to Various Proxies for Ex Ante Uncertainty 
Study Offer Firm Owner- Firm er of uw Auditor Bank or Debt Profit PA/fA-a Country Sample Size 
Size Sizea ship Age Return Quality Quality Debt Equity (Years) 
Level Dumm~ Ratiob 
Logue '73 (-)6 Mixed us 250 (65-69) 
Ritter '87 . (+)b us 664 (77-82) 
Johnson & Miller '88 (+t us 962 (81-83) 
Beatty '89 (+l (-t us 2,215 (75-84) 
Buckland & Davies '90 (+)d (-t UK 331 (80-85) 
Carter & Manaster '90 (-) (-) (-l us 501 (79-83) 
Levis '90 (+t (+t British 135(85-88) 
Wethyavivom & Koo- (-t (-) (+) Thailand 32 (88-89) 
Smith '90 
James & Wier '90 (-) (-) (-l (-) (-l us 549 (80-83) 
Slovin & Young '90 Mixed (-) (-/ us 316 (80-84) 
Keasy & Short '92 (+/ (-/ (+)* (+) (-/ UK 222 (84-88) 
McGuinnes '93 (+) Hong Kong 92 (80-90) 
Garfinkel '93 (-l (-)b (-) (-/ (-) us 549 (80-83) 
Affleck-Graves et al. '93 (-l (+l (-) (-/ (+)b (-t (-l us 1,078 (83-87) 
Kim at al. '93 (-l Mixed Mixed Mixed (+l Korea 177 (88-90) 
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Table 3.3 (continued) 
Study Offer Firm Owner Firm er of uw Auditor Bank or Debt Profitc PA/TA3 Country Sample Size 
Size Sizea 
-ship Age Return Quality Quality Debt Equity (Years) 
Level Dummy Ratiob 
Clarkson '94 (-) (-) (-t (+) (+) us 420 (76-85) 
How et al. '94 (-)b (-) (+)o (-) Mixed Australia 340 (80-90) 
Michaely & Shaw '94 (+)b (+)b us 947 (84-88) 
Clarkson & Merkley '94 (-t (-) (+)b (-) (-) Canada 180 (84-87) 
How '96 (-)b (-)b (+)b (-) Mixed (+t (-) Australia 200 (79-90) 
Lee et al. '96a (-) (+) (+t (-t (-) Australia 266 (76-89) 
Lee et al. '96b (-t (-t (+) Singapore 128 (73-92) 
Chisty et al. '96 Mixed Mixed (+t (+)b (-) us 599 (79-84) 
Pettway & Kaneko '96 (-) (-) Japan 147 (81-93) 
Hedge & Miller '96 (+t (-)b (-) (+)b (-t (-)b (-)b us 890 (81-85) 
Hameed & Lim '98 (-) (+) Singapore 53 (93-95) 
Booth & Chua'96 (-) us 2,151 (77-88) 
Michaely & Shaw '98 (-) (-)b (-) (-) us 809 (84-88) 
Paudyal et al. '98 (+) (+t (+t Malaysia 79 (84-95) 
\ C. d denote coefficients being significantly different from zero at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
8 The measure of firm size usually takes two forms: total assets or sales. 
bThere are various measures for debt to equity ratio. 
c Profit is measured either as the level of profits or profitability ratios. 
d P Alf A is the ratio of plant assets to total assets. 
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Table 3.3 shows some studies that involve accounting variables in their 
regressions. These accounting variables include the level of debt (financial leverage), 
profit level or profitability, operating leverage measured as the ratio of plant assets to 
total assets, and IPO or firm size. The findings are mixed. The other variables most 
frequently tested are issue size, aftermarket standard deviation, the length of operating 
history, the prestige of underwriter and auditor, and ownership retention. The issue size 
appears to be consistently and negatively related to the degree of underpricing, apart from 
studies by Hedge and Miller (1996) and Buckland and Davies (1990). Aftermarket 
standard deviation is also consistently positively related to the degree of underpricing. 
The results for other variables seem to be mixed. 
There is a study that examines the cross-sectional variance of the level 0f 
underpricing in Indonesian IPOs. Hanafi (1998) tests the relation between the level of 
underpricing and three variables namely market capitalisation, security return variability, 
and industry type. A sample of 106 IPO firms from seven industries are examined. Hanafi 
finds that none of these three variables are significantly related to level of underpricing. 
Hanafi also considers the effect of the price earning ratio restriction imposed by the 
market regulator on IPO initial excess return and finds that such a restriction does not 
have a significant effect. Hanafi goes on to suggest a possible examination of other 
factors that could be related to the magnitudes of underpricing. 
Another study using 119 Indonesian IPOs having initial return greater than zero 
reveals that the extent of underpricing is negatively related to the offer price and year in 
operation and positively related to the standard deviation of aftermarket return (Sautma, 
1998). Although these two studies do not run a regression analysis, the reported findings, 
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in particular Sautma, appear to suggest that the extent of underpricing in Indonesian IPOs 
is somewhat predictable. Thus, the level of significant positive initial return in Indonesian 
IPO must have been related to certain factors. It is the main purpose of the current study 
to examine the factors that explain the variation of initial return in Indonesian IPOs. 
In summary, empirical studies have supported the notion that certain accounting 
information available in the issue prospectus could explain the cross-sectional variation 
of the level of underpricing. This accounting information is also value relevant to the 
IPO. The evidence also indicates that the actions and/or signals selected by the 
entrepreneurs can be used to determine the initial returns of the IPOs. This apparently 
suggests that the initial return or underpricing phenomenon is explainable. 
3.5 Research Question 
The review in the previous sections can be summarised into three conclusions. 
First, information disclosed in the prospectus is regarded as a potential source for 
assessment about the value of the issuing firm. In particular, some financial accounting 
information has been used, explicitly or implicitly, as input into the pricing of an IPO. 
Second, there is evidence that IPOs are on average underpriced. The theories proposed to 
explain the underpricing phenomenon have generated similar implications that the more 
uncertain the value of the issuing firms (i.e., the greater the ex ante uncertainty) the 
greater the degree of underpricing. Third, there are a number of potential proxies for ex 
ante uncertainty that have been used to explain the extent of IPO underpricing. Among 
the identified proxies, as found in previous studies accounting risk measures appear to be 
useful as potential proxies for total firm risk and thus ex ante uncertainty, which would 
make it reasonable to examine them as potential determinants of IPOs initial returns. 
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The above conclusions lead to the following research question "Is there an 
association between accounting variables perceived to be a measure of total firm risk 
and the magnitudes of underpricing of new issues of common stocks? If so, what factors 
best determine the underpricing of new issues of common stocks?". 
3.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has provided a review of the literature. Information disclosed in the 
prospectus is a potential source for determination about the value of an IPO. The 
literature suggests that some financial accounting information is value relevant to the IPO 
and it has empirically been used as an input into the pricing of an IPO. 
Empirical studies have found that new issues of unseasoned stock (IPO) are on 
average underpriced. The level of this positive initial return varies across countries, with 
a lower level tending to be found in more developed markets, and a higher level in less 
developed markets. Some theoretical explanations have been advanced to unravel this 
puzzling phenomenon. The proposed theories generally come to a similar conclusion that 
the more uncertain the value of the issuing firms (i.e., the greater the ex ante uncertainty) 
the greater the degree of underpricing. 
The current study argues that the total firm risk and the ex ante uncertainty of an 
IPO are positively correlated, which suggests that total firm risk is a potential proxy for 
ex ante uncertainty. The review has shown that accounting risk measures are value 
relevant to the value of an IPO. Given that accounting risk measures are potential proxies 
for total firm risk, and as total firm risk is positively related to the ex ante uncertainty of 
an IPO, it is reasonable to argue that accounting risk measures are also potential 
indicators of ex ante uncertainty. It is the specific purpose of this study to examine the 
59 
association between accounting risk measures and the degree of underpricing in the 
context of a sample of Indonesian companies. 
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CHAPTER4 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This Chapter presents the study' s research methodology and is organised as 
follows. Section 4.1 describes the selection of the sample and the source and type of the 
data used in the study. The section also describes the classification of the sample based 
on both the years of offering and industry. The definition and measurement of each of the 
variables and hypothesis formulation are presented in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 presents 
the regression model. The final section summarises the chapter. 
4.1 Sample Selection 
The sample firms used in this study must satisfy the following basic criteria: 
1. The firms must have made an initial public offering during the period 1989-1997. 
2. The firms must have an initial public offering on the Jakarta Stock Exchange. 
3. The firms must not be in the real estate, property, and construction industry (Code 61-
69), the finance and insurance industry (Code 81-89), or an investment company 
(Code 98). 
4. The prospectus of the IPO firms must be available. 
5. The firms must not be in an early development stage. 
6. The firms must have sufficient trading liquidity after the issue. 
The first criterion is applied for two reasons. First, the terminal year of 1989 is 
imposed because prior to that year the market was not highly regulated and also the 
market experienced low trading liquidity and high volatility. A number of market 
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deregulations that were introduced in late 1988 have attracted firms to list on the stock 
exchange with the first issue occurring in July 1989. Limiting the sample of IPO firms to 
1997 should minimise the effects of the economic crisis experienced by Indonesia, which 
started in the second half of 1997. Only firms listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange are 
considered in this study. Most of the firms making an IPO tend to list on the JSX and/or 
the Surabaya Stock Exchange (SSE). However, some firms list only on the SSE. In 
addition, the SSE has its own Composite Index, which tends to be lower than that of the 
JSX, and is also considered to have lower liquidity than the JSX. 
The third criterion is employed to obtain a relatively homogenous sample with 
respect to the state of financial accounting reports. Firms in the real estate, property, and 
construction industry, the finance and insurance industry, and firms classified as 
investment companies have significant differences compared to other industries, which in 
turn may affect their valuation. Such differences include the structure of capital used in 
their operation. In addition to this, since the main issue analysed in this study is the role 
of accounting information in determining the magnitudes of underpricing, differences in 
capital structure and also components of balance sheet and profit and loss statements may 
affect the calculation and definition of variables. 
The fourth criterion is necessary since a large part of the data needed for analysis 
comes from the issue prospectuses. Firms in the early development stage are excluded 
because they have unusual sales or assets increases which may affect the performance 
recorded in financial reports. Each firm must have trading records following their issue 
and the trading records must be sufficient. This criterion is imposed to allow for 
sufficient calculation of immediate aftermarket performance as this study examines 
market response soon after the issue. An IPO firm with low liquidity in its aftermarket 
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may reflect a low market response and thus could alleviate factors used in the valuation 
of the issue. 
Three sources of data are used for this study: the JSX, the Bisnis Indonesia daily 
newspaper, and the Datastream Database. Most of the data was collected from the JSX. 
All of the issue prospectuses were gathered from the Capital Market Reference Centre 
(Pusat lnformasi Pasar Modal or PRPM), a joint unit of the JSX and Bapepam with its 
main role being a source of public information. PRPM stores and files, amongst other 
items, firms' prospectuses of new issues or rights offering, daily stock prices, and firm 
financial reports. However, daily stock price data is not always in the files, especially for 
data for 1989, 1990, 1991, and 1992. The JSX also provides data electronically, which is 
available for purchase. Yet, this form of database is only available for the period since 
September 1992. Although some of the data for daily stock prices prior to 1992 is 
available, external parties are not allowed to access it because of missing data problems. 
To obtain the data for daily stock prices for the period prior to 1993, I asked one of the 
JSX employees to assist me in collecting them after giving a list of the firms. However, 
there is still some missing data. 
To overcome the difficulties in data collection, in particular in relation to stock 
price data for periods prior to 1993, I utilised the library of Bisnis Indonesia, a daily 
newspaper which concentrates on business news. The filing and data collection of Bisnis 
Indonesia are comprehensive and easy to access. Bisnis Indonesia publishes JSX daily 
stock price movements covering, amongst other things, the opening price, highest and 
lowest price, and the closing price as well as the volume of transactions. The Bisnis 
Indonesia newspaper started publication of stock price movements both for the JSX and 
the SSE in August 1989. 
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The third source of data used in this study is the Datastream Database. This 
database provides information on daily stock prices, the volume of transactions, high and 
low bid prices for the world's major capital markets, including the JSX. The data on 
stock prices are expressed in adjusted and unadjusted currencies. For example, for the 
JSX the stock price is expressed in either Indonesian Rupiah or in other major currencies 
(i.e., British pounds). The database includes data for Indonesian public firms from 2 
April 1990 onward. However, some differences are present regarding the starting date of 
IPOs compared to the data from the JSX and Bisnis Indonesia. This problem is overcome 
by consistently using the JSX data, as it is the main source of the data of this study. 
In order to maintain consistency, the data collected from the JSX and Bisnis 
Indonesia is crosschecked with the data from the Datastream database. The Datastream 
database has one potential limitation, in that it does not adjust for Indonesian public 
holidays in their database, as Indonesian has some differences in its public holidays 
compared to most western countries. In this case, I carefully examined such possible 
differences and adjusted where appropriate. 
Table 4.1 shows the number of firms remaining after each of the selection criteria 
was applied. As can be seen in Table 4.1, two hundred and sixty four firms made an IPO 
during the periods of 1989-1997 (Criterion 1 ). Of these 264 firms, 86 are those that come 
from the real estate, property, and construction industries (JSX Code 61-69: 26 firms), 
the finance and insurance industries (JSX Code 81-89: 54 firms), and investment 
companies (JSX Code 98: 6 firms). These IPO firms were excluded from the sample 
(Criterion 2). Four IPO firms were dropped, as their prospectuses were unavailable 
(Criterion 3). Furthermore, six IPO firms were eliminated from the sample, as they were 
classified as being in an early development stage (Criterion 4). Two IPO firms were 
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dropped due to no trading records being available for them (Criterion 5). These two firms 
were those that went public in July and August 1989. Efforts have been directed to obtain 
the early trading records of these two firms, yet neither the JSX nor Bisnis Indonesia 
newspapers have the records. Finally, thirteen more IPO firms were excluded from the 
sample, as they suffered from insufficient trading liquidity, i.e., they have recorded little, 
if any, change of hands of the issue stocks in their early stage of public offering (Criterion 
6). Furthermore, the prices of these stocks were relatively unchanged leading to low price 
variability. 
Table 4.1 
Sample Selection Procedure 
Description 
Number of firms that made an IPO during the period 1989-1997 
Firms having JSX Code of 61-69, 81-89, and 98 
Firms not in JSX Code of 61-69, 81-89, and 98 
Firms with prospectuses which are unavailable 
Firms with available prospectuses 
Firms in early development stage 
Firms not in early development stage 
Firms where the trading records are unavailable 
Firms with available trading records 
Firms having a lack of trading liquidity in the aftermarket 
Potential sample 
Firms which made a dual listing (3) and made a major restructuring ( 1) 
Final sample 
#ofIPO 
264 
- 86 
178 
=---1 
174 
:_Q 
168 
=--1 
166 
=-11 
153 
=---1 
149 
JSX Code 61-69 are for firms in the real estate, property, and construction industry, Code 81-89 are for 
finance and insurance industry, and Code 98 is for investment company. 
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The application of the six criteria reduces to a total of one hundred and fifty three 
IPO firms available for examination. However, closer examination reveals that three 
firms had made a double listing, that is, they not only listed on the Indonesian domestic 
stock exchanges, but they also listed on foreign stock exchanges, such as the New York 
Stock Exchange or the London Stock Exchange. These three IPO firms were then 
excluded from the sample, as this factor might create significantly different impacts on 
the demands for the issue and therefore the price. All of this could affect the initial 
motive of investors in the secondary market. One more firm was dropped from the 
sample as it had made a major restructuring in the period just before going public. Such 
action has generated unusual effects on its financial structure and operating performance. 
Finally, one hundred and forty nine IPO firms satisfied the requirement criteria and have 
been determined as the final sample. 
Table 4.2 shows the industry classifications and the year of IPO for the sample 
firms. The sample firms examined in this study represent 56.43% of the total number of 
IPOs made by firms during the period of analysis of 1989-1997. Most of the sample firms 
come from manufacturing industries (Code 31-39, 41-49, and 51-59) which provided 109 
firms or 73.15% of the total number of IPO firms examined. These industries involve 
basic industries and chemicals (48 firms), miscellaneous industries (35 firms), and 
consumer goods industries (26 firms). As noted by Husnan (1994), this study also finds 
that the most frequent IPOs' occurred during the market boom of 1989-1990, with a 
second boom occurring in 1993-1994. The boom periods (1989, 1990, 1993, and 1994) 
account for almost two-thirds of the sample firms (64.44%) or 96 firms of the total. 
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Table 4.2 
Industry Classification and Year of IPO of the Sample Firms 
Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Total % 
Code 
11-19 2 l 2 5 3.36 
21-29 l l l l l 5 3.36 
31-39 5 15 5 2 4 8 2 4 3 48 32.21 
41-49 2 11 3 4 7 4 I I 2 35 23.49 
51-59 l 6 2 l 3 6 2 4 l 26 17.45 
71-79 I 2 l l 5 3.36 
91-99* 4 5 l 3 3 4 3 l l 25 16.77 
Total 12 41 11 10 17 26 10 13 9 149 100.00 
% 8.05 27.52 7.38 6.71 11.41 17.45 6.71 8.72 6.04 100.0 
Total 32 66 17 14 21 47 22 15 30 264 
IPOs 
%of 37.50 62.12 64.71 71.43 80.95 55.32 45.45 86.67 30.00 56.43 
total 
l l-19 for agriculture, 21-29 for mining, 31-39 for basic industry and chemical, 41-49 for miscellaneous 
industry, 51-59 for consumer goods industry, 71-79 for infrastructure, utility, and transportation, and 91-99 
for trade and services. 
* This excludes companies in the 98 code, which are investment companies. 
4.2 Measurement of Variables and Hypotheses Formulation 
4.2.1 Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable used in this study is the level of underpricing. This is 
measured as the difference between the first day's closing price and the offering price 
divided by the offering price. Other measures of the dependent variable examined are the 
returns measured in one week, one month, and one year. The adjusted return is measured 
as the difference between the initial excess return for each IPO and the market returns on 
the date of the listing of the IPO. 
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The first hypothesis to be tested is one that relates to the widely found evidence of 
systematic underpricing of initial share offers. Previous studies of fudonesian IPOs have 
documented significant underpricing (Husnan, 1991, 1994; Hanafi, 1998; among others). 
Thus, in relation to the existing evidence of significant underpricing, the following 
hypothesis is tested (stated in alternative form). 
H1 Initial public offerings of common stocks are underpriced, on average. 
This study also uses other measures of initial returns. Previous studies have used 
these different measures of initial returns (See for example, How, 1994 ). The following 
are the various measures of the degree of initial returns used in this study. The use of 
other measures is intended to examine whether the level of initial return is sensitive to the 
model used to calculate it. 
1. UP; = (P;.t - P;.orr) / P;.orr. 
2. MAUP; = [(P;.t- P;.0 rr) / P;.orr] - [(Ml;t - MI;.t-1) I MI;.t-'1· 
3. UPL; = ln (P;.tl P;.orr). 
4. UPA5D; = (Pj.v - P;.0 rr) / P;.off· 
5. UPLA5D; = ln [(P;,v / P;.orr). 
where P;t is the first day closing price of security j, P;.orr is the offering price of security j, 
M~t is market index on the issue day of security j, MI;. t-l is market index on one day 
before the issue of security j, P;.v is the average of the first five days prices after the issue, 
and ln is the natural logarithm. 
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Some studies find that taking the market return does not alter the findings, 
especially when the market's returns do not have significantly high volatility. (See for 
example the discussion in Ritter, 1990). 
4.2.2 Independent Variables 
It is difficult to precisely select the appropriate accounting risk measures given 
that no theory explicitly specifies the best ratio or measure for each of the accounting risk 
measures. Therefore, to avoid or minimise bias in the selection of accounting risk 
measures some criteria have been imposed. Dhingra (1982) advocates some basic criteria 
in the selection of accounting ratios used as proxy for total firm risk. These include, 
firstly, the measure must have pertinence in reflecting the risk characteristics of the firm; 
secondly, it must have precision in its projected relationship with risk; thirdly, it must 
capture the important relationship suggested in the literature; fourthly, it is easy to 
understand by the general investment community; and, finally, it has been frequently used 
in previous research dealing with risk analysis (to assist comparability). In addition to 
these five criteria, I also propose three additional criteria: firstly, the ratio or measure 
must have been suggested in the IPO literature; secondly, if possible, the ratio or measure 
must have been examined in the Indonesian capital market or in other emerging markets; 
and thirdly, the selected ratio must be feasible in terms of the data availability. 
After considering the above criteria, five accounting risk measures are finally 
selected and used as proxies for ex ante uncertainty. These accounting risk measures are 
financial leverage, operating leverage, size, growth, and profit margin. Each of these 
selected variables will be discussed followed by the hypotheses. 
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4.2.2.1 Financial Leverage 
The finance literature suggests that the variability of firm value is affected by the 
introduction of debt into its capital structure. When debt is introduced into a firm's 
capital structure, a more volatile earnings stream results. This will increase the risk of 
common stocks, which leads the shareholders to demand a higher return (Brealey & 
Myers, 1996). Early studies by Hamada (1969) and Rubenstein (1973) show that firm 
risk is a function of financial leverage. Ben-Zion and Shalit (1975) and Christie ( 1982) 
also confirm that such a relationship does exist. Dhingra ( 1982) acknowledges that 
financial leverage is regarded as one of the predictors of firm risk. Gahlon ( 1981 ), 
Gahlon and Gentry (1982), and Mandelker and Rhee (1984) provide theoretical models, 
and empirical evidence, that financial leverage is a potential determinant of firm risk. 
Japanese investors also perceive that leverage is a significant predictor of the systematic 
risk of common stocks (Ferris, Hiramatsu, & Kimoto, 1990). 
Empirical evidence in an IPO setting, however, provides mixed results. Kim et al. 
(1993) find a significant positive relationship between financial leverage and initial 
excess returns in a study of Korean IPOs. How et al. (1995) find no significant 
relationship between financial leverage and the degree of underpricing in their study of 
Australian IP0s, but using a reduced sample they find a significant positive relationship. 
In contrast, James and Wier (1990) find that IP0s with a history of a borrowing 
relationship experience lower underpricing than those without a borrowing relationship. 
Further, James and Wier posit that ex ante uncertainty is decreasing in a firm's pre-IPO 
capital structure upon the existence of debt. Slovin and Young (1990) also find that the 
presence of bank debt and/or lines of credit in the capital structure of a firm prior to IPO 
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is negatively related to IPO initial returns. Garfinkel (1993) also documents that the 
existence of debt in a firm's pre-IPO capital structure reduces the level of underpricing. 
Unlike James and Wier (1990), Slovin and Young (1990), and Garfinkel (1993), 
who use a binary variable, Hedge and Miller ( 1996) use the amount of debt as the 
variable. Hedge and Miller argue that the existence of debt prior to the offering of an IPO 
can be used as a signal about the quality of the issue. Their hypothesis is developed on 
the basis of the financial signalling literature that suggests that one of the primary means 
used by a high quality firm is debt financing (Leland & Pyle, 1977; Myers & Majluf, 
1984). Hedge and Miller argue that issuers of a high quality firm use larger amounts of 
debt prior to the offering to signal that the firm has high quality prospects. A high quality 
firm uses debt either to mitigate inefficiencies in its investment decisions or to signal its 
private information to the market. Hedge and Miller point out that there is a greater 
probability that outsiders will have the opportunity to detect the firm's ability to service 
its debt obligations the larger the firm's debt. In other words, pre-IPO debt serves as a 
proxy for a firm's future prospects. Their finding supports their proposition of a negative 
and significant association between the level of IPO firms' debt prior to the offering and 
the degree of underpricing. 
The existing mixed findings on the relationship between financial leverage and 
the degree of underpricing have made it difficult to predict the correlation between them. 
The current study relies upon its prediction based on the existing findings about the 
Indonesian stock market, which suggest that debt levels are positively correlated with 
firm risk (Tandelilin, 1997a, 1997b; Rizka, 1998). In addition to this, Anderson et al. 
( 1996), in a review of the IPO literature, concludes that the degree of underpricing 
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increases with the level of debt. Thus, this assertion leads to the following hypothesis 
(stated in its alternate form). 
H2 The higher the level of /PO firm financial leverage the lower is the degree of 
underpricing. 
There are three measures of financial leverage examined in this study. First, 
financial leverage is measured as the ratio of total debt to the sum of debt and post-
market value of equity. Total debt is defined as the aggregate amount of debt of the most 
current year prior to the offering. The post-market value of equity is defined as the initial 
market value of the issue (i.e., the number of shares outstanding after the issue times the 
offering price). The other measures of financial leverage are the ratio of total debt to total 
assets and the ratio of long term debt to total assets. 
4.2.2.2 Operating Leverage 
There have been a number of suggestions, theoretically and empirically, about the 
perceived usefulness of operating leverage as a determinant of firm risk (Lev, 1974; 
Gahlon, 1981; Gahlon & Gentry, 1982; Mandelker & Rhee, 1984; O'Brien & 
Vanderheiden, 1987, among others). The literature also advocates that operating leverage 
is a potential determinant of firm risk, as shown by its effect through operating risk 
(White, et al. 1998). 
Lev (1974) finds operating risk, measured as the ratio of fixed operating costs to 
variable operating costs, is positively associated with total firm risk. Such an association 
occurs because the increase in the proportion of fixed costs is followed by an increase in 
volatility of returns. 1n his study, Lev runs a time-series regression of total costs on 
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output to estimate operating leverage. The variable cost component of the firm is 
calculated as being the slope coefficient of the regression on output. Subsequent studies, 
such as Mandelker and Rhee (1984) and O'Brien and Vanderheiden (1987) use a similar 
approach to Lev and find a significant relationship. Since information about an IPO, as 
disclosed in the prospectus, is limited to a maximum of three years of financial 
statements, Lev's approach is not applicable in an IPO setting. Accordingly, given this 
data limitation a proxy for operating leverage is required.8 One potential candidate for the 
proxy for operating leverage is capital intensity. 
Brigham and Gapenski ( 1991) define capital intensity as "a measure of the 
amount of assets required per dollar sales" (p. 933). They point out that capital intensity 
is one of the greatest influences on a firm's external funding requirements.9 The selection 
of capital intensity may raise some questions, since it does not capture all of a firm's 
fixed costs nor does it consider the relative magnitude of fixed and variable costs. Thus, 
it might be identified as a noisy proxy for operating leverage. However, given the 
limitations of the data, capital intensity may be the only appropriate surrogate available 
for operating leverage. 
Following Brigham and Gapenski (1991), capital intensity can be expressed as the 
ratio of sales to total assets (a reciprocal of total assets turnover), which is similar to one 
of the static measures of operating leverage suggested by O'Brien and Vanderheiden 
(1987). This ratio suggests the amount of assets required to generate sales. A higher ratio 
8 O'Brien and Vanderheiden (1987) suggest the use of a static proxy. They examine four proxies, namely 
depreciation to total assets ratio, depreciation to sales ratio, total assets to sales ratio, and fixed assets to 
total assets. Yet, none of the variables is found to be significant. 
9 Brigham and Gapenski (1991) also note that projected sales growth, initial fixed asset utilization rate 
(excess capacity situation), profit margin, and dividend policy are identified as other factors influencing a 
firm's external funding requirement. 
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means that more assets are required to obtain sales, which could be perceived as the firm 
having a lower utilisation of its assets. O'Brien and Vanderheiden contend that this ratio 
may serve better than the other operating leverage proxies (such as fixed to total assets 
ratio) because it provides a more reasonable gauge of the intensiveness of physical capital 
relative to labour and raw material. Rosenberg and McKibben (1973) also use this ratio 
in their study. A higher ratio means that the firm is engaging in low assets intensiveness. 
Accordingly, a firm with a lower sales to assets ratio is said to be less attractive and thus 
more risky. Therefore, it is predicted that the higher the ratio, the higher is the level of 
initial return. 
Another measure for capital intensity is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. 
Finns with a larger assets base tend to be exposed to more fixed operating costs relative 
to variable costs, resulting in greater leverage. In addition, fim1s are more likely to face 
greater inflexibility if their production technology demands a high proportion of fixed 
assets. It is usually more difficult for a firm with a heavier fixed asset base to convert to 
new products and production methods. Also, the earnings of such a firm tend to be 
unstable, resulting in a greater degree of risk to holders of its securities. Therefore, a 
positive relation between the ratio of fixed to total assets and risk is predicted. 
The selection of these two proxies for operating leverage is subject to some 
theoretical limitations. For example, two firms with similar fixed to total assets ratio do 
not always use a similar amount of labour (variable costs), meaning that operating 
expenses from which the operating leverage is measured will also differ. Also, a firm 
with low fixed physical assets (for example, a service firm) could have larger current 
assets and may be exposed to relatively large operating costs in terms of salaries and/or 
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benefits given its highly skilled staff. This firm could have a large degree of operating 
leverage and low fixed to total assets ratio. 
Empirical studies have paid little, if any, attention to the potential influence of 
operating leverage as a determinant of IPO initial return. Garfinkel (1993), who uses the 
ratio of plant assets to total assets, finds a negative, but insignificant, relationship. 
However, as firms are likely to reduce the capital intensity ratio to obtain external 
financing, it is expected that a higher capital intensity ratio (i.e., operating leverage) is 
associated with higher initial returns. This prediction leads to the following hypothesis 
(stated in alternative form). 
H3 The higher the level of /PO operating leverage the higher is the degree of 
underpricing. 
Two measures of operating leverage are examined: the ratio of total assets to sales 
and the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. 
4.2.2.3Size 
Beaver et al. ( 1970) point out that firm size can be used as a proxy for the total 
risk of the firm. Ritter (1984) proposes an argument that more established firms (usually 
larger firms) are less risky than less established ones, because more is known about them 
and they are easier to value. Using size as proxy for ex ante uncertainty, Ritter provides 
support for his argument. Barry and Brown (1984) also suggest that there is a positive 
relationship between firm size and firm specific information. That is, larger IPOs, where 
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more information is available about them, are more likely to be related to lower risk and 
thus lower ex ante uncertainty. 
Assuming that large firms have a more diversified asset base, then if the value of 
the assets of the firm are less than perfectly correlated we may expect that larger firms 
have a lower variance of rate of return than smaller ones. Whittington ( 1980) suggests 
that larger firms tend to have a wider spectrum of activities, suggesting that their share 
prices and returns on equity are relatively more stable. Ben-Zion and Shalit (1975) note 
that when size is used as a proxy for economies of scale, firms are able to incur lower 
costs and earn economic rents. Ibbotson et al. (1988; 1994) find IPOs with lower sales 
prior to the offering are more underpriced than ones with larger sales, and they suggest 
that sales may be used as proxy for the level of investor's uncertainty regarding the 
issuing firm. 
Although most of the studies find negative relationships, between initial abnormal 
return and firm or issue size, some still document a positive and significant relationship 
(for example, Afleck-Garves et al., 1993). Indonesian studies also show mixed findings. 
For example, Sautma (1998) finds a positive coefficient for sales and a negative 
coefficient for issue size (gross proceeds), although neither proxy is statistically 
significant. A similar finding is reported in Rizka (1995). 
To summarise, a large number of empirical studies have found an inverse and 
significant relationship between IPO size and the degree of initial excess returns. 
Accordingly, it is expected that the degree of underpricing is negatively related to the size 
of the IPO. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed (stated in alternative form). 
"4 The larger the size of the /PO firm the lower is the degree of underpricing. 
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Two measures of firm size are examined in this study: sales and the issue size. All 
are expressed in their natural logarithms. 
4.2.2.4 Growth 
Fewings (1975) and Turnbull (1977) argue that the growth of a firm (either 
represented by sales or assets) may reflect a substantial element of business uncertainty. 
Firms with constant or stable growth are regarded as having less uncertainty and being 
less risky. These firms are usually those that are able to maintain their business and tend 
to have a longer operating history. In contrast, firms that experience faster growth (which 
tend to be young firms) are subject to greater uncertainty and, therefore, are perceived to 
be more risky. These firms are usually those that are in the early stages of their existence, 
which is a common characteristic of IPO firms, and tend to experience excessive sales 
growth. This is in line with Hall and Renner (1988) who note that the success of an IPO 
usually rests on a sharp increase in sales, suggesting that, ceteris paribus, one indication 
of the success of the operations an entity seeking capital through an IPO is an increase in 
sales. Therefore, since it can be argued that faster growing firms are more risky, it is 
expected that, as growth increases, initial return should increase. Investors will demand 
higher abnormal returns to compensate for the risk they are bearing. Thus, it is expected 
that as growth increases initial return should increase. This prediction leads to the 
following hypothesis (stated in alternative form). 
Hs The higher the growth of the /PO firm the higher is the degree of underpricing. 
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Two measures of growth are used in this study: growth of sales, and growth of 
total assets. Growth of sales is defined as [(sales t - sales t-1) / sales t-i1· The growth of 
total assets is measured in similar fashion to the growth of sales. 
4.2.2.5 Profitability 
The level of profitability is examined because an investor's judgments about the 
effectiveness of business operations may be determined by past profitability. It is argued 
that high profitability may reduce ex ante uncertainty since highly profitable IP0s may 
alleviate investors' concern about the effectiveness of management. Krinsky and 
Rotenberg (1989a) also contend that the profitability of existing operations may provide 
outsiders with evidence of management effectiveness, and a high profit margin may 
reduce concerns over the historical level of management shirking or perquisites 
consumption. 
Profitability has been regarded as a potential proxy for the riskiness of an IPO 
(Beatty & Zajac, 1995). It is also not uncommon that a profitable IPO firm is more 
attractive than a less profitable one. An IPO firm with a negative profit is regarded as 
being exposed to greater risk that one with a positive profit. This suggests that an inverse 
relationship exists between profitability and risk in an IPO setting. 
The regulators of Indonesian IPOs appear to be concerned with level of 
profitability. One of the common stock listing requirement requires that firms wishing to 
make an IPO must have posted operating profits in the last two fiscal years of operation 
(Refer to Table 2.2). Thus, it seems that profitability is considered crucial in Indonesian 
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IPOs. However, as has been stated in the requirement, an IPO firm may not be required to 
have posted a profit when it has just started the business. 
In addition, it has been widely recognised that earnings have information content, 
that is, accounting earnings supply information for stock price valuation. Kaplan (1978) 
and Watts and Zimmerman (1986), based on their review, conclude that accounting 
earnings, from the efficient market hypothesis's point of view, reflect factors that affect 
stock prices. Thus, earnings or earnings levels are useful for stock price assessment. 
Earnings have also been used as a standard input in the valuation of IPOs (Perez, 1984; 
Bloch, 1986; Sutton & Benedetto, 1988; Buck, 1990; Benninga & Sarig, 1997, amongst 
others). This suggests that earnings are one of the potential determinants of an IPO issue 
price. 10 
Sterling ( 1987) points out that one of the key factors to the success of an IPO is 
that the issuing firm must have a good quality of earnings. Hall and Renner (1988) also 
assert that the success of IPOs usually rests on earnings trends. Empirical evidence, 
however, provides mixed findings. Buckland and Davies (1989), as cited in Keasey and 
McGuinnes (1992), and Keasey and Short (1992) find that the issue price discount is 
inversely related to the IPO firm's past profits. There is another study that does not 
provide strong support for the view that profitability is associated with initial abnormal 
returns in the new issues market (Kim et al., 1993). Kim et al. find a negative but 
insignificant association between profitability and IPO initial returns in their study of 
Korean IP0s. In contrast to Kim et al., Pettway and Kaneko (1996) find a positive but 
10 Aggarwal and Rivoli (1991) find that firms with low or negative income tend to exhibit higher issuance 
costs. These issues are more likely to be marginally undersubscribed, which will increase the risk faced by 
the investment banker. Thus, IPO firms having low or negative income, and thus earnings, are perceived to 
be more risky than those with positive income. 
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insignificant relationship in their study of Japanese IP0s. Michaely and Shaw (1998) also 
report a similar finding. 
As IPO firms with (greater) profitability are perceived to have been better able to 
manage their business, and thus have exhibited lower risk, it is expected that more 
profitable IPOs experience lower initial returns. This expectation leads to the following 
hypothesis (stated in alternative form). 
"6 The higher the level of !PO firm profitability the lower is the degree of 
underpricing. 
Three measures of profitability are used in this study: net operating profit ratio 
(profit before extraordinary items), net profit margin ratio, and return on assets. 
Five other variables are included as control variables, namely ownership 
retention, underwriter quality, operating history, the IPO's standard deviation of returns 
to the tenth trading day excluding the first day return, and the state of the market. Some 
other alternative independent variables are also considered depending on the possibility 
of further analysis. Such possibilities include the length of time to listing. 
4.2.2.6 Underwriter Quality 
Titman and Trueman (1986) analytically demonstrate that the quality of auditors 
can be used as a signal of the quality of information in the valuation of newly issued 
shares. Higher quality auditors are associated with the quality of the services and thus 
more accurate information which leads to a more precise estimate of firm value. By 
choosing a higher quality auditor, entrepreneurs can credibly signal private information. 
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Thus, ex ante uncertainty decreases when higher quality auditors are engaged. Balvers et 
al. (1988) and Beatty (1989), among others, provide evidence that IPO firms engaging a 
higher quality auditor experience less underpricing than those engaging a lower quality 
auditor. 
Titman and Trueman ( 1986) assert that their model can be analogously extended 
to the quality of underwriter with the same implications of a negative relationship with 
the extent of IPO initial abnormal returns. The intuition behind this proposition is that 
higher quality underwriters will attempt to maintain their capital by offering only low risk 
IP0s. Their special access to the issuing firm allows them to detect which firm is a low or 
high risk IPO. In addition, higher quality IPO firms will select high quality underwriters 
in an attempt to signal their quality. Since underpricing is detrimental to the issuing firm, 
selecting a high quality underwriter is expected to reduce the extent of underpricing. 
An early study by Logue (1973) finds mixed results. Subsequent studies, 
following Titman and Trueman's (1986) proposition, find support for a negative 
relationship between the quality of underwriter and initial return (Balvers et al., 1988; 
Johnson & Miller, 1988). A more refined model using ranking qualification proposed by 
Carter and Manaster (1990) shows support for a negative association between 
underwriter (investment banker) reputation and the degree of underpricing. Subsequent 
studies, either using dummy or rank variables, support Carter and Manaster's claim 
(Affleck-Graves et a., 1993; Kim et al., 1993; How et al., 1995). 
An Indonesian study also finds a negative and significant relationship between the 
quality of underwriter and the extent of underpricing (Rizka, 1995). Rizka uses a dummy 
variable in differentiating between high and low underwriter quality. An underwriter is 
assigned as having high quality if he falls in the first tier of those that have been engaging 
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as lead underwriter of an IPO (solely or jointly) at least ten times. An underwriter that 
does not fall into this tier is determined as a low quality one. 
The above evidence leads to the expectation that a higher quality underwriter 
reduces ex ante uncertainty and thus is associated with lower initial returns. This 
expectation leads to the following hypothesis (stated in alternative form). 
H1 The higher the reputation of underwriters the lower is the degree of underpricing. 
Following Rizka (1995), in the current study the quality of underwriters is 
determined based on the frequency of their appearance as lead underwriter. The proxy for 
underwriter quality is determined by classifying an underwriter as having high quality if 
it has been as lead underwriter at least ten times. A dummy variable is used to 
differentiate the prestige of an underwriter, that is a higher quality underwriter is coded 
one, or zero otherwise.11 
4.2.2. 7 Ownership Retention 
Leland and Pyle (1977) have demonstrated that the percentage of shares retained 
by the entrepreneurs making an IPO can convey information about the quality of the IPO. 
They argue that the greater the percentage of ownership held by the vendors the higher 
11 This study also considers the role of auditor reputation in reducing the degree of underpricing. However, 
Gumanti ( 1996) finds that more than 90% of the Indonesian IPO firms are audited by Indonesian auditors 
affiliated with one of the Big Six accounting firms. This suggests that differentiating the prestige of the 
auditor between the Big Six and non-Big Six in Indonesian IPO market seems to be inappropriate. 
82 
the quality of the IPO. In other words, ownership retention could serve as a signal of 
information about the future prospects of the firm. Note that the Leland and Pyle model 
does not directly predict that the level of ownership retention is a signal of IPO initial 
returns. In this respect, Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), Allen and Faulhaber (1989), and 
Welch (1989) actually demonstrate that the degree of underpricing is used as a signal of 
IPO quality through the level of ownership retained by the initial owners. They argue that 
a high quality firm uses the degree of underpricing as a means of obtaining a greater price 
in the subsequent offerings. 
Ownership retention is usually measured as the ratio of shares held by the initial 
owners (issuers) after the issue. Empirical evidence finds a positive and significant 
relationship between the level of ownership retained by the issuers and the degree of 
underpricing (Clarkson et al., 1991; How & Low, 1993; Lee et al., 1996, Hedge & Miller, 
1996, among others). Thus, consistent with previous studies, a positive relationship 
between ownership retention and the degree of underpricing is expected. This prediction 
leads to the following hypothesis (stated in alternative form). 
11s The higher the proportion of retained ownership the higher is the degree of 
underpricing. 
Ownership retention is measured as the portion of shares held by original owners 
after the issue. 
4.2.2.8 Operating History 
Ritter (1984) suggests that a firm's age is a good proxy for the difficulty of firm 
valuation. Younger firms have less operating history and, therefore, less information 
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available, making them difficult to assess. In contrast, older firms appear to provide 
better information, and have also shown their ability to survive. So, younger firms are 
more likely to be riskier than older ones. This suggests that it might be more difficult to 
assess younger firms than older ones. Ibbotson et al. (1988) assert that a more established 
IPO reduces investor uncertainty about the firm's real value which lowers the degree of 
underpricing. In addition, Barry, Muscarella, and Vetsuypens (1991) find that the 
operating history of the firm is negatively related to ex ante uncertainty. Beatty (1989) 
argues that a longer operating history may provide market participants with better 
information about managerial production-investment decisions. This may provide a better 
knowledge of the past performance of the issuing firms. Accordingly, this additional 
information may reduce mvestors' estimation of ex ante uncertainty. 
Beatty (1989) finds a significant negative association between initial returns and a 
firm's age suggesting that a longer operating history is associated with lower ex ante 
uncertainty and thus lower initial returns. This negative and significant finding is 
supported by many of the following studies (Clarkson, 1994; Lee et al., 1996b; Young & 
Zaima, 1994; Loughran et al., 1994, amongst others). In addition, the age of the IPO is 
considered to be in the top hierarchy related to the uncertainty of the IPO (Clarkson, 
1994). 
Given that ex ante uncertainty is reduced when more information about the IPO 
firm is available, it is expected that IPO firms with longer operating history will be less 
underpriced than those with shorter history of operation. This prediction leads to the 
following hypothesis (stated in alternative form). 
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H, The longer the /PO firm's operating history the lower is the degree of 
underpricing. 
IPO operating history is measured as the difference between the years of operation 
and the IPO years. The natural logarithm of the number of years in operation is used as 
the measure of age variable. 
4.2.2.9 Ex Post Uncertainty 
The standard deviation of daily aftermarket returns subsequent to the issue is 
included as proxy for ex post uncertainty. This proxy provides an examination of 
observable firm risk, that is, the measure of the risk level of the IPOs. Ritter (1984) 
suggests that higher volatility in stock prices is more likely to be related to firms with 
high uncertainty before public trading began. Greater variability of the daily returns 
subsequent to the first day's trading can be interpreted as evidence of the existence of 
greater uncertainty concerning the issue. This means that IPOs with high variance 
experience greater uncertainty about their offerings. Thus, the aftermarket standard 
deviation of daily returns reflects the market response to the issue.12 
Previous studies provide mixed results on the significance of the relationship 
between the degree of underpricing and ex post standard deviation of returns. Logue 
(1973), Clarkson (1994), and Lee et al. (1996) do not find a significant relationship. 
However, Johnson and Miller (1988), Wolfe and Cooperman (1990), Affleck-Graves et 
12 Johnson and Miller (1988) point out that the inclusion of after market standard deviation will diminish 
the explanatory power of underwriter reputation in explaining the cross-sectional variance of initial returns. 
This happens in the situation when the knowledge of an underwriter reputation will not increase the 
explanation of the level of underpricing once the uncertainty variable is taken into account, assuming that 
the greater the ex ante uncertainty about the issue the greater the underpricing will be. Chishty et al. (1996) 
find support that such inclusion reduces the explanatory power of underwriter reputation. 
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al. (1993), and Chishty et al. (1996) find a significant positive relationship. These studies 
obviously use different measures of standard deviation. For example, Clarkson uses the 
standard deviation over the 59 trading days subsequent to the first day trading, Lee et al. 
use the standard deviation of monthly returns, Wolfe and Cooperman use the first 100 
trading days, and Miller and Reilly (1987) use the first five trading days. 
Indonesian studies also find positive and significant relationships between the 
aftermarket standard deviation of return and the degree of underpricing (Rizka, 1995; 
Sautma, 1998). Another study, however, does not find a significant relationship 
(lndrajati, 1997). Both Rizka and Indrajati use the tenth day's aftermarket standard 
deviation excluding the first day return, but their sample size is different. 
Given the above evidence and theoretical explanation, it is expected that greater 
variability in the aftermarket is associated with a greater degree of underpricing. Thus, a 
positive relationship is expected between the daily standard deviation in the early after 
market and the initial returns. This prediction leads to the following hypothesis (stated in 
alternative form). 
H10 The higher the standard deviation of aftermarket return of the /PO firm the 
higher is the degree of underpricing. 
Considering that not all of the IP0s examined in this study have complete trading 
records following its IPO (i.e., lower liquidity) the standard deviation of the daily return 
over ten days after the IPO excluding the first day return is used in this study, which is 
consistent with Rizka (1995) and Indrajati (1997). However, it appears that it is at the 
discretion of the researcher to select the time frame in measuring the aftermarket standard 
deviation. Thus, another measure might also be used. 
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4.2.2.10 Market Condition 
Logue (l 973) is probably the first to have considered the effect of market 
condition on the extent of IPO underpricing. Early support of Logue's finding is provided 
in Ritter (1984). Ritter documents the existence of the hot issues phenomenon in which 
firms that went public during the hot market, a market with heavy IPOs, tend to be 
underpriced more than those that went public in other periods. Subsequent studies 
looking at this relationship find consistent support. For example, How (1996), in a study 
of Australian industrial IPOs, finds a positive and significant relationship between the 
state of the market and the degree of underpricing. 
Husnan ( 1991, 1994) finds that IPO firms that went public during market booms 
are more underpriced than those that went public in other periods. This finding suggests 
that a positive relationship between the aftermarket standard deviation and the degree of 
underpricing. Thus, consistent with previous studies, it is predicted that a firm that went 
public in the periods when more firms were making an IPO, will be underpriced more 
than firms that went public in other periods. This prediction leads to the following 
hypothesis (stated in alternative form). 
H11 /PO firms going public during a bullish market will be underpriced more than 
those going public during a bearish one. 
The years perceived to have more IPOs are 1989, 1990, 1993, and 1994 (Husnan, 
1994; Winarto, 1997). Thus, these periods are regarded as booms (bullish), whilst the 
other periods are regarded as bearish. An IPO firm will be assigned the value of one if it 
went public during the boom periods and zero otherwise. 
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4.3 Regression Model 
Multivariate and univariate analysis will be used to test the hypotheses. The 
multivariate model applying ordinary least square (OLS) regression is as follows: 
UPi = <Xo + a 1FLj + a 20Li + a 3Sizej + o.iGroi + a 5Prof; + <X<;UWQj +a10wnj + 
(-) (+) (-) (+) (-) (-) (+) 
asAgej + <X<JSDRj +a,oMCj + Uj (4.1) 
(-) (+) (+) 
where UP is the level of underpricing, FL is financial leverage, OL is operating leverage, 
Size is the size of the issue, Gro is growth, PM is profit margin as a measure of 
profitability, UWQ is underwriter quality ( an underwriter is assigned as having high 
quality if he falls in the first tier of those that have been engaging as lead underwriter of 
an IPO (solely or jointly) at least ten times. An underwriter that does not fall into this tier 
is determined as a low quality one), Own is ownership retention, Age is the the natural 
logarithm of the number of years in operation which is used as the measure of the IPOs' 
age variable, SD is the standard deviation of aftermarket returns, and MC is the market 
condition. (The years perceived to have more IP0s are 1989, 1990, 1993, and 1994 
(Husnan, 1994; Winarto, 1997). Thus, these periods are regarded as booms (bullish), 
whilst the other periods are regarded as bearish. An IPO firm will be assigned the value 
of one if it went public during the boom periods and zero otherwise).The descriptions of 
each of the variables are presented in Table 4.3 along with the predicted sign of the 
association between these variables and underpricing. 
As an additional analysis, I will also examine whether information available in 
the issue prospectus is value relevant to the IPO as previously examined in Kirn et al. 
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( 1995a) and Klein ( 1996). Thus, the tests are intended to test the external validity of these 
studies. The results of the test are expected to strengthen the findings reported in the 
multivariate analyses and shed light on the value relevance of accounting information in 
the pricing of an IPO. Next, I briefly review these two studies. Klein's study is presented 
first followed by Kim et al. ( 1995a). 13 
Table 4.3 
The Definition of Variables and Their Expected Relationship 
Variables 
(Abbreviation) 
Dependent 
Measurement 
Underpricing (UP) UPj = (Pj, - Pj.otr) I Pi.off 
Independent 
Financial Leverage 
(FL) 
1. total debt / (total assets + initial market value 
of equity) 
2. total debt / total assets 
3. long term debt/ total assets 
Operating Leverage 1. total assets / sales 
(OL) 2. fixed assets / total assets 
SIZE (SIZE) 1. natural logarithm of sales 
2. natural logarithm of gross proceeds 
Growth (ORO) 1. (sales t - sales t-1) / sales t-t 
2. (total assets t - total assets t-t) / total assets t-t 
Profitability (PRO) 1. operating profit/ sales 
Underwriter quality 
(UW) 
2. net income after tax / sales 
3. net income after tax / total assets 
High quality underwriter is assigned 1 and 0 
otherwise 
Expected 
Coefficient 
+ 
+ 
Retained ownership The portion of shares held by the issuer after the + 
(OWN) issue 
13 Although Kim et al. (1995a) study was published earlier than Klein (1996), their work was based on 
Klein's working paper. Thus, Klein's paper is the first study on pricing the IPO. 
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Operating history 
(LAge) 
Standard deviation 
(SDR) 
Market condition 
(MC) 
Natural logarithm of year in operation 
The daily standard deviation from the second day 
of trading to the tenth day after the issue. 
Score l for firm making an IPO during bullish 
market and O otherwise 
+ 
+ 
All measures are collected from the issue prospectus, except for the standard deviation of 
aftermarket return. 
Klein ( 1996) argues that the limited information available about the issuing firm 
in an IPO has made information contained in the issue prospectus a potential source of 
firm-specific information in the estimation of future growth and risk of the firm. 
Therefore, the prospectus, which is an audited document publicly available to outsiders, 
represents further assurance of the accountability of information since misleading 
information could lead to punishment or legal lawsuits. Departing from the Miller and 
Modigliani framework, Klein develops a testable model expressing equity value as a 
function of accounting earnings, book value of equity, expected earnings growth 
variables, and market or firm-specific risk factors. The IPO off er price is used to 
represent equity value. 
Unlike seasoned equities where the proxies for risk variables are easily identified, 
for most IPOs these proxies are unavailable, given the limited data and short operating 
history. One potential source available is the firm prospectus. Thus, risk proxies must be 
obtained from the prospectus. Klein ( 1996) uses the level of ownership retention as the 
proxy for the firm-specific variable. The identity of the firm's auditor and underwriter is 
used as the proxy for firm-specific growth and risk variables. Three risk proxies are used 
by Klein, with a dummy variable being given to each of the proxies. The first risk proxy 
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is whether a risk warning is presented in the cover of the prospectus, where a value of 
one is given for the presence of warning, and zero otherwise. The second risk proxy is the 
age of the firm, where a value of one is given if the firm presents the operating history for 
three or more full fiscal years in the prospectus, and zero otherwise. The final risk proxy 
is whether warrants are issued, where a value of one is given for a firm offering stock 
only, and zero if the firm offers a combination of stocks and warrants. The firm's pre-
offering earnings per share, the pro forma book value of equity per share, and the net 
proceeds of the issue are used as proxies for accounting variables. Finally, the Nasdaq 
composite index is used as the proxy for the market factor and industry factor and is 
included to seek the effect of industry membership. The dependent variable is the issue 
price. 
A sample of 193 US IPOs is examined alongside 40 IPOs as the holdout sample. 
Klein ( 1996) finds support for the proposition that the prospectus provides value-relevant 
information about the IPO. More specifically, Klein finds that the firm's offering price 
and aftermarket price are positively related to earnings per share, book value of equity per 
share, the level of ownership retention, underwriter quality, and the issue proceeds. The 
display of the risk explicit reference on the issue prospectus is negatively related to the 
price. The model explains 62% of the variation of the issue price and 44% of the market 
price. The finding of a significant relationship between offer price and accounting 
variables is interesting given that existing IPO studies have largely ignored such 
possibilities, with attention placed on the cross-sectional variance of IPO initial returns. 
Klein's study also provides further support for the literature that accounting variables are 
value relevant about the IPO. To test the robustness of the model, Klein applies the 
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model to 40 IPO firms and finds that the model is successful in predicting initial and 
aftermarket prices. 
Kim et al. (1995a) test the external validity of Klein's model using Korean IPOs. 
A modification is advanced to capture institutional differences between Korean and US 
markets. They propose two models: (1) the benchmark model, and (2) the augmented 
model. The benchmark model consists of four variables, namely earnings per share, issue 
size, industry index, and the type of offer. Three signalling variables are added to the 
augmented model. The models are tested on a sample of 147 Korean IPOs that went 
public between June 1985 and March 1990. The tests are run on two groups of IPOs: 
those that went public before (labelled BEFORE) and after (labelled AFTER) the IPO 
price liberalisation which took place on 25 June 1988. The models explain about 40% of 
the variation of the pricing of Korean IPOs. The issue prices are significantly related to 
earnings per share, the industry index, and issue proceeds. On the other hand, none of the 
signalling variables is significantly related to the IPO price. 
Similar to Klein (1996), Kim et al. (1995a) also test the predictive ability of the 
models using hold-out samples. The models are tested on sixteen IPOs of the BEFORE 
group and thirty-six IPOs of the AFTER group. The results show that the models appear 
to be able to predict the market price of the holdout samples as indicated by a relatively 
high degree of correlation between the actual and predicted prices. 
The findings reported in Klein (1996) and Kim et al. (1995a) provide further 
support to the contention that accounting information is impounded in the determination 
of IPO issue price and is value relevant about the IPO. Thus, the main objective of this 
additional analysis is to test the external validity of the assertion that accounting 
information is value relevant to the Indonesian IPO market. 
92 
Similar to Kim et al. (1995a), some modifications are needed to test Klein's 
(1996) model, as not all the variables examined by Klein are available in the current 
study. For example, it is uncommon for Indonesian IPO to provide specific warnings 
about risk on the front cover of the prospectus. Also, none of the IPOs provide an audited 
financial report of more than three fiscal years in their prospectuses. Most of the 
prospectuses in 1989 and 1990 consist only of the last two years of audited financial 
reports. Given this firm-specific difference, I use the natural logarithm of firm age, 
natural logarithm of gross proceeds, and the firm financial leverage (measured as the ratio 
of total debt to total assets plus the equity initial market value) as the measures for firm 
risks. A combination of stock and warrants is almost non-existent in Indonesian IPOs. 
Therefore, this variable is not examined in the current study. The auditor variable is not 
examined as more than 90% of the sample firms are audited by prestigious auditors 
(Refer to Footnote 11). The other explanatory variables are earnings per share, and price 
to book value of equity. The model used to test the pricing of IPOs is as follows: 
LP; = ao + a1LEPS; + a2PBV; + a3LGP; +a.FL;+ a5UWQ; + 3<;0WN; +a1LAGE; + asIND; + u; (4.2) 
(+) (+) (+) (-) (+) (+) (+) (?) 
where LP is either offer price or market closing price of week one and both are expressed 
in natural logarithm, LEPS is natural logarithm of earnings per share, PBV is price to 
book value of equity, GP is gross proceeds, UWQ is underwriter quality, FL is financial 
leverage, OWN is the level of ownership retention, Age-is the IP0s' operation in years, 
and IND is industry membership. Definitions of variables used in the regression are 
presented in Table 4.4. 
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4.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has provided an account of the study's research methodology. It 
presented the sample selection criteria. It also elaborated upon the definitions, as well as 
the measurement, of variables. The Chapter presented the hypotheses to be tested and 
outlined the regression model. The Chapter also provided the model for the additional 
test which is the test of the pricing of the IPOs. The findings of the study are presented in 
the next Chapter. 
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Table 4.4 
Definitions of Variables and Expected Coefficients for Regression Model 
of the Pricing of IPOs 
Variable Definition Notation Expected 
Sign 
Dependent Variable 
1. Off er price Natural logarithm of the offer price. LPR 
2. Market price Natural logarithm of the market closing price LPW 
of week one. 
Independent Variables 
EPS Pre-offering earning per share for the latest LEPS + 
fiscal year, expressed in natural logarithm. 
B V of Equity a Post-offering book value of equity per share. PBV + 
Level of Percent of equity retained by the initial OWN + 
Ownership issuers. 
Underwriter Dummy variable, score 1 is given if the issue uw + 
Quality is underwritten by prestigious underwriter 
and O otherwise. 
Risk 1. Gross proceeds from the issue, expressed LOP + 
in natural logarithm. 
2. Age, the firm years in operation, LAGE + 
expressed in natural logarithm. 
3. Financial leverage, measured as the ratio FL 
of total debt to total assets plus initial 
market value of equity. 
Industry The value according to the firm's industry IND ? 
Membership classification. 
a Post-offering book value of equity per share is measured as the ratio of offer price to book value of equity 
per share. 
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CHAPTERS 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This chapter reports the results of the empirical tests. Section 5.1 provides a 
general profile of the sample and the descriptive statistics of continuous variables 
partitioned on the basis of industry classification and year of offering. The section also 
presents the findings of various measures of underpricing as well as the aftermarket 
returns. Section 5.2 presents the preliminary results of the analysis of the relationship 
between initial returns and the variables. The results of univariate tests are outlined in 
Section 5.3. Section 5.4 provides the results of multivariate analyses and the tests of the 
hypotheses. The multicollinearity diagnoses are provided in Section 5.5 followed by 
sensitivity analysis, while discussions of the findings are set up in Section 5.7. Section 
5.8 provides additional analyses, which comprise two tests: tests of the model on two 
states of the market and tests of the pricing of IPOs. The final section summarises the 
chapter. 
5.1 General Profile and Descriptive Statistics of the Sample 
Panel A of Table 5.1 provides the general profiles of the full 149 sample firms. 
The mean and median of sales for the most recent year (twelve months) are Rp. 106.66 
billion and Rp. 59.01 billion, respectively. The sales range from Rp. 2.82 to Rp. 1,363.85 
billion with a standard deviation of Rp. 165.09 billion. The mean of total assets of Rp. 
141.44 billion is significantly higher than the mean of sales (p < .10). 
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The mean offering price of the sample firms is Rp. 5,336.4. A deeper examination 
reveals that the offering price during the early market boom (i.e., 1989 and 1990) is 
significantly higher (p < .001) than for the subsequent periods ( 1991 to 1997). The mean 
and median offering prices are Rp. 8,850 and Rp. 8,550 for the years 1989-1990, 
compared to Rp. 3,554 and Rp. 3,200 for the years 1991-1997. The mean offering price 
for all IPOs made during 1989-1997 is Rp. 5,234.1 (Panel B of Table 5.1), which is 
insignificantly different from the mean offering price of the sample firms (t= 0.278, p < 
.390). 
The sample firms examined in this study offer on average of 23.01 million shares, 
with a minimum number of shares offered of 0.53 million and a maximum number of 
430.77 million. The mean number of shares offered for the sample firms is lower than the 
mean of all WO firms during the periods of examination of 38.05 million (Panel B of 
Table 5.1). A similar patter is shown for the amount of proceeds from the issue. The 
mean gross proceeds for the sample firms is 75.64 million. The figure stands at 91.96 
miJiion for all IP0s. 
The mean and median ages of the firms in this study (i.e., the years in operation) 
are 16.41 years and 16.00 years, respectively, suggesting that the sample firms have been 
in existence for quite a long time. The years in operation range from 4 years to 79 years, 
with a standard deviation of 10.36 years. 
The descriptive statistics for the continuous variables examined in this study are 
presented in Table 5.2. For all of the accounting ratios, the values are based on the firms' 
most recent financial data available in the prospectus. The sample firms have a mean 
(median) of financial leverage (measured as total debt divided by total assets plus the 
97 
initial market value of equity) of 40.08% (39.60%). The mean values for the second and 
third measures of financial leverage are 63.44% and 237 .23%, respectively. 
Table 5.1 
General Profiles of the Sample Firms (n=l49) 
and All IPOs that Went Public in the Periods of Examination (n=264) 
Description Mean Median S.Dev. Min. Max. 
Panel A: Sample Firms (n=l49) 
Sales (bill) 106.66 59.01 165.09 2.82 1,363.85 
Total assets (bill) 141.44 70.19 200.91 2.48 1,346.16 
Offering price 5,336.4 4,750.0 3,287.6 650 17,250 
Shares (mill) 23.01 10.00 44.96 0.53 430.77 
Gross proceeds (bill) 75.64 40.00 119.39 3.41 898.32 
Age (year) 16.41 16.00 10.36 3.00 79.00 
Panel B: All IP0s Made in 1989-1997 (n=264) 
Offering price 5,234.1 4,500.0 4,063.9 500 41,300.0 
Shares (mill) 38.05 10.75 102.45 0.53 1,085.03 
Gross proceeds (bill) 91.96 45.17 173.18 1.28 1,913.33 
Age (year) 16.11 14.00 11.10 1.00 79.00 
Sales and total assets are recorded based on the firms' most current year available in the prospectus. Age is 
measured as the firms' years in operation. 
Amounts are expressed in Indonesian Rupiah, except for number of shares and age. 
The mean total assets to sales ratio (OLl), as a measure of operating leverage, for 
the sample firms is 159.25%. There appears to be a high degree of variance in OLI. A 
close check reveals that one IPO firm has an extreme value of 2, 106.68%, which could be 
a potential candidate for being an outlier (The sensitivity analysis presented in Section 
5.6 confirms that this observation is influential). The exclusion of this firm reduces the 
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mean OLl to 146.10%, with a maximum value of 610.66%. The ratio of fixed assets to 
total assets (OL2) has a mean value of 35.80%, which is considerably lower than OLl. 
Table 5.2 
Descriptive Statistics of Continuous Variables (n=149) 
FLI is measured as total debt/ (total assets+ initial market value of equity); FL2 is measured as total debt/ 
total assets; FL3 is measured as long term debt / total assets; OL I total assets / sales; OL2 fixed assets / 
total assets; SIZE l is the natural logarithm of sales for the last fiscal year; SIZE2 is the natural logarithm of 
gross proceeds of the issue; GROl is measured as (saleSt - sales1_1) / sales1. 1; GR02 is measured as (total 
assets1 - total assets1_1) / total assets1_1; PRO I is the ratio of operating profit to sales; PR02 is the ratio of net 
income after tax to sales; PR03 is the ratio of net income after tax to total assets; UWQ is the measure of 
underwriter quality and takes a value of one for high quality underwriter and zero otherwise; OWN is the 
retained ownership level and is measured as the portion of shares held by the issuer after the issue; LAGE is 
the natural logarithm of years in operation, SDR is the standard deviation of the first ten days return, 
excluding the first day return; MC is market condition and takes a value of one for a firm making an IPO 
during a bullish market and zero otherwise. FL is financial leverage; OL is operating leverage; GRO is firm 
growth; PRO is profitability, UWQ is underwriter quality, OWN is ownership retention, SDR is standard 
deviation of returns, and MC is market condition. 
Description Mean Median S.Dev. Min. Max. 
FLl (%) 40.08 39.60 15.80 3.35 73.70 
FL2 (%) 63.44 66.17 16.78 5.25 93.94 
FL3 (%) 237.23 200.00 168.95 5.54 997.79 
OLl (%) 159.25 115.71 186.65 28.02 2,106.7 
OL2 (%) 35.80 34.38 19.83 0.23 84.74 
GROl (%) 41.42 31.38 48.78 -29.43 395.23 
GR02(%) 50.75 33.53 57.81 -19.30 372.87 
PROl (%) 17.59 15.95 7.82 -4.34 50.78 
PR02 (%) 9.61 7.80 7.82 0.16 43.83 
PR03 (%) 6.95 6.26 4.87 0.12 27.01 
SIZE1 24.63 24.62 1.29 19.52 28.79 
SIZE2 24.53 24.48 1.23 21.95 28.50 
OWN(%) 76.53 76.90 8.84 30.00 96.20 
LAGE 2.65 2.77 0.55 1.09 4.37 
SOR 2.66 2.07 2.10 0.17 11.92 
UWQ 0.78 1.0 0.03 0.0 1.0 
MC 0.64 1.0 0.04 0.0 1.0 
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On average, the sample firms examined in this study recorded a sales growth of 
41.42%. The sales growth ranges from -29.43% to 395.23%. Eight firms recorded 
negative sales growth. The average growth of total assets of 50.75% is slightly higher 
than the average growth of sales, which is significantly different at the 10% level. The 
growth of total assets ranges from -19.30% to 372.87%. Twelve firms had negative assets 
growth. 
It is difficult to predict the effect of negative growth on ex ante uncertainty. One 
may argue that negative growth may be associated with a greater risk of default or 
bankruptcy. Thus, firms with negative growth are more likely to get exposed to greater 
risk. However, firms with positive and higher growth are also associated with greater 
risk. Thus, it is difficult to assert the relationship between negative growth and ex ante 
uncertainty {the degree of underpricing). One way of overcoming the confounding effect 
of negative growth on ex ante uncertainty is by assigning a value of zero for firms with 
negative growth. Yet, a qualitatively similar result is obtained as indicated by the 
correlation coefficient. That is, prior to assigning zero for negative sales (total assets) 
growth, the correlation between sales (total assets) growth and the degree of underpricing 
is -4.49% (-12.42%), whilst after the change the correlation is -4.87% (-12.29%). Other 
ways to mitigate the effects of negative growth on the regression estimates are (1) using 
absolute values as replacement for negative values, and (2) omitting the firms with 
negative growth. The second option is less desirable as it reduces the sample size. Yet, 
application of the first alternative does not qualitatively change the correlation coefficient 
between growth measures and the degree of underpricing. A discussion of the sensitivity 
tests is provided in Section 5.6. 
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The mean of the firms' profitability ratios is 17 .59% when profitability is 
measured as operating profit margin (the ratio of profit before extraordinary items to 
sales). When profitability is measured as net profit margin (the ratio of net income after 
tax to sales) the figure has a mean value of 9.61 %. The mean profitability ratio is 6.95%, 
when profitability is measured as the ratio of net income after tax to total assets. None of 
the sample firms examined in this study had negative profits in their last fiscal year of 
operation prior to going public. 
The mean and median of the number of shares held by the initial issuers after the 
issue (i.e., the level of retained ownership) for the sample firms are 76.53% and 76.90%, 
respectively. This figure is comparable with IPOs in some Asian countries, such as 
74.18% for Malaysian IPOs (Paudyal et al., 1999), 68.73% for Singaporean IPOs (Lee et 
al., 1996b), and 69.71% for Korean IPOs (Kim et al., 1995a). The proportion of retained 
ownership varies from 30.00% to 96.20%. A deeper examination reveals that during early 
market boom periods (1989-1990) ownership retention is higher than in ~he subsequent 
periods (1991-1997). The mean (median) value of retained ownership is 80.0% (80.7%) 
for 1989-1990, compared to 75.3% (75.0%) for 1991-1997. The mean difference of the 
proportion of ownership retention between these two periods is significantly different 
from each other (p < .001). Thus, it appears that the state of the market affects the 
issuers' decision on the amount of shares they offer.14 
The mean and median standard deviations of aftermarket returns for the first ten 
days of trading, excluding the first day return, of the sample firms are 2.66% and 2.07%, 
14 There appears a tendency during the early market boom ( 1989 and 1990) for the issuers of Indonesian 
IPOs to offer the issue at a higher price than in the subsequent periods. The mean offer price of 8,557.2 for 
the early market boom is statistically significant compared to the mean offer price of 3,558.3 for the 
subsequent periods (t = 12.197, p < .0000). Thus, it is clear that for issuers who want to raise a similar 
amount of the issue size, selling at a higher price means fewer shares can be offered. 
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respectively. The standard deviations of aftermarket return vary from 0.17% to 11.92%. 
The figures show that IPO firms examined in this study experience, on average, little 
price changes following the issues. 
More than three-quarters of the sample firms examined in this study (78.5% or 
117 firms) used prestigious underwriters when they went public. Just over two-third of 
the sample firms (64.4% or 96 firms) went public during the boom periods (1989, 1990, 
1993, and 1994). 
5.1.1 Test of Hypothesis 1 
Table 5.3 provides summary statistics of the degree of initial returns for the full 
sample firms. The table also presents various measures of initial returns as an 
txamination of the sensitivity of the measures used to calculate initial returns. The Table 
shows that there are differences in the level of initial returns between the measures. The 
initial returns range from 8.03% to 9.59%. The lowest initial return is the fifth measure, 
that is, when the initial return is measured as the natural logarithm of the average of first 
week's price relative to the offer price. The highest initial return is the fourth measure, 
that is, when initial return is measured as the difference between the average of the first 
five days price and the issue price. The t-tests for mean differences between measures do 
not indicate any significant difference at traditional levels. This finding suggests that the 
selection of the initial return as the dependent variable accounts little for the extent of 
underpricing. Hence, the level of initial return is not sensitive to the measures used to 
calculate it. 
As shown in Table 5.3, the mean raw initial return for the full sample is 9.47% 
and is statistically significant (p < .001), with a minimum initial return of -26.47% and a 
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maximum initial return of 134.48%. The average underpricing of 9.47% means that about 
Rp. 1,067 .6 billion funds raised for the IPO firms examined in this study are left on the 
table. On average, each of the IPO firms has left Rp. 7.16 billion on the table. This is 
quite a significant amount as the average gross proceed from the issue is Rp. 75.64 
billion (Refer to Table 5 .1 ). 
Table 5.3 
Results of Various Measures of IPO Initial Returns 
No Measures Mean Med. S.Dev. Kurt. Skew. 
1 UPl 9.4r 5.26 17.06 1,922.47 304.59 
2 MAUP 9.49a 5.32 17.10 2,072.69 318.75 
3 UPLi 8.04a 5.13 13.76 689.76 129.55 
4 UPASDj 9.59a 4.00 17.62 858.26 205.99 
5 UPLA5Di 8.03a 3.92 14.69 385.31 91.30 
a denotes coefficient being significantly different from zero at 0.001 level. 
UPi 
UPLi 
UPASOj 
UPLASDi 
MAUPi 
= (Pj.1 - Pj,011) I Pj.off 
= In (Pi,./ Pj,off) 
= (Pj,v - Pj,off) / Pj,off 
= ln (Pj.v / Pj.off), 
: [(Pj,1- Pj,off) / Pj,off] - [(Mljt - M\.1-1) / Mlj.t-tl 
Min. Max. 
-26.47 134.48 
-26.92 137.07 
-30.75 85.22 
-30.26 lt 1.93 
-36.03 75.11 
Where Pit is the first day closing price of security j, Pj,off is the offering price of security j, Mlit is market 
index on the day of the issue of security j, Mli, 1.1 is market index on the day before the issue of security j, 
and Pi.vis the average of the first five day price after the issue of security j. 
The median raw initial return of 5.26% indicates a substantial skewness in the 
distribution of initial-day returns. The sign test (p < .001) and Wilcoxon signed rank test 
(p < .001), however, indicate that the 5.26% median return is significantly different from 
zero. A standard deviation of 17 .06%, which is almost double the figure of the mean 
return, illustrates the presence of significant differences in initial-day returns across 
individual firms. This high variability in the extent of initial returns may be attributed to 
\03 
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some factors. This has obviously provided a further rationale for examining whether 
various characteristics of the IP0s could explain differences in reported initial returns. 
The finding of significant underpricing supports the hypothesis that Indonesian 
IPOs are underpriced, on average (H1). This finding also confirms the widely 
documented evidence that the IP0s of common stock are underpriced, on average. 
Consistent with previous studies, this study finds that 75.84% of the firms (113 firms) are 
underpriced (with initial returns ranging from 0.69% to 134.48%), while 10.74% (16 
firms) are overpriced, in that the first day closing price is lower than the offer price (with 
initial return ranging from-26.47% to -1.47%). The remaining 20 firms (13.42%) do not 
experience a price change in their first day of trading. 
The findings reported in Table 5.3 are ,;;lightly lower compared to those reported 
in earlier studies of Indonesian IP0s by Rizka (1995), Sautma (1998), and Hanafi (1998), 
who document significant underpricing of 12.5%, 10. l %, and 15.1 %, respectively. The 
difference in the extent of significant underpricing reported in this study may be 
attributed to several factors. Firstly, this study excludes firms in finance and insurance 
industries, real estate, property, and construction industries, and investment companies, 
whilst most of the previous studies do not. Secondly, this study uses raw initial-day 
returns in measuring the level of underpricing, while most of previous studies consider 
market returns. However, if the market adjusted return is used, the level of underpricing 
is about the same as when using the raw return (see Table 5.4). An examination of the 
extent of market returns shows that the mean and standard deviations of market returns 
during the first trading day for each of IPO firms examined are -0.02% and 1.24%, 
respectively. This indicates that market returns do not really have a significant impact on 
the extent of initial returns. Beatty and Ritter ( 1986) also note that when market returns 
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have little impact on reported returns, the use of raw returns is preferable in performing 
cross-sectional analysis of initial returns. Thus, the use of raw returns would reflect the 
IPO firms' actual performance. 
Table 5.4 
Industrial Classification, Year of Offering, and Raw Initial Returns of the IPO Firms 
#of %of Mean Med. S.Dev. Kurt. Skew. Min. Max. 
IPO IPO 
Panel A: Industrial Classification and the Degree of Underpricing 
11-19 5 3.36 5.41 2.15 7.56 215.59 156.61 0.00 17.95 
21-29 5 3.36 7.87c 5.26 6.36 -208.53 7.87 0.00 14.94 
31-39 48 32.21 7.78a 2.81 15.57 324.35 140.48 -24.29 56.73 
41-49 35 23.49 12.20b 6.06 25.69 1,519.37 334.31 -26.47 134.48 
51-59 26 17.45 7.08c 3.70 13.09 132.83 27.32 -25.64 37.21 
71-79 5 3.36 6.64 3.91 9.08 343.59 181.37 0.00 22.22 
91-99* 25 16.77 13.lla 11.19 11.58 -120.03 27.04 -5.26 33.68 
Panel B: Year of Offering and the Degree of Underpricing 
1989 12 8.05 22.09d 9.92 37.03 940.85 296.08 0.00 134.48 
1990 41 27.52 9.0la 4.35 13.58 204.33 154.49 -11.11 50.00 
1991 11 7.38 0.93 2.68 7.91 415.84 -178.87 -19.29 IO.I I 
1992 IO 6.71 8.71b 8.23 8.51 73.00 93.63 0.00 26.67 
1993 17 11.41 24.02a 24.71 16.83 -36.14 48.02 0.00 56.73 
1994 26 17.45 2.93 1.44 I0.59 139.08 -12.72 -24.29 24.19 
1995 10 6.71 -0.38 1.44 10.59 383.55 -140.43 -25.64 15.38 
1996 13 8.72 8.45a 7.69 7.07 147.03 -89.22 -25.64 17.95 
1997 9 6.04 9.90 15.38 16.21 266.23 -154.98 -26.47 23.73 
Total 149 100.00 9.47a 5.26 17.06 1,922.47 304.59 -26.47 134.48 
a. b. c. d. denote the coefficient as being significantly different from zero at the 0.001, O.ot, 0.05, and 0.10 
levels, respectively. 
Industry classification is defined as follows: 11-19 for agriculture, 21-29 for mining, 31-39 for basic industry 
and chemical, 41-49 for miscellaneous industry, 51-59 for consumer goods industry, 71-79 for infrastructure, 
utility, and transportation, and 91-99 for trade and services. 
* This excludes companies in the 98 code, which is the investment company. 
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Table 5.4 reports the degree of initial returns partitioned on the basis of the 
industry classifications (Panel A) and year of offering (Panel B). Panel A of Table 5.4 
shows that two industries (that is, miscellaneous industry with initial return of 12.20%, 
and trade and services industry with initial return of 13.11 % ) appear to exhibit larger 
initial returns compared to the other industries. Test on mean difference of these two 
industries shows that the mean is not significantly different from each other (t= -0.165). 
For the seven industries examined, only in two industries (that is, agriculture and 
infrastructure, utility, and transportation) are the initial returns not significantly different 
from zero. Three industries: agriculture, mining, and infrastructure, utility, and 
transportation, recorded overpricing, in that the first day closing price was lower than the 
offering price. 
Unlike the US or Australia, there are only small numbers ·of firms in the mining 
industry listed on the Indonesian stock market. Previous studies have documented that 
IPO firms in the mining industry have a higher degree of underpricing than IP0s in other 
industries, given the fact that mining IP0s exhibit greater risk, and thus investors demand 
greater return (see for example Ritter, 1984). Later in the section, I examine the 
difference in initial returns between two major groups of industries. 
Looking at the year of IPO base, as shown in Panel B of Table 5.4, this study 
finds that during the bullish periods, when more firms made IP0s (especially for 1989 
and 1993), the degree of underpricing is greater than during the bearish periods. Husnan 
( 1994) and Winarto ( 1997) note that Indonesian stock markets experienced market 
booms in 1989, 1990, 1993, and 1994. Husnan and Winarto assume that these periods to 
be the bullish periods, a period where there are considerably many firms making IP0s 
compared to other period. Of these periods, only in 1994 are Indonesian IP0s marginally 
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underpriced (p < .12). Thus, it appears that firms that went public during these periods 
were more underpriced than firms that made IPOs in other periods. This finding supports 
Ritter's ( 1991) claim of the existence of a cycle in IPO underpricing. That is, IPO firms 
tend to be more underpriced when more IPOs enter the market and less underpriced when 
fewer IPOs enter the market. As can be seen in Panel B, Indonesian IPO firms are 
significantly underpriced in six of the nine years of examination. 
To examine the behaviour of the initial returns in initial trading days, the first 
twenty days of trading are analysed. Table 5.5 shows the average daily raw and adjusted 
initial returns as well as the cumulative mean returns over twenty days subsequent to the 
first trading day. The results of tests of mean differences of the cumulative returns 
suggest that neither the mean raw, nor market adjusted, returns in the subsequent days 
following the issue is significantly different from zero. This finding confirms the 
assertion that investors will not be able to earn significant abnormal returns in the days 
following the issue of an IPO. The evidence of no excess return in the aftermarket prices 
is indicative of efficiency in the pricing of the Indonesian secondary market. Thus, 
investors who bought in the secondary market were unlikely to earn excess returns on 
average over various trading periods from one day to one month. 
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Table 5.5 
Mean Daily Initial Return and Cumulative Mean Return of the IPO Firms 
Day Raw Initial Cumulative Market Adjusted Cumulative 
Return Raw. Return Initial Return Market Adjusted 
Return 
1 9.478 9.47 9.498 9.49 
2 -0.22 9.25 -0.21 9.28 
3 0.41 9.66 0.45 9.73 
4 -0.15 9.51 -0.16 9.57 
5 0.56 10.07 0.31 9.88 
6 0.19 10.26 0.11 9.99 
7 -0.03 10.23 0.21 10.20 
8 -0.20 10.03 -0.11 10.09 
9 -0.30 9.73 0.31 10.40 
10 0.04 9.77 0.20 10.60 
11 0.04 9.81 0.01 10.61 
12 -0.05 9.76 -0.03 10.58 
13 -0.37 9.39 -0.42 10.16 
14 0.36 9.75 0.88 11.04 
15 -0.11 9.64 -0.73 10.31 
16 0.25 9.89 0.41 10.72 
17 0.09 9.98 0.21 10.93 
18 -0.07 9.91 -0.08 10.85 
19 0.09 10.00 -0.02 10.83 
20 -0.05 9.95 0.18 11.01 
• denotes coefficient being significantly different from zero at the 0.001 level. 
Raw initial return is measured as (P1 - P1• 1) / P1. 1• The market adjusted initial return is measured as [(Pj,1 -
Pj.off) / Pj.off] - [(MR;, - MRj.1-1) / MRi,1-d, 
Figure 5.1 presents the behaviour of initial day's returns of IPO firms examined in 
this study. The graph shows the average cumulative raw initial returns and market 
adjusted initial returns from the first to the twentieth day of trading. The market adjusted 
initial returns exceed the raw initial returns starting in the eighth day of trading. 
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bought shares at the offering price and sold them at the end of the first week will earn, on 
average, an abnormal return of 10.24% (the returns range from -35.29% to 113.79%). 
The mean return of 10.24% is statistically significant (p < .001). A significant mean raw 
return of 10.56% will be earned if they sell the shares at the end of the sixth month (the 
returns range from -71.05% to 237.93%). Holding shares up to their first anniversary 
year will give investors an abnormal return of 2.57%. This mean return is, however, 
insignificantly different from zero. Qualitatively similar results are obtained when the 
returns are adjusted for the market returns (see Panel B). 
Overall, therefore, the results reported in Table 5.6 indicate that the positive 
returns to investors in Indonesian IPOs are obtained up to their first anniversary year. 
This result suggests that there is still the possibility to earn abnormal returns in the 
Indonesian IPO market within one year of their first trading. The results also suggest that 
the abnormal returns following the issue are related to returns on first day of trading. 
Given the limitation of the number of firms listed on the JSX and also the number of 
comparable firms, this study is unable to compare the initial market performance of the 
IPO firms examined and those of comparable firms. 
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Table 5.6 
Raw Initial Returns over Various Holding Periods of the IPO Firms 
Period Mean Med. S.Dev. Kurt. Skewn. Min. Max. 
Panel A: Raw Return 
1st day 9.47a 5.26 17.06 1,922.47 304.59 -26.47 134.48 
1st week 10.24a 3.70 20.22 781.36 209.00 -35.29 113.79 
2nd week 10.26a 4.62 23.10 635.81 180.34 -50.00 130.34 
3rd week 10.07a 5.60 23.84 486.29 179.86 -48.48 131.38 
1st month 10.21a 4.30 24.72 273.69 168.00 -50.76 117.24 
6th month 10.56b 2.88 48.57 418.18 308.98 -71.05 237.93 
1st year 2.57 -8.06 67.23 834.77 509.01 -98.67 410.34 
Panel B: Adjusted Return 
1st day 9.49a 5.32 17.10 2,072.69 318.75 -26.92 137.07 
1st week 10.16a 4.74 19.48 956.70 223.58 -30.40 117.73 
2nd week 10.05a 5.49 21.80 857.43 198.89 -36.25 133.86 
3rd week 9.99a 6.82 23.03 618.78 134.60 -49.18 135.3 l 
1st month 10.38a 7.58 23.21 382.13 116.80 -48.58 122.38 
6th month 13.22a 9.93 42.33 533.13 137.79 -74.41 236.77 
1st year 7.04 -5.51 63.47 974.18 204.84 -121.86 401.94 
-
1 and b denote the coefficient as being significantly different from zero at the O.OOland 0.01 levels, 
respectively. 
The raw initial returns are measured as the difference between the price at period t minus the offer price 
divided by the offer price, while for the adjusted initial returns the measures are adjusted by the market 
return in their corresponding periods. 
The return for the other periods is calculated as follows: Rt= P1 - Po/ P0, where P, is the price at period t 
and Po is the offering price. For the adjusted return, the market return on the corresponding periods is used. 
In the following, I examine the relationship between the IPO' s time lapse and the 
degree of underpricing. Previous studies, such as How et al. ( 1995) and Lee et al ( 1996a), 
have shown that the degree of underpricing is negatively related to the time lapse of the 
issue. Time lapse is defined as the number of days from the day the statement of 
111 
registration becomes effective to the date of listing. These studies use Australian IPOs. 
How et al. argue that the level of time lapse, or the amount of time to listing, is a 
potential proxy for the level of informed demand. They further argue that an issue that 
has a shorter filing period (which also means that it is sold more quickly) has a 
significantly higher level of informed demand and is thus subject to greater underpricing. 
Thus, a negative relationship between the level of time lapse and the degree of 
underpricing is predicted. Common sense also suggests that when there is sufficient time 
to assess the IPO, as indicated by a longer time lapse, investors will be able to value the 
IPO better, resulting in lowering the ex ante uncertainty and thus lower underpricing. 
To test whether this finding holds for Indonesian IP0s, I divide the sample firms 
into three groups based on their time lapse. Table 5.7 shows the time lapse between the 
listing date and the first day of trading alongside the descriptive statistics of initial 
returns. The time lapse between the registration date and the first day of trading ranges 
from 7 to 90 days, with mean and median values of 41.95 and 40 days, respectively. 
The results shown in Table 5. 7 suggest that IPO firms with longer time lapses are 
marginally more underpriced than those with shorter time lapses. That is, the longer the 
time lapse the higher is the degree of underpricing. The t-tests between groups, however, 
do not show that the means are significantly different. This finding is similar to that of 
James et al. (1995) of unit trust IP0s in Australia. The pair-wise correlation, not reported 
in the Table, between the time lapse and the degree of underpricing indicates a positive 
but insignificant correlation of 0.0946. This finding is in contrast to How et al. (1995) 
and Lee et al. (1996a) who document an inverse relation between the time lapse and the 
degree of underpricing in Australian IP0s. 
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Table 5.7 
Initial Returns and Time Lapse of the IPO Firms 
Initial return is the raw initial return. Time lapse is measured as the periods from the effective date of the 
statement of registration to the listing date and is expressed in the number of days. 
Group Time Lapse #of firms Mean Median S.Dev. Min. Max. 
(days) 
I :5 33 52 9.32a 6.17 13.94 -24.29 56.73 
II 34 ~48 50 7.28a 4.18 15.00 -26.47 50.00 
m >48 47 11.98a 5.41 21.66 -5.19 134.48 
a denotes coefficient as being significantly different from zero at the 0.00 l level. 
As discussed earlier, industry membership is related to the degree of 
underpricing; that is, certain industry types exhibit greater initial returns than do others 
(Refer to Table 5.3). Earlier evidence shows that the degree of underpricing differs 
significantly between industries (Ritter, 1984). Ritter finds that IPOs in the mining 
industry are, on average, more underpriced than IP0s in other industries. To examine 
whether initial return is related to industry membership, the sample firms are partitioned 
into two industry groups. Thus, the results shown in Table 5.8 would complement earlier 
findings reported in Table 5.3. 
Due to the limitation of the numbers of IPO firms in the mining industry, this 
study only examines two groups of industries. The group classification is based on the 
following reasoning. Firstly, the JSX, and also some national newspapers such as 
Kompas and Bisnis Indonesia, have regularly published company stock performance 
according to their industry membership. As well as a classification based on individual 
industries, they are also grouped into two or more larger categories. The manufacturing 
industry is one of them, and it consists of three industries: basic industry and chemicals, 
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miscellaneous industries, and consumer goods industry. Secondly, an earlier study failed 
to find any significant differences between single industries (Hanafi, 1998). Thus, 
grouping companies into smaller classifications is expected to shed some further light. 
Table 5.8 provides the results of assessing the relationship between industry 
membership and initial returns. The first group (labelled manufacturing) consists of 109 
firms. The second group comprises those industries that are not in the first group, and it 
consists of 40 firms. The results show that IPO firms in the first group exhibit lower 
initial returns compared to those in the second group. The t-test of the mean differences 
between groups is, however, insignificant (t = .671, p < .252). This finding suggests that 
there is no significant difference in initial returns between the two major groups of 
industries. Thus, it appears that industry membership is not related to initial return 
variation. This finding supports that of Hanafi ( 1998). 
Table 5.8 
Initial Returns and Industry Membership of the IPO Firms 
Industry # of firms Mean Median S.Dev. Min. Max. 
31-39, 41-49, 109 9.03a 5.26 18.91 -26.47 134.48 
51-59 
11-19,21-29, 40 10.683 6.66 10.56 -5.26 33.68 
71-79, 91-99* 
• denotes coefficient as being significantly different from zero at the 0.00 I level. 
Initial returns are measured as the raw return. Industry classification is defined as follows: 11-19 for 
agriculture, 21-29 for mining, 31-39 for basic industry and chemical, 41-49 for miscellaneous industry, 51-
59 for consumer goods industry, 71-79 for infrastructure, utility, and transportation, and 91-99 for trade and 
services. 
* This excludes companies in the 98 code, which is the investment company. 
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5.2 Preliminary Analyses of the Relationship between Independent Variables 
and Initial Returns 
Before proceeding to univariate and multivariate analyses, I will first examine the 
relationship between initial returns and each of the selected proxies for ex ante 
uncertainty used in this study. In doing so, the sample firms are first partitioned into high 
and low ex ante uncertainty subsamples. The average initial returns for the subsamples 
are then compared with each other using a standard t-test. For each of the continuous 
measures (FL, OL, SIZE, ORO, PRO, OWN, AGE, and SDR) the median value is used 
as the cut-off point, and splits the firms into two subsamples. For the dichotomous 
variables (UWQ and MC), the sample firms are split on the basis of the value assigned to 
the variables. It is predicted that underpricing decreases with size, profitability, 
underwriter quality, and years in operation (age). Underpricing is expected to increase 
with financial leverage, operating leverage, growth, ownership retention, standard 
deviation of aftermarket return, and market condition. 
Table 5.9 presents the statistics for initial returns for the sample partitioned on the 
basis of median values for the continuous variables and the value assigned to the 
variables for the dichotomous variables. As can be seen in Panel A of Table 5.9 and in 
support of the prediction, it is found that initial returns increase with financial leverage. 
This is correct for all three financial leverage measures (FLl, FL2, and FL3). The 
strongest relationship is found for FLl. The t-tests for differences in means show that 
IPO firms with lower financial leverage have significantly lower initial returns compared 
to those with higher financial leverage (p < .001 for FLl and p < .10 for FL2 and FL3). 
The mean initial returns for firms with low and high FLl are 4.76% and 14.27%, 
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respectively. The mean initial returns for firms with low and high FL2 and FL3 are 7.25% 
and 11.73%, and 7.29% and 10.89%, respectively. 
The results reported in Panel B of Table 5.9 do not support the prediction that IPO 
firms having high level operating leverage, measured as the ratio of total assets to sales 
(OLl) and fixed assets to total assets (OL2), tend to have higher average initial returns. In 
fact, operating leverage appears to have been negatively related to initial returns. The 
mean initial returns for firms with low and high OLl and OL2 are 13.42% and 5.4%, and 
12.55% and 6.35%, respectively. The t-tests of mean differences between subsamples for 
the two measures of operating leverage are statistically significant (OLl has p < .01, 
while OL2 has p < .05). 
In support of the prediction, the IPO size (SIZE2), measured as the natural 
logarithm of gross proceeds, decreases with initial return (Panel C). That is, larger IP0s 
tend to experience, on average, lower degrees of underpricing (the mean initial returns for 
low and high IPO size are 13.42% and 5.47%, respectively). The t-test for mean 
differences is significant at the 5% level. The result using natural logarithm of sales 
(SIZE1) in the most current year prior to the offering, however, is in sharp contrast to that 
using gross proceeds. IPO firms with larger sales appear to be more underpriced than 
IPOs with lower sales. The mean difference, however, is not significant (t = 0.132). Thus, 
the degree of underpricing is increasing with the level of sales. 
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Table 5.9 
Average and Standard Deviation of Initial Return Partitioned on the Basis of Median 
Value for Continuous Variables and on the Basis of the Value Assigned to 
the Variables for Dichotomous Variables 
FL! is measured as total debt/ (total assets+ initial market value of equity); FL2 is measured as total debt/ 
total assets; FL3 is measured as long term debt/ total assets; OLI total assets/ sales; OL2 fixed assets/ 
total assets; SIZE l is the natural logarithm of sales for the last fiscal year; SIZE2 is the natural logarithm of 
gross proceeds of the issue; GROI is measured as (sale&i - sale&i.1) / sale&i.1; GR02 is measured as (total 
assets, - total assetSt.1) / total assetSt.1; PROl is the ratio of operating profit to sales; PR02 is the ratio of net 
income after tax to sales; PR03 is the ratio of net income after tax to total assets; UWQ is the measure of 
underwriter quality and takes a value of one for high quality underwriter and zero otherwise; OWN is the 
retained ownership level and is measured as the portion of shares held by the issuer after the issue; LAGE is 
the natural logarithm of years in operation, SDR is the standard deviation of the first ten days return, 
excluding the first day return; MC is market condition and takes a value of one for a firm making an IPO 
during a bullish market and zero otherwise. FL is financial leverage; OL is operating leverage; GRO is firm 
growth; PRO is profitability, UWQ is underwriter quality, OWN is ownership retention, SDR is standard 
deviation of returns, and MC is market condition. Ex ante uncertainty, and consequently underpricing, is 
predicted to increase with financial leverage (FL), operating leverage (OL), growth (GRO), ownership 
retention level (OWN), standard deviation of return (SDR), and market condition (MC), and decrease with 
firm size (SIZE), profitability (PRO), underwriter quality (UWQ), and IPO age (LAGE). 
Variablea Partition #Firm Mean UP crUP t-valueP 
(F-value)' 
Panel A: Financial Leverage (%) 
FLl :5 39.60 75 4.76 9.86 3.509a 
> 39.60 74 14.25 21.10 (4.757a) 
FL2 :5 66.17 75 7.25 13.52 1.605d 
> 66.17 74 11.73 19.86 (2.156a) 
FL3 :5200.00 75 7.29 13.66 1.577d 
> 200.00 74 10.89 19.78 (2.084a) 
Panel B: Operating Leverage(%) 
OLl :5 115.71 75 13.42 20.03 2.925b 
> 115.71 74 5.47 12.29 (2.679a) 
OL2 :5 34.38 75 12.55 20.01 2.254c 
> 34.38 74 6.35 12.82 (2.281a) 
Panel C: Firm Size (Natural Logarithm) 
SIZE1 :524.8009 75 9.29 13.53 0.132 
> 24.8009 74 9.66 20.11 (2.208a) 
SIZE2 :5 24.4121 75 13.42 20.49 2.924b 
> 24.4121 74 5.47 11.50 (3.174a) 
Panel D: Firm Growth (%) 
GROl :5 31.38 75 8.76 14.69 -0.513 
> 31.38 74 10.19 19.24 (1.715b) 
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Table 5.9 (continued) 
GR02 s 33.53 75 11.25 21.62 1.291 ii 
> 33.53 74 7.67 10.47 (4.291 8 ) 
Panel E: Firm Profitability (%) 
PROl S 15.95 75 11.59 19.46 1.536d 
> 15.95 74 7.32 14.03 (1.924b) 
PR02 $7.80 75 11.93 19.75 1.789c 
>7.80 74 6.97 13.50 (2.141 8 ) 
PR03 $6.26 75 10.68 19.52 0.868 
>6.26 74 8.25 14.17 (1.899b) 
Panel F: The Quality of Underwriter 
UWQ 0 32 8.75 15.10 0.296 
l 117 9.67 17.61 (1.360) 
Panel G: The Level of Retained Ownership (%) 
OWN $76.90 75 7.57 13.55 1.373d 
> 76.90 74 11.40 19.91 (2.1598 ) 
Panel H: Age (Operating History) (year) 
AGE ~ 16.00 73 10.35 13.16 0.619 
> 16.00 76 8.63 20.16 (2.3478 ) 
Panel I: The Standard Deviation of Aftermarket Returns (%) 
SDR $2.21 75 8.12 11.55 0.973 
>2.21 74 10.85 21.23 (3.7738 ) 
Panel J: Market Condition (the State of the Market) 
MC 0 53 8.09 13.95 1.183 
1 96 11.97 21.51 (3.2938 ) 
Panel K: Offering Price and Number of Shares 
PRICE $4,750.00 75 9.43 15.69 0.030 
>4,750.00 74 9.52 18.45 (1.382d) 
# of Shares ::; 9,300,000 73 13.28 20.24 2.702b 
> 9,300,000 76 5.82 12.27 (2.6778 ) 
a, b, c. d. denote coefficient as being significantly different from zero at the 0.00 I, 0.0 I, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. 
p t-test values for differences in average of raw initial return between high and low ex ante uncertainty 
subsamples. The subsamples are formed on the basis of the selected proxies for ex ante uncertainty. 
cp F-test values for differences in variance of raw initial return between high and low ex ante uncertainty 
subsamples. The subsamples are formed on the basis of the selected proxies for ex ante uncertainty. 
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Although not reported here, a similar result of a positive association is evident 
when total assets is used as the proxy for firm size. This conflicting result is interesting 
given the nature of these two proxies for firm size, which suggests that they must have 
been positively correlated (i.e., larger firms tend to have larger offerings). The coefficient 
of the bivariate correlation between gross proceeds and sales is 54.00 {p < .001). The 
correlation coefficient between sales and initial return is 0.0320%, while the correlation 
coefficient between gross proceeds and initial return is 28.50 {p < .001) (Table 5.11). 
Given this low correlation coefficient, sales might not be a good proxy for firm size. In 
addition, as shown in Table 3.5, previous studies have found that the coefficients for 
sales, as a proxy for firm size in the test of cross-sectional variance of initial return, have 
been mixed and inconsistent. On the other hand, the gross proceeds or issue size have 
been consistently and negatively related to the degree of underpricing. 
The relation between initial return and firm growth is shown in Panel D of Table 
5.9. It appears that underpricing decreases with firm growth, when growth is measured as 
total assets growth. The mean initial returns for low and high assets growth firms are 
11.25% and 7.67%, respectively. The t-test of mean differences is significant only at the 
10% level. In contrast to total assets growth, it is found that IPO firms with higher sales 
growth tends to be more underpriced than those with lower sales growth (the mean initial 
returns are 8.76% and 10.19%, respectively). Thus, a mixed finding in relation to the 
association between initial returns and the proxies for firm growth is evident. However, 
as shown in the next section, these two proxies for growth have a negative relationship 
with initial returns. The findings reported in Panel D do not support the prediction that 
initial return increases with firm growth. 
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Panel E of Table 5.9 shows that, on average, IPO firms with higher levels of 
profitability tend to be less underpriced, compared to those with lower profitability. The 
mean initial returns for low and high PRO l, PR02, and PR03 are 11.59% and 7 .32%, 
11.93% and 6.97%, and 10.68% and 8.25%, respectively). The t-tests of mean differences 
show that only PRO 1 and PR02 are significantly different at the 10% level. Overall, the 
findings reported in Panel E support the prediction that initial return decreases with 
profitability. 
The t-tests of the differences in average initial returns for high and low 
subsamples formed on the basis of selected accounting risk measures suggest that the 
initial returns of firms with high average initial return are statistically greater than those 
with low average initial return at the 5% level. This significance level holds for each of 
selected accounting risk proxies except for Growth, which is significant at the 10% level. 
The results of the F-tests for differences in the variance of initial return provide further 
evidence that the selected accounting risk proxies appear to capture the dimension of ex 
ante uncertainty. The F-tests indicate that the variance between subsamples are 
statistically significant at the 0.1% level except for GROl, PROl, and PR03 (significant 
at the 1 % level). It should be noted, however, that the F-test values have considerably 
high variation. The F-values range from 1.715 to 4.757. This suggests that some 
accounting risk measures have a better ability to discriminate between high and low ex 
ante uncertainty, while some may have been identified as noisy proxies (those with lower 
F-values). Results using adjusted initial returns are qualitatively similar to those using 
raw initial returns (See Appendix 1 ). 
In summary, despite previous evidence of mixed findings concerning the relation 
between the degree of underpricing and the proxies for accounting risk measures, it has 
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been shown that the selected accounting risk proxies appear to capture the extent of 
initial return. This has made it difficult to draw inferences about the overall relation 
between accounting risk proxies and the underpricing of Indonesian IPOs. However, as 
some variables have been found to be significantly related to the extent of underpricing, it 
can be argued that the selected accounting risk measures are potential proxies for ex ante 
uncertainty. This assertion is empirically supported in later sections. 
Panels F through J of Table 5.9 present tests of the relation between initial returns 
and the control variables. Panel F shows that, out of 149 sample firms, 117 IPOs are 
underwritten by a prestigious underwriter. In contrast to the prediction, it appears that 
IPO firms engaged with more prestigious underwriters are more underpriced than those 
that do not employ prestigious underwriters. The mean initial returns for firms with low 
and high quality underwriters are 9.31 % and 9.62%, respectively. However, this modest 
difference is not statistically significant. 
The relationship between initial return and the level of ownership retention is 
shown in Panel G. The results suggest that underpricing increases with ownership levels, 
which is in support of the prediction (the mean initial returns for low and high ownership 
levels are 7 .57% and 11.40%, respectively). The difference of initial returns between 
firms with low and high ownership retention is significant at the 10% level. Further, this 
study finds that younger IP0s tend to be more underpriced than older ones (Panel H of 
Table 5.7). The mean initial returns for younger IPOs is 9.93%, and 8.91% for older 
IPOs. The t-test of mean differences is, however, insignificant at the traditional level. 
Underpricing appears to increase with the standard deviation of aftermarket 
returns (Panel I), which is in support of the prediction of a positive relationship. The 
mean initial returns for IPO firms with low and high standard deviations of aftermarket 
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return are 8.11 % and 10.85%, respectively. The mean difference between these two 
groups is, however, insignificant. Panel I also shows that the standard deviation of initial 
returns for firms experiencing higher variance of aftermarket returns is almost double the 
figure of firms with a lower variance of aftermarket returns (column 5). The high 
standard deviation of initial return could affect the overall relationship between the extent 
of underpricing and the standard deviation of aftermarket return (as shown in the next 
section, this assertion is empirically supported). 
Panel J of Table 5.9 shows that the initial returns for firms going public during 
hot and cold periods are 11.97% and 8.09%, respectively. Thus, consistent with the 
second phenomenon of IPOs, the cycle in the initial returns, this study finds that firms 
making an IPO during a bull market appear to be more underpriced. However, this 
assertion seems to be premature given the result of the t-test that indicates that the means 
between the two groups are not significantly diffe1ent from each other. 
Table 5.9 also provides evidence that IPO firms selling an issue with a lower 
offering price tend to be more underpriced than those that sell an issue al a higher 
offering prices (Panel K). The mean initial returns for firms with low and high offering 
prices are 9.43% and 9.52%, respectively. The mean initial return is insignificantly 
different between the two groups. Thus, it appears that initial return variation is not 
related to price differences. 
Finally, I examine the possible relationship between the number of issued shares, 
which is a potential proxy for liquidity, and the degree of underpricing. As shown in 
Panel K of Table 5.9, the number of issued shares decreases with the degree of 
underpricing. IPO firms offering lower numbers of shares are more underpriced than 
those that offer larger share volumes. The mean initial returns for firms offering lower 
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and larger share numbers are 13.28% and 5.82%, respectively. The mean difference is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, firms with lower liquidity, as indicated by 
the number of shares traded, are more underpriced than those IPOs with higher liquidity. 
One possible explanation of this positive relationship is that IPO firms offering lower 
numbers of shares are subject to greater rationing when demand for the issue exceeds the 
available shares being offered. For example, assuming that the number of investors, the 
demand for the issue, and the degree of underpricing are constant, a limited number of 
shares offered will reduce investors' probability of receiving their expected allocated 
shares. This will force them to crowd in the secondary market (especially when the issue 
is perceived as being good value), which will increase the demand for the issue and 
consequently lift the price, finally resulting in higher underpricing. 
The initial analysis of the relationship between the degree of underpricing and the 
control variables suggests that the selected control variables appear to be of potential 
proxies for ex ante uncertainty, at least for the level of retained ownership and the state of 
the market. The F-tests of differences in the variance of initial return between high and 
low ex ante uncertainty subsamples indicate that only the underwriter quality variable is 
not statistically significant. All other variables are significant at the 0.1 % level. Results 
based on the adjusted initial return provide a similar conclusion (See Appendix 1 ). The 
results of univariate analysis provided in the next section give further support for this 
assertion. 
5.3 Univariate Analyses 
As shown in the previous section, the degree of underpricing is related to the 
proxies for ex ante uncertainty. In this section I provide further analysis of the 
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relationship between the degree of underpricing and the proxies for ex ante uncertainty. 
To do so, I perform a simple regression using the raw initial returns as the dependent 
variable and each of the proxies for ex ante uncertainty as the independent variable. 
Because homoscedasticity is rejected in only two out of seventeen simple regressions, 
standard errors and t-statistics are based on simple ordinary least squares. The analysis is 
compiled with the results of the bivariate Pearson correlations between the degree of 
underpricing and each of the proxies for ex ante uncertainty. 
Table 5.10 provides the results of the simple regression tests. Because 
homoscedasticity is rejected in two regressions (FLl and SOR) at the 1 % level, the 
reported standard errors and t-statistics are based on the simple regressions. The results of 
the bivariate correlation are presented in Table 5.11. The results of the simple regressions 
reveal that, out of five accounting risk proxies, only financial leverage is found to be 
significantly related to the initial return. Size is only significantly related to initial return 
when the gross proceeds (SIZE2) are used. Details of research findings are presented 
next. 
All three alternate measures of financial leverage are positively related to the 
degree of underpricing (FL 1 is significant at p < .001 and Fl2 and FL3 are both 
significant at p < .05). Thus, the findings cannot reject the null hypothesis of a positive 
relationship between the level of financial leverage and the degree of underpricing. The 
Pearson correlation coefficients, shown in Table 5.11, support the results of the 
univariate tests, with two financial leverage proxies (FLl and FL3) being positively 
related to the degree of underpricing. FLl has the highest adjusted R-square value 
followed by FL3 and FL2. This initial finding suggests that FLl appears to be a better 
proxy for financial leverage in relation to the degree of underpricing than the other two 
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candidates. Overall, the findings on the relationship between financial leverage and the 
degree of underpricing reported here are consistent with results reported in Table 5.9. 
The coefficients for both proxies for operating leverage are negative, and do not 
support the prediction. Neither proxy is significantly related to the degree of 
underpricing. The findings reported in Table 5.11 on the correlation between operating 
leverage and the degree of underpricing also show similar patterns (Table 5.10). This 
result is consistent with the results reported in Table 5.9. 
While the firms' sales (SIZEl) have a positive but insignificant relationship with 
the degree of underpricing, the second proxy for firm size (i.e., the natural logarithm of 
gross proceeds (SIZE2)) is found to be negatively and significantly related to the degree 
of underpricing (p < .001). The Pearson c0rrelation matrix shows that the issue size 
(SIZE2) is negatively and significantly correlated with the degree of underpricing (p < 
.001). Thus, it appears there is a mixed finding on the relationship between firm size and 
the degree of underpricing. 
As pointed out earlier, the use of sales as the proxy for firm size in an IPO setting 
produces inconsistent results. Some studies find a positive relationship, whilst others find 
a negative relationship. Further, some studies find no significant relationship with the 
degree of underpricing (See Table 3.5). On the other hand, the issue size or gross 
proceeds from the issue is found to be consistently and negatively related to the degree of 
underpricing. Given these conflicting results, at this stage it is difficult to draw inferences 
about the relationship between firm size and the degree of underpricing. However, as 
shown later in the multivariate analysis, SIZE2 appears to be consistently and 
significantly related to the degree of underpricing. 
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Table 5.10 
Simple Regression of Raw Initial Returns on Explanatory Variables (n=149) 
The raw initial return is measured as the difference between the first day closing price and the offer price divided by the offer price. FLI is measured as total debt/ (total assets 
+ initial market value of equity); FL2 is measured as total debt/ total assets; FL3 is mP-asured as long term debt/ total assets; OLI is measured as the ratio of total assets to sales; 
OL2 is measured as the ratio of fixed assets to total assets; SIZE I is the natural logarithm of sales for the last fiscal year; SIZE2 is the natural logarithm of gross proceeds of the 
issue; GROl is measured as (sales1 - sales1• 1) / sales1_1; GR02 is measured as (total assets1 - total assets1_1) / total assets1• 1; PROl is the ratio of operating profit to sales; PR02 is 
the ratio of net income after tax to sales; PR03 is the ratio of net income after tax to total assets; UWQ is the measure of underwriter quality and takes a value of one for high 
quality underwriter and zero otherwise; OWN is the retained ownership level and is measured as the portion of shares held by the issuer after the issue; LAGE is the natural 
logarithm of years in operation, SOR is the standard deviation of the first ten days return, excluding the first day return; MC is market condition and takes a value of one for a 
firm making an IPO during a bullish market and zero otherwise. Standard errors (in parentheses) are from the ordinary least squares regression. FL is financial leverage; OL is 
operating leverage; GRO is firm growth; PRO is profitability, UWQ is underwriter quality. OWN is ownership retention, SOR is standard deviation of returns, and MC is 
market condition. 
FU FL2 FL3 OLl OL2 SIZE1 SIZE2 GROl GR02 PROl PR02 PR03 UWQ OWN LAGE SOR MC 
Coef. .3188 .1563 .0209 -.0092 -.0787 .0041 -.0443 -.0159 -.0355 -.1773 -.2634 -.0232 .0119 .2647 -.0195 .3865 .0624 
(SE) (.0829) (.0789) (.0081) (.0075) (.0697) (.0061) (.0128) (.0287) (.0240) (.1351) (.1773) (.2862) (.0336) (.1277) (.0238) (.6598) (.0286) 
t-stat. 3.8438 1.982c 2.588c -1.237 -1.129 .671 -3.607 8 -.555 -1.477 -1.313 -1.486 -.081 .354 2.073c -.819 .586 2.183c 
Const. -.0328 -.0044 .0449 .1087 .1221 -.0060 1.1759 .1007 .1120 .1251 .1194 .0957 .0848 -.1071 .1453 .0832 .0541 
(SE) (.0356) (.0516) (.0234) (.0182) (.0284) (.1499) (.3001) (.0183) (.0184) (.0274) (.0219) (.0242) (.0297) (.0984) (.0640) (.0232) (.0229) 
t-stat. -.922 -.085 1.916d 5.9688 4.2978 -.040 3.9193 .5.5148 6.0888 4.5703 5.454 3.9558 2.854b -1.093 2.269c 3.5883 2.367c 
Adj. R2 8.46 1.93 3.68 .35 .18 -.37 7.50 -.47 .79 .48 .80 -.67 -.59 2.17 -.22 -.44 2.47 
F-stat. 14.7698 3.927c 6.699c 1.531 1.275 .450 13.0083 .308 2.182 1.723 2.208 .007 .125 4.297c .672 .343 4.767c 
Expected (-) (-) (-) (+) (+) (-) (-) (+) (+) (-) (-) (-) (-) (+) (-) (+) (+) 
Si 
a. b, c, d, denote coefficient as being significantly different from zero at the 0.001, 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
126 
Table 5.11 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Continuous Variables 
Underpricing is measured as the difference between the first day closing price and the offer price divided by the offer price. FLl is measured as total debt / (total 
assets+ initial market value of equity); FL2 is measured as total debt/ total assets; FL3 is measured as long term debt/ total assets; OLl is measured as the ratio of 
total assets to sales; OL2 is measured as the ratio of fixed assets to total assets; SIZE l is the natural logarithm of sales for the last fiscal year; SIZE2 is the natural 
logarithm of gross proceeds of the issue; GROl is measured as (sales, - sales1. 1) / sales1•1; GR02 is measured as (total assetSt - total assets1•1) / total assets1.1; PROl is 
the ratio of operating profit to sales; PR02 is the ratio of net income after tax to sales; PR03 is the ratio of net income after tax to total assets; UWQ is the measure 
of underwriter quality and takes a value of one for high quality underwriter and zero otherwise; OWN is the retained ownership level and is measured as the portion 
of shares held by the issuer after the issue; LAGE is the natural logarithm of years in operation, SDR is the standard deviation of the first ten days return, excluding 
the first day return; MC is market condition and takes a value of one for a firm making an IPO during a bullish market and zero otherwise. Standard errors (in 
parentheses) are from ordinary least squares regression. FL is financial leverage; OL is operating leverage; GRO is firm growth; PRO is profitability, UWQ is 
underwriter quality, OWN is ownership retention, SDR is standard deviation of returns, and MC is market condition. All tests are two tailed-tests. 
UP FLl FL2 FL3 OLl OL2 SlZEl SIZE2 GROl GR02 PROl PR02 PR03 UWQ OWN LAGE SOR 
UP 1.000 
FLl 
FL2 
FL3 
OLl 
OL2 
SIZEl 
SIZE2 
GROl 
GR02 
PROl 
PR02 
PR03 
UWQ 
OWN 
LAGE 
SOR 
MC 
0.299a 1.000 
0.154 0.728a l.000 
0.204c 0.599a 0.8138 l.000 
-0.105 -0.057 -0.106 -0.105 l.000 
-0.100 -0.142 -0.226b -0.217b 0.244b 1.000 
0.032 0.335a 0.093 0.004 -0.145 0.027 l.000 
-0.285a -0.246b -0.139 -0. J 7 l c 0.262a 0.265a 0.640" l.000 
-0.049 -0.049 -0.030 -0.094 -0.049 0.099 -0.001 0.002 1.000 
-0.124 -0.048 -0.122 -0.122 0.028 -0.013 -0.118 -0.060 0.385" 
-0.115 -0.259" -0.3388 -0.282a 0.425" 0.4988 -0.075 0.328" 0.032 
-0.127 -0.369a -0.47la -0.3858 0.433a 0.441a -0.125 0.2698 0.042 
-0.012 -0.4238 -0.404a -0.382" -0.162 0.164c -0.085 0.004 0.067 
0.022 0.113 0.174c 0.167c -0.050 -0.039 -0.230b -0.177c 0.053 
0.174 0.369" 0.203c 0.223b -0.048 -0.044 0.151 -0.121 -0.004 
-0.090 -0.055 -0.041 -0.011 0.006 -0.121 0.141 0.200c -0.060 
0.043 0.028 0.022 0.118 -0.109 0.064 -0.031 -0.166c 0.028 
0.173c -0.050 0.168c 0.175c 0.013 -0.2llb -0.320" -0.187c -0.124 
l.000 
0.029 1.000 
0.085 0.7648 1.000 
-0.035 0.3478 0.587" 
-0.044 -0.029 -0.053 
0.101 -0.042 0.039 
0.043 0.073 -0.019 
-0.149 -0.041 -0.016 
-0.115 -0.072 -0.082 
l.000 
-0.066 
-0.029 
-0.094 
0.038 
-0.049 
8
' b. c, d. denote coefficient as being significantly different from zero ;1t the 0.00!, 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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1.000 
0.162c l.000 
-0.059 -0.147 
0.019 -0.039 
0.123 0.002 
1.000 
0.129 1.000 
-0.145 0.059 
MC 
l.000 
The coefficients of the two measures of growth are negative. The Pearson 
correlation coefficient also indicates a negative correlation between asset growth and the 
degree of underpricing. This result can not reject the null hypothesis of a negative 
relationship between growth and the degree of underpricing. Neither measure, however, 
is significantly related to the degree of underpricing. 
As predicted, all three measures of profitability have negative relationships with 
the degree of underpricing. Although the correlation coefficients are negative for the 
three measures of profitability, none of them are statistically significant. The finding of a 
negative relationship (obtained from the simple regression analysis) between profitability 
and the degree of underpricing, rejects the null hypothesis of a positive relationship. 
Out of five control variables, two variables (that is, the proportion of shares 
retained by initial owners, and the state of the market) are found to be significantly 
related to the degree of underpricing. Both variables are statistically significant at the 5% 
level. The coefficients found in these two variables are in the expected direction. Both 
the level of ownership retention and the state of the market are positively related to the 
degree of underpricing. Thus, the findings cannot reject the null hypothesis that the level 
of ownership retention, and the state of the market, are positively related to the degree of 
underpricing. 
In contrast to the existing evidence, this study documents a positive but 
insignificant relationship between underwriter prestige and the degree of underpricing. It 
is still unclear whether the positive relationship is caused by bias in determination of 
underwriter quality or other factors. A number of methods have been advocated to deal 
with the selection between prestigious and non-prestigious underwriters, such as by 
separating them on the basis of the lower frequency of the number of services for each of 
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the underwriters. Yet, a consistent outcome of a positive, but insignificant, relationship is 
found. 
As predicted, this study finds that underpricing decreases with the extent of firm 
operating history. This finding suggests that Indonesian IPOs with longer operating 
histories tend to experience a lower degree of underpricing compared to their 
counterparts of younger firms. However, the lack of a significant relationship has, 
perhaps, made this assertion premature. 
The coefficient of the aftermarket standard deviation of return is as predicted but 
insignificant. The finding of a positive relationship between aftermarket standard 
deviation and the initial returns implies that higher underpriced IPOs may be more risky 
than lower ones. This finding is in support of previous results of positive correlations 
between (ex post) risk and the quality of IPOs. 
Overall, the results from the simple regression tests provide modest support for 
the view that the selected accounting risk measures are related to the degree of 
underpricing. Given the preliminary nature of the tests, the findings reported here need 
further investigation. The findings vis-a-vis the control variables appear to be more 
convincing as only one variable (the quality of the underwriter) has a coefficient not in 
support of the prediction. Results using the market adjusted returns and the average of 
the first weeks' prices are qualitatively similar to the use of raw initial returns (See 
Appendixes 2 and 3). Thus, the overall results are not sensitive to the measures used to 
calculate initial returns. 
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5.4 Multivariate Analyses 
Results shown in the previous sections suggest that some accounting risk proxies 
appear to better capture the extent of ex ante uncertainty and thus initial return. The 
multivariate analyses presented in this section generally serve to narrow and refine the 
basic conclusions drawn from the correlation and univariate tests presented in Tables 5.9 
through 5.11. Table 5.12 provides the results of various regression models from possible 
combinations. Altogether, there are eighteen regressions. White's consistent covariance 
matrix estimator is used in estimating the standard errors of residuals to account for the 
presence of heteroscedasticity. This is because White's tests for heteroscedasticity find 
that homoscedasticity is rejected at the 5% level in two out of eighteen regressions. Thus, 
the t-values and standard errors reported in the Table are on the adjusted basis. 
The results reported in Table 5.12 suggest that the selected accounting risk 
proxies are related, to a certain extent, to the degree of underpricing. The adjusted R2 
values range from 1.93 to 12.01. All the regression coefficients using FLl as the proxy 
for financial leverage are statistically significant (Regressions l to 6). For FL2 the 
coefficients are significant in three out of six possible regressions (Regressions 8, 10, and 
12). Further, four out of six regressions are significant when FL3 is used as the proxy for 
financial leverage (Regressions 14, 15, 16, and 18). 
Some proxies are found to be consistently and significantly related to the degree 
of underpricing. These include FLl, S1ZE2, and GR02. The other proxies are significant 
in some, but not in other, regressions. Out of twelve accounting risk proxies, three are 
found to be insignificant in all of the regressions. These are OL2, PROl, and PR02. 
However, given the evidence that the other proxies for accounting risk measures are 
significant in at least some regressions, it can be argued that the proxies are contributing 
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to the significance of the set of accounting risk measures. As the evidence also suggests 
that some proxies are not significant, they might be affected by the presence of 
multicollinearity among variables. As shown in the section, multicollinearity is likely to 
be present. This makes the ability to make inferences about the statistical significance of 
the individual accounting risk measures difficult. 
5.4.1 Test of Hypothesis 2 (Financial Leverage) 
Financial leverage is consistently and positively related to the degree of 
underpricing. This result confirms the findings reported in the previous section. The 
coefficients of FLl are highly significant in all regressions. On the other hand, FL2 is 
only moderately significant in one of six regressions (Regression 12), suggesting that this 
measure is either a poor proxy for financial leverage or is subject to multicollinearity 
problems. FL3 is significant in four of six regressions. Collinearity among variables 
might have impaired the significance level of FL3. The correlation matrix shows that 
FL3 is significantly related to the degree of underpricing (p < .000). Nevertheless, the 
finding of a positive and significant relationship between the proxies for financial 
leverage and the degree of underpricing means I cannot reject the hypothesis (H2). 
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Table 5.12 
Multivariate Tests of Raw Initial Returns on Continuous Variables (n=149) 
The raw initial return is measured as the difference between the first day closing price and the offer price divided by the offer price. FLl is measured as total debt / (total 
assets + initial market value of equity); FL2 is measured as total debt / total assets; FL3 is measured as long term debt / total assets; OLl is measured as the ratio of total 
assets to sales; OL2 is measured as the ratio of fixed assets to total assets; SIZEl is the natural logarithm of sales for the last fiscal year; S1ZE2 is the natural logarithm of 
gross proceeds of the issue; GRO I is measured as (sale5i - sale5i.i) / sales1. 1; GR02 is measured as (total asset5t- total asset5i.1) / total asset5t.1; PROl is the ratio of operating 
profit to sales; PR02 is the ratio of net income after tax to sales; PR03 is the ratio of net income after tax to total assets; UWQ is the measure of underwriter quality and takes 
a value of one for high quality underwriter and zero otherwise; OWN is the retained ownership level and is measured as the portion of shares held by the issuer after the 
issue; LAGE is the natural logarithm of years in operation, SDR is the standard deviation of the first ten days return, excluding the first day return; MC is market condition 
and takes a value of one for a firm making an IPO during a bullish market and zero otherwise. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for White's (1980) 
heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix. FL is financial leverage; OL is operating leverage; GRO is firm growth; PRO is profitability, UWQ is underwriter 
quality, OWN is ownership retention, SDR is standard deviation of returns, and MC is market condition. 
Reg. FLl FL2 FL3 OLl OL2 SIZE1 SIZE2 GROl GR02 PROl PR02 PR03 uw OWN LAGE SOR MC Const. R"Z 
(F) 
1 .3186 -.0101 -.0052 -.0057 .0391 -.0292 .1484 -.0126 .1829 .0638 .0039 8.44 
(.1159) (.0047) (.0045) (.0181) (.0929) (.0323) (.1202) (.0191) (.8812) (.0249) (.0689) (2.373t 
2.750b -2.154c 
-1.158 -.314 .421 -.905 1.235 -.658 .208 2.566c .057 
2 .2945 -.0085 -.0132 -.0315 .1267 -.0313 .2363 .0028 .0006 .0642 .1112 11.10 
(.1100) (.0041) (.0065) (.0170) (.1201) (.0315) (.1393) (.0199) (.8560) (.0241) (.1048) (2.860/ 
2.678b -2.lOlc -2.045c -1.849d 1.055 -.994 1.696d .139 .001 2.658b 1.061 
3 .3750 -.0072 -.0078 -.0276 .4361 -.0302 .1527 -.0042 .0082 .0632 .0087 10.61 
(.1196) (.0030) (.0046) (.0166) (.2279) (.0313) (.1225) (.0196) (.8720) (.0238) (.0671) (2.769)b 
3.135b -2.355c -l.675d -1.667d 1.914d -.964 1.246 -.212 .009 2.654b .129 
4 .2815 .0028 -.0135 -.0022 .0059 -.0261 .2295 -.0004 .2119 .0645 .1089 9.26 
(.1103) (.0769) (.0063) (.0174) (.1105) (.0313) (.1328) (.0196) (.9145) (.0250) (.1031) (2.521/ 
2.552c .0361 -2.146c -.127 .054 -.833 1.728d -.022 .232 2.574c 1.056 
5 .3006 -.0304 -.0053 -.0300) .0047 -.0240 .1798 -.0123 .1807 .0558 .0028 8.48 
(.1141) (.0735) (.0046) .0174) (.1255) (.0314) (.1302) (.0188) (.9094) (.0235) (.0662) (2.381l 
2.634b 
-.414 -1.131 -l.727d .038 -.765 1.382 -.654 .199 2.373c .043 
6 .3403 -.0062 -.0147 -.0288 .4856 -.0283 .2144 .0061 .0067 .0645 .0989 12.01 
(.1098) (.0619) (.0059) (.0165) (.2340) (.0304) (.1319) (.0197) (.8849) (.0243) (.0967) (3.033/ 
3.098b 
-.099 -2.446c -l.751d 2.075c -.932 1.626d .309 .008 2.656b 1.023 
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Table 5.12 (continued) 
Reg. FLl FL2 FL3 OLl 
7 .0857 -.0080 
(.0679) (.0041) 
1.262 -l.943d 
8 .0788 -.0048 
(.0719) (.0038) 
1.097 -1.265 
9 .0860 -.0091 
(.0639) (.0038) 
1.347 -2.383c 
10 .1035 
(.0684) 
1.512 
11 .0405 
(.0749) 
.540 
12 .1158 
(.0623) 
1.858d 
OL2 SIZE1 SIZE2 GROl GR02 PROl PR02 
-.0021 -.0012 -.0559 
(.0050) (.0178) (.1070) 
-.422 -.954 -.5232 
-.0165 -.0348 -.0493 
(.0072) (.0172) (.1446) 
-2.286c -2.025c 
-.341 
-.0037 -.0328 
(.0050) (.0175) 
-.742 -l.873d 
.5111 -.0169 -.0063 -.0356 
(.0786) (.0070) (.0166) (.1136) 
.065 -2.421 C -.379 -.313 
-.0317 -.0045 
-.0328 -.1875 
(.0753) (.0052) (.0174) (.1332) 
-.422 -.475 -l.887d -1.408 
-.0085 -.0185 -.0342 
(.0660) (.0068) (.0174) 
-.128 -2.703b -1.964d 
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PR03 UWQ OWN LAGE SDR MC Const. R2 
(F) 
-.0275 .2714 -.0191 .2788 .0508 -.0552 1.93 
(.0311) (.1364) (.0202) (.9277) (.0242) (.0994) (1.293) 
-.883 1.989c -.946 .301 2.100c -.555 
-.0324 .4249 .0036 .0953 .0507 .1332 6.20 
(.0303) (.1691) (.0212) (.8884) (.0236) (.1212) (l.984t 
-1.069 2.512c .170 .107 2.145c 1.099 
.0111 -.0298 .3095 -.0153 .1352 .0489 -.0448 2.95 
(.2342) (.0305) (.1438) (.0205) (.9192) (.0234) (.0909) (1.453) 
.047 -.978 2.153c -.746 .147 2.093c -.493 
-.0295 .3884 .0013 .2713 .0522 .1303 4.43 
(.0301) (.1559) (.0201) (.9440) (.0244) (.1186) (l.690l 
-.984 2.492c .065 .287 2.142c 1.099 
-.0229 .3286 -.0187 .2597 .0451 -.0441 2.89 
(.0297) (.1488) (.0201) (.9524) (.0233) (.0889) (1.443) 
-.774 2.208c -.929 .273 1.938d -.495 
.1869 -.0321 .4163 .0057 .1119 .048 .1359 6.05 
(.2272) (.0298) (.1609) (.0205) (.9209) (.0234) (.1229) (l.959t 
.823 -1.076 2.587c .277 .122 2.078c 1.106 
,. ;.. ... 
Table 5.12 (continued) 
Reg. FL 1 FL2 FL3 OLl 
13 .0142 -.0079 
(.0063) (.0042) 
2.262c -1.898d 
14 .0112 -.0051 
(.0069) (.0039) 
1.637d -1.280 
15 .0149 -.0083 
(.0066) (.0038) 
2.254c -2.152c 
16 .0132 
(.0061) 
2.169c 
17 .0111 
(.0071) 
1.569 
18 .0148 
(.0065) 
2.276c 
Exp. (-) (-) (-) (+) 
Si 
OL2 SIZE1 SIZE2 GROl GR02 PROl PR02 PR03 UWQ OWN LAGE SOR MC Const. R7 
-.0003 -.0081 
(.0049) (.0183) 
-.069 -.442 
-.0151 
(.0074) 
-2.035c 
-.0019 
(.0050) 
-.372 
.0082 -.0152 -.0032 
(.0785) (.0070) (.0168) 
.105 -2.165c -.188 
-.0297 -.0013 
(.0746) (.0052) 
-.397 -.246 
-.0074 -.0166 
(.0663) (.0070) 
-.111 -2.371 C 
(+) (-) (-) (+) 
-.0337 
(.0176) 
-l.916d 
-.0302 
(.0180) 
-l.674d 
-.0306 
(.0179) 
-l.711d 
-.0330 
(.0179) 
-l.840d 
(+) 
-.0392 
(.1024) 
-.383 
-.0414 
(.1084) 
-.382 
(-) 
-.0397 
(.0176) 
-.268 
-.1378 
(.1296) 
-1.063 
(-) 
(F) 
-.0283 .2419 -.0205 .1679 .0492 -.0525 3.06 
(.0311) (.1389) (.0199) (.9128) (.0241) (.0976) (1.471) 
-.909 1.742d -1.026 .184 2.047c -.538 
-.0321 .4091 .0025 .0205 .0493 .1374 6.74 
(.0302) (.1746) (.0211) (.8879) (.0273) (.1242) (2.076/ 
-1.062 2.343c .117 .023 2.079c 1.107 
.0971 -.0302 .2736 -.0164 .0241 .0470 -.0457 4.10 
(.2468) (.0304) (.1491) (.0203) (.9096) (.0233) (.0902) (l.637l 
.393 -.995 1.836d -.809 .026 2.019c -.506 
-.0288 .3757 .0006 .1739 .0516 .1354 5.03 
(.0299) (.1609) (.0199) (.9376) (.243) (.1223) (l.789)d 
-.959 2.334c .029 .186 2.123c 1.108 
-.0248 .2917 -.0199 .1756 .0429 -.0436 3.74 
(.0299) (.1531) (.0199) (.9456) (.229) (.0880) (1.579) 
-.828 1.905d -.999 .186 1.867d -.499 
.2218 -.0309 .4012 .0047 .0102 .0477 .1416 6.69 
(.2401) (.0295) (.1677) (.0203) (.9246) (.0233) (.1268) (2.068/ 
.924 -1.046 2.393c .230 .011 2.042c 1.117 
(-) (-) (+) (-) (+) (+) 
a, b. c, d, denote coefficient as being significantly different from zero at the 0.001, 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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5.4.2 Test of Hypothesis 3 (Operating Leverage) 
The coefficients of the operating leverage proxies have been mixed, especially when 
OL2 (the ratio of fixed assets to total assets) is used. None of the coefficients of OL2 is 
significant. The coefficients of OLl (the ratio of total assets to sales) are negative and 
significant, except in Regressions 8 and 14 where the coefficients are positive and 
insignificant. Thus, it appears that capital intensity, measured by total assets to sales ratio, is 
related to the degree of underpricing. The negative and significant coefficients of OLl in 
almost all regressions are obviously in contrast to prior expectation. The negative coefficient 
for operating leverage is not surprising given its negative correlation with financial leverage. 
The discussions in Section 5.6 show why this contradictory finding occurs. Thus, the 
hypothesis (H3) that operating leverage is positively related to the degree of underpricing is 
rejected. 
5.4.3 Test of Hypothesis 4 (Firm Size) 
The coefficient of the SIZE variable is in the expected direction as it has a negative 
association with the degree of underpricing. Size is significantly and negatively related to the 
degree of underpricing when the issue size (SIZE2) is used in the regressions, while SIZE1 
(measured as the natural logarithm of firm sales) is only significant in one of eighteen 
regressions. This would suggest that the issue size (SIZE2) is a better proxy for firm size 
rather than sales, at least for the current study. The coefficient of SIZE1 is negative in the 
multiple regression models, which is in the opposite direction to the results obtained in the 
univariate analysis. This could be attributed to colliniearity between variables. Thus, the 
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hypothesis ("4) that IPO size is negatively related to the degree of underpricing is consistent 
with the results. 
5.4.4 Test of Hypothesis 5 (Firm Growth) 
In contrast to the prediction, growth is found to be negatively related to the degree of 
underpricing. Growth is significant in all possible regressions when the total assets growth is 
used in the regressions. On the other hand, none of the coefficients of sales growth is 
significant, suggesting that this measure could be not a good proxy for firm growth with 
respect to IPO initial returns. Thus, the hypothesis (H5) that firm growth is positively related 
to the degree of underpricing is not supported. 
5.4.5 Test of Hypothesis 6 (Profitability) 
The coefficients for profitability ratios are mixed. This study predicts that profitability 
is negatively related to the degree of underpricing. The coefficients of profitability ratios are 
negative only for PRO 1 (net operating profit margin) and PR02 (net profit margin) and only 
when financial leverage is measured either as FL2 or FL3. In all other regressions the 
coefficients of the profitability ratios are positive. Profitability is positively and statistically 
related to the degree of underpricing only for PR03 (return on total assets) and only when 
FLl is used as the proxy for financial leverage. Given the mixed findings on the regression 
coefficients for profitability, it is difficult to draw inferences regarding their relationship with 
the degree of underpricing. The lack of significance levels on the coefficient for profitability 
measures makes inferences ambiguous. However, as two of the proxies have more negative 
coefficients and also referring back to the findings in the previous section, it can be argued 
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that the profitability ratio tends to be negatively related to the degree of underpricing. Thus, 
~ is moderately supported. 
In summary, it can be argued that the selected accounting risk measures appear to 
have been able to explain the variation of the degree of underpricing in Indonesian IPOs. 
However, this conclusion must be treated with caution. The presence of multicollinearity 
might have impaired the ability to draw conclusions about the significance of each of the 
accounting risk measures. Taken collectively, the findings allow acceptance of the alternate 
hypothesis that accounting risk measures are related to the magnitudes of underpricing in 
Indonesian IPOs. As shown later in the sensitivity analysis, the findings are robust across 
various measures and alternatives. 
Out of five control variables, two variables are found to be statistically related to the 
degree of underpricing. These are the level of ownership retained by the issuers, and the state 
of the market. The coefficients for these two control variables are in the expected direction. 
Although the coefficients of the other three variables are, as expected, neither coefficient is 
statistically significant. 
5.4.6 Test of Hypothesis 7 (Underwriter Quality) 
In contrast to the findings of the univariate analysis of a positive relationship between 
the degree of underpricing and the quality of underwriter, the multivariate test produces a 
negative but insignificant association. The result is somewhat suggestive that IPO firms with 
less ex ante uncertainty, or total firm risk, engage relatively prestigious underwriters. Thus, 
results of the multivariate analysis suggest that the hypothesis of a negative relationship 
between underwriter quality and the degree of underpricing is not supported (H7). 
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5.4.7 Test of Hypothesis 8 (Ownership Retention) 
The level of ownership retention (OWN) is positively and statistically significant in 
fifteen of eighteen regressions. Ownership retention is not significant when the firm sales 
level (SIZEl) and FLl (financial leverage is measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets 
plus the initial market value of equity) are used in the regressions (Regressions l, 3, and 5). 
Furthermore, the significance level of ownership retention is much smaller when SIZEl is 
included in the regression. The results suggest that the level of ownership retention provides a 
signal about the quality of the IPO, giving additional support for the signalling model of 
Leland and Pyle (1977). Thus, the finding of a positive and significant relationship between 
the level of ownership retention and the degree of underpricing means I cannot reject the 
hypothesis (ffs). 
5.4.9 Test of Hypothesis 9 (IPO Age) 
The coefficients of the firms' years in operation (LAGE) are generally in the expected 
direction; that is, IPO age is negatively related to the degree of underpricing. This suggests 
that IPO firms with relatively longer operating histories experience a lower degree of 
underpricing, on average. Negative coefficients are found in ten of the total of eighteen 
regressions. The coefficients of LAGE are positive only when S2 and PR03 are included in 
the regressions. The inconsistencies in the signs of age coefficients may be affected by the 
presence of high collinearity between independent variables. The collinearity diagnoses in the 
next section suggest this may be responsible for these inconsistencies. Nevertheless, 
hypothesis (H9) that the IPO age is negatively related to the degree of underpricing is not 
supported. 
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5.4.10 Test of Hypothesis 10 (Aftermarket Standard Deviation) 
In support of prior expectations, the multivariate analysis finds that the aftermarket 
standard deviation of return is positively related to the degree of underpricing, providing 
further support for Ritter (1987). This finding is consistent with the initial results of the 
univariate analysis and also is consistent with Rizka (1995). None of the coefficients, 
however, is statistically significant at the traditional level. Thus, the hypothesis (H10) that the 
aftermarket standard deviation of returns is positively related to the degree of underpricing is 
not supported. 
5.4.11 Test of Hypothesis 11 (The State of the Market) 
As mentioned earlier, this study finds that the state of the market is positively related 
to the degree of underpricing. The coefficients are significantly different from zero in all 
eighteen regressions. This finding supports the result reported in the previous section. Thus, it 
is evident that IPO firms going public in a bullish period tend to be more underpriced, on 
average, than their counterparts that go public in bearish periods. This provides further 
support for the second phenomenon of the IPO market. Hence, this study cannot reject the 
hypothesis of a positive relationship between the state of the market and the degree of 
underpricing (Hu). 
The results for the control variables suggest that IPO firms with lower ex ante 
uncertainty, or total firm risk, experience a lower degree of underpricing. The negative 
coefficients for underwriter quality and age, and positive coefficients for retained ownership 
level and aftermarket standard deviation, confirm the notion that ex ante uncertainty is 
positively related to firm total risk. 
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In summary, this study finds that accounting risk measures are of potential use as 
proxies for ex ante uncertainty and are, consequently, related to the magnitudes of IPO 
underpricing. Out of five accounting risk proxies examined, two proxies are found to be 
correlated in the expected direction and thus support the hypotheses (Financial Leverage and 
Firm Size). Two other variables are correlated in the opposite direction (Operating Leverage 
and Firm Growth). Conclusions have to be carefully drawn in relation to the coefficient for 
profitability ratio since the proxies for profitability ratio used in this study produce mixed 
results. This study finds that in general the coefficients for all of the five control variables are 
in the expected direction. As shown in Appendix 4, the use of the market adjusted initial 
return, as the dependent variable, produces a qualitatively similar conclusion. Thus, the 
results obtained from the model are robust regardless of the dependent variables used in the 
regressions. 
The low adjusted R2 values, however, raise further questions that other factors could 
be more related to the extent of Indonesian IPO underpricing. This study finds that, on 
average, the model explains just below ten percent of the variation of initial returns. Yet, as 
noted by Beatty and Ritter (1986), ex ante uncertainty proxies would only explain a small part 
of the cross-section variation of IPOs initial returns. This is because ex ante uncertainty is 
unobservable. Thus, the success of the model depends heavily on the success in selecting the 
proxy (Anderson et al., 1995). 
S.S Multicollinearity Diagnoses 
Multicollinearity refers to the presence of high degree of correlation between two or 
more independent variables. Multicollinearity can have harmful effects on multiple 
regressions, particularly in the interpretation of the results. The presence of multicollinearity 
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would affect the ability to draw inferences about the significance of individual independent 
variables. A simple way to detect multicollinearity is to look at the pair-wise relations 
between independent variables. Other, and more powerful ways of detecting 
multicollinearity, are by examination of the condition index and variance inflation factors 
(Hair, Anderson, Tatham & Black, 1995). 
As shown in Table 5.10, there are many pair-wise relations which are correlated at 
statistically significant levels (p < .01 or better). Fomby, Hill, and Johnson (1984) suggest 
that multicollinearity might become a serious problem if the pair-wise correlation is greater 
than 80%. Although none of the pair-wise correlation coefficients shown in Table 5.10 
exceeds the 80% threshold, the presence of many numbers of significantly correlated pairs 
implies that further investigation is needed. 
To detect whether collinearity is present in the regressions, I first examine the extent 
of the variance inflation factors (VIF). The VIF scores for each variable in the eighteen 
regressions are provided in Table 5.13. There appears no evidence of multicollinearity in the 
regression models. Hair et al. (1995) suggests that variance inflation factors above 10 would 
indicate a problem of collinearity between independent variables. From 18 regressions 
examined, none of the independent variables has a VIF score above 10. Indeed, none of the 
independent variables has a score above 2. Thus, the results shown in Table 5.13 suggest that 
multicollinearity is not present in the regressions examined in this study. To further examine 
the presence of multicollinearity, the condition indexes and the coefficient variance of 
proportion of each of the independent variables are examined. 
The condition indexes of each of the eighteen regressions are examined. Table 5.14 
provides the results of multicollinearity detection based on Regression 1. (See also Appendix 
5 for the proportion of variance of coefficient of Regressions 5 and 11 of Table 5.12). Hair et 
al. ( 1995) suggest three steps that can be used to diagnose the presence of multicollinearity 
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(p.153). First, identify all condition indices that have values above the threshold of 30. 
Second, for all condition indices with the value exceeding the threshold value, identify 
variables having a variance proportion coefficient above 50%. Finally, collinearity would be 
indicated if the condition index identified in the first step accounts for a substantial proportion 
of variance of 90% or greater for two or more coefficients. As shown in Table 5.14, two 
condition indices (rows 10 and 11) have values that exceed the 30 threshold. Of these two 
rows, row 11 has two variance values exceeding the 90% threshold (the Intercept and SIZE2). 
This suggests that there exists collinearity between the SIZE variable and the intercept. Thus, 
it can be suggested that multicollinearity is present for the data sets. Although not reported, 
the results of multicollinearity diagnoses using the condition indexes and coefficient of 
variation for other Regressions are qualitatively similar to those reported here. 
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Table 5.13 
Collinearity Diagnoses Using Variance Inflation Factors for Each of the Eighteen 
Regressions as Described in Table 5.12 
FLl is measured as total debt/ (total assets+ initial market value of equity); FL2 is measured as total debt/ total 
assets; FL3 is measured as long term debt / total assets; OLl is measured as the ratio of total assets to sales; OL2 
is measured as the ratio of fixed assets to total assets; SIZE 1 is the natural logarithm of sales for the last fiscal 
year; SIZE2 is the natural logarithm of gross proceeds of the issue; GROl is measured as (sales. - sales1_i) / 
sales._,; GR02 is measured as (total assets1 - total assets1_1) / total assets1_1; PROl is the ratio of operating profit to 
sales; PR02 is the ratio of net income after tax to sales; PR03 is the ratio of net income after tax to total assets; 
UWQ is the measure of underwriter quality and takes a value of one for high quality underwriter and zero 
otherwise; OWN is the retained ownership level and is measured as the portion of shares held by the issuer after 
the issue; LAGE is the natural logarithm of years in operation, SDR is the standard deviation of the first ten days 
return, excluding the first day return; MC is market condition and takes a value of one for a firm making an IPO 
during a bullish market and zero otherwise. FL is financial leverage; OL is operating leverage; GRO is firm 
growth; PRO is profitability, UWQ is underwriter quality, OWN is ownership retention, SDR is standard 
deviation of returns, and MC is market condition. The variance inflation factor (VIF) explains the degree to 
which each independent variable is explained by the other independent variables. Large VIF values, usually a 
cutoff threshold of 10 is used, indicate high collinearity (Hair et al., 1995). So, any coefficient with a factor value 
exceeding 10 denotes a possibility of high collinearity. This collinearity diagnosis is available on SPSS and the 
coefficients reported here were taken directly from the output of SPSS. 
R F F F 0 0 s s G G p p p u 0 L s M 
E L L L L L I I R R R R R w w A D C 
G 1 2 3 1 2 z z 0 0 0 0 0 N G R 
E E 1 2 1 2 3 E 
1 2 
1 1.40 1.28 1.39 1.03 1.35 1.16 1.24 1.10 1.06 1.20 
2 1.52 1.34 1.33 1.08 1.58 1.13 1.32 1.12 1.11 1.16 
3 1.64 1.09 1.43 1.10 1.35 1.16 1.29 1.12 1.09 1.22 
4 1.29 1.53 1.33 1.03 1.51 1.13 1.23 1.20 1.10 1.20 
5 1.52 1.36 1.40 1.10 1.51 1.16 1.32 1.14 1.08 1.27 
6 1.62 1.21 1.35 1.09 1.33 1.14 1.28 1.18 1.12 1.21 
7 1.25 1.27 1.28 1.03 1.39 1.18 1.14 1.10 1.06 1.23 
8 1.47 1.31 1.28 1.09 1.71 1.14 1.16 1.12 1.11 1.15 
9 1.38 1.11 1.33 1.12 1.30 1.18 1.16 1.11 1.08 1.24 
10 1.23 1.54 1.30 1.03 1.57 1.14 1.11 1.19 1.10 1.20 
11 1.44 1.36 1.32 1.11 1.62 1.18 1.20 1.13 1.07 1.29 
12 1.37 1.23 1.27 1.09 1.24 1.14 1.12 1.18 1.12 1.19 
13 1.21 1.27 1.26 1.03 1.33 1.17 1.16 1.10 1.07 1.22 
14 1.35 1.30 1.28 1.09 1.53 1.13 1.17 1.12 1.12 1.16 
15 1.38 1.12 1.33 1.12 1.29 1.17 1.19 1.10 1.09 1.23 
16 1.21 1.54 1.29 1.03 1.51 1.13 1.13 1.20 1.12 1.20 
17 1.34 1.36 1.31 1.11 1.50 1.17 1.23 1.14 1.08 1.29 
18 1.38 1.23 1.27 1.09 1.22 1.14 1.14 1.18 1.13 1.19 
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Table 5.14 
Collinearity Diagnoses Using the Condition Indices and the Decomposition of 
Coefficient Variance Matrix (Regression 1 of Table 5.12)* 
FLl is measured as total debt/ (total assets+ initial market value of equity); OLI is measured as the ratio of 
total assets to sales; SIZE2 is the natural logarithm of gross proceeds of the issue; GR02 is measured as (total 
assetSt - total assets1_1) / total assets,_,; PR02 is the ratio of net income after tax to sales; UWQ is the measure 
of underwriter quality and takes a value of one for high quality underwriter and zero otherwise; OWN is the 
retained ownership level and is measured as the portion of shares held by the issuer after the issue; LAGE is 
the natural logarithm of years in operation, SOR is the standard deviation of the first ten days return, 
excluding the first day return; MC is market condition and takes a value of one for a firm making an IPO 
during a bullish market and zero otherwise. FL is financial leverage; OL is operating leverage; GRO is firm 
growth; PRO is profitability, UWQ is underwriter quality, OWN is ownership retention, SDR is standard 
deviation of returns, and MC is market condition. Values that are boldfaced indicate the possible presence of 
multicollinearity. The condition index above 30 is indicative of the presence of multicollinearity and the 
variance of coefficient above .90 in at least two variables on the same row is indicative of the presence of 
multicollinearity. 
Ro Condi- Inter- Proportion of Variance of Coefficient 
tion cept FLl OLl SIZE2 GR02 PR02 UW OWN LAGE SOR MC w Index 
1 1.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.003 
2 3.561 0.000 0.001 0.456 0.000 0.015 0.030 0.068 0.000 0.000 0.037 0.009 
3 3.666 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.663 0.000 0.103 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.049 
4 4.376 0.000 0.005 0.020 0.000 0.177 0.000 0.401 0.000 0.002 0.260 0.029 
5 5.139 0.000 0.014 0.086 0.000 0.010 0.001 0.280 0.001 0.001 0.428 0.217 
6 5.418 0.000 0.027 0.070 0.000 0.088 0.019 0.073 0.001 0.004 0.196 0.520 
7 6.435 0.000 0.111 0.296 0.000 0.009 0.569 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.013 
8 10.350 0.001 0.555 0.030 0.001 0.007 0.358 0.000 0.002 0.118 0.039 0.024 
9 17.217 0.004 0.164 0.001 0.004 0.021 0.020 0.003 0.086 0.722 0.010 0.044 
10 35.190 0.035 0.027 0.001 0.046 0.002 0.000 0.033 0.898 0.152 0.007 0.004 
11 107.757 0.960 0.094 0.030 0.949 0.004 0.000 0.033 0.012 0.001 0.019 0.087 
* Details of the process of detecting multicollinearity can be found in Hair et al. (1995, pp. 152-154). 
In summary, the tests for the presence of multicollinearity suggest that collinearity 
among the independent variables is present. This means that the inferences for the 
significance levels obtained in the multivariate analysis are impaired by the collinearity 
problems. Thus, conclusions regarding the significance levels of the variables examined must 
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be carefully drawn. Further, recall that the adjusted R2s for the eighteen regressions reported 
in Table 5.12 vary considerably, with the lowest value being of 1.93% and the highest value 
being of 12.01 %. The evidence also suggests that some accounting variables capture better 
the variance of initial returns than do others. This obviously has led to greater variance in the 
adjusted R2 values. The relatively low adjusted R2 values indicate that the model does not 
fully capture the variation of initial returns. Nevertheless, the evidence of significance levels 
might suggest that accounting risk measures examined in this study are related to the extent 
of Indonesian IPO underpricing. 
5.6 Sensitivity Analyses 
Recall that this study considers the effect of negative GROWTH on the degree of 
underpricing. Two possible remedies for addressing the effect of negative growth on the 
extent of initial return are proposed: ( 1) assigning zero growth, or (2) taking the absolute 
value for firms with negative growth. Recall, also, that there might be bias in the 
determination of the quality of the underwriter, as this study follows Rizka (1995) who 
assigned an underwriter as a top quality underwriter if they fell in the first bracket of those 
underwriters engaging as lead underwriters on least ten occasions. There is no specific 
justification of the determination of high and low underwriter quality in Rizka. Thus, other 
determinations on the quality of underwriter are possible. To examine the sensitivity of the 
determination between high and low quality underwriters, I assign an underwriter as being 
prestigious if it falls in the first top five most frequently underwriting the issues. In this 
section, I examine the effects of change on the significance levels of the regression analysis 
after adjustments were made on the GROWTH variables and the quality of the underwriter. 
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I perform similar regressions as in Table 5.12 using the new GROWTH variables. The 
first sensitivity test I perform is changing the negative Growth to zero. The results are 
qualitatively unchanged. Even the t-statistics for the GROWTH variables are much smaller 
than those reported in Table 5.12. The adjusted R2s and also the significance levels of the 
regressions are not statistically affected by the changes. For example, the t-statistic of 
GROWTH! in Regression 1 is unchanged, as the new regression produces at-statistic value 
of -0.313 compared to -0.314 in the initial model. A similar conclusion of an unaffected 
significance level is obtained when the absolute value is used as a replacement for negative 
growth. For example, the t-statistic for Growth variables (GROWTH2) in Regression 18 is 
down to -1.818 compared to -1.840 reported in the initial model. Thus, it has been shown 
that transformation of the GROWTH variables does not alter the results obtained from the 
initial model. 
The adjusted R2s of the regressions and the coefficients of the significance level are 
improved slightly, on average, when the Underwriter quality variable is replaced by the new 
definition. For example, the adjusted R2 value of Regression 1 becomes 8.79% compared to 
8.44% in the initial model. The t-statistic for underwriter quality is improved to -1.345 
compared to -0.905 in the initial model. The results are even more promising in regressions 
employing FL2 and FL3 as the proxies for financial leverage. For example, out of six 
possible regressions employing FL2 as the proxy for financial leverage, the coefficients for 
underwriter are significant at the 10% level in three regressions when SIZE2 is used as the 
proxy for firm size. Similar results are obtained when FL3 is used as the proxy for financial 
leverage. Thus, other things being equal, it appears that the determination of the quality of the 
underwriter affects the explanatory power of the underwriter quality variable on the degree of 
underpricing. This preliminary conclusion, however, must be treated with caution. That is, the 
reason why the coefficient of underwriter quality is significant in the regression employing 
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FL2 and FL3 and S2 and not in the regression employing FLl when most of the regressions 
using FLl are found to be statistically significant remains unexplained. Again, collinearity 
between variables may be responsible. 
Recall also on the possibility of outliers, which could affect the regression coefficients 
(Refer to Table 5.2). The variable that most probably has an outlier is OLl. One of the sample 
firms has OLl ratio of 2,107.0. Recall that OLl has a minimum value of 0.28 and a median of 
0.15 with mean value of 1.59. The 2,107.0 certainly is a potential candidate for an outlier. An 
outlier could have been influential, or may have had no effect on the regression. To test this 
possibility, I re-run the regressions by excluding the firm having this extreme value. The 
results are generally similar to the findings reported in Table 5.12. The only effect of the 
exclusion of this firm is that the coefficients of OLl previously found to be significant 
become insignificant, but the regression coefficients are not affected. Thus, it appears that the 
outlier that was found in variable OLl has a significant effect only on the variable itself, but 
not on the other variables or the overall regressions. 
S. 7 Discussions 
It has been shown that, despite the presence of multicollinearity in the model, the 
accounting risk measures examined in this study are related to the extent of Indonesian IPO 
underpricing. The presence of multicollinearity has made inferences about the significance of 
individual coefficients difficult. However, the R2 statistics are unaffected by the presence of 
multicollinearity (Kennedy, 1985). Thus, the results reported in this study are statistically 
valid. 
This study finds that three accounting risk proxies (that is, financial leverage; firm 
size; and firm growth) are constantly and statistically related to initial return. In particular, 
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FLl (measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets plus the initial market value of equity), 
SIZE2 (measured as a natural logarithm of the issue size), and GR02 (measured as total 
assets growth) are highly significant. The other two accounting risk proxies (that is, operating 
leverage; profitability) are less convincingly related to the degree of IPO underpricing. 
This study predicted a positive relationship between both financial and operating 
leverages and the degree of underpricing. The results give support for only financial leverage 
but not operating leverage. Operating leverage is negatively related to the degree of 
underpricing. There is no study examining the combined effect of financial and operating 
leverages on the extent of IPO underpricing. The existing literature suggests that operating 
leverage is negatively related to firm risk, while financial leverage is positively related to firm 
risk (Mandelker & Rhee, 1984). Mandelker and Rhee use the firm's systematic risk as a 
proxy for firm risk. This relationship is not surprising given that "the firm's decision on 
operating leverage can be offset by its decision on its financial leverage" (p.54). Thus, there 
appears an inverse relationship on the firm's risk between the effects of financial and 
operating leverages. The pair-wise correlation between financial and operating leverage 
provides support for the view that these leverage proxies are inversely related to each other. 
The correlation coefficients of these leverage measures are negative with some coefficients 
being statistically significant at the l % level (See Table 5.10). The evidence reported in 
Tables 5.12 through 5.16 also reveals that when financial leverage has a positive coefficient, 
operating leverage has a negative coefficient and vice versa. It is unclear, however, whether 
this inverse relationship is in support of Mandelker and Rhee, or that the specification or 
variable measurement error is responsible. Whilst the measures of financial leverage are 
consistent with previous studies, there might be other proper or correct measures of operating 
leverage. Given data limitation, the measures of operating leverage used in this study might 
be reasonable. 
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In summary, it has been the case that financial leverage will always be negatively 
related to operating leverage. Thus, it has also been clear why this study does not find support 
for the prediction of a positive relationship between operating leverage and the degree of 
underpricing. The nature of an inverse relationship between financial and operating leverages 
has contributed to the inability of the current study to predict a positive association between 
operating leverage and the degree of underpricing, as financial leverage has been found to be 
positively and statistically related to the degree of underpricing. 
The strong evidence on the relationship between financial leverage, particularly FLl, 
and initial returns supports the previous evidence suggesting that financial leverage is one of 
the potential risk determinants. This positive relationship is in support of Anderson et al. 
(1995) who, based on their literature survey, assert that a larger initial return is related to a 
firm's excessive reliance on debt financing. This finding, however, is in sharp contrast to 
Hedge and Miller ( 1996) who find a negative and significant association. This opposite 
finding could have been attributed to a difference in perspective. The current study argues 
that financial leverage is a measure of risk. On the other hand, Hedge and Miller rely on a 
signalling hypothesis. They argue that issuers use the presence of debt financing in pre-lPO 
as a credible signal that the firm is a high quality one given that larger debt will increase the 
expected return on equity. The distinction of whether financial leverage is a risk measure or 
signal of firm quality is still unclear. Since these studies use qualitatively similar measures of 
financial leverage (FLl), the results should be not too different. One possible explanation of 
the positive relationship found in the current study is that debt is a concern in Indonesian 
corporations. A survey conducted on large Indonesian listed companies reveals that most of 
the firms are concerned about their debt level because debt is seen as a measure of risk which 
will affect the firm's ability to obtain external funds (Ang, Fatemi, & Tourani-Rad, 1997). 
Also, empirically, financial leverage is found to be positively related to the systematic risk of 
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Indonesia common stocks (Hanafi, Purwanto, & Halim, 1995; Tandelilin, 1997a, 1997b). 
Thus, the finding reported in the current study suggests that financial leverage is a proxy for 
firm risk, not a signal of quality. 
The current study also documents that the relationship between financial leverage 
measures and initial returns varies considerably. FLl (measured as the ratio of total debt to 
total assets plus initial market value of equity) has the highest correlation compared to the 
other two measures (FL2 and FL3), and even FLl is significant in all regressions. This high 
correlation is seen as being related to how financial leverage is measured. The inclusion of 
the market value will better reflect the actual assets of the firm. This is in line with the 
suggestion in the literature that the use of market value in the assessment of financial leverage 
as risk determinant is theoretically and empirically stronger than are book values (Ryan, 
1997). Hedge and Miller (1996) also use the measure similar to FLl used in the current study 
and find their financial leverage . is positively and significantly related to the degree of 
underpricing. Thus, it is not surprising that FLl is related more strongly to the IPO initial 
returns than the other two financial leverage measures (FL2 and FL3). 
Consistent with previous studies, the current study finds that the firm's issue size 
(gross proceeds) is negatively and statistically related to the extent of IPO underpricing. As 
can be seen in Table 3.5, most of the existing studies find a negative and significant 
relationship. A less convincing association is documented when the firm's size is proxied by 
sales or total assets. For Indonesian IPOs, the firm's issue size appears to be a more 
appropriate proxy for firm size given the nature of the market. It has been the case that the 
Indonesian stock market is considered to have low liquidity, and to be a small market 
(Husnan & Theobold, 1990; Husnan, 1994; Roll, 1994). This low liquidity is mainly 
attributed to fewer stocks available in the issue market. An attractive IPO with few stocks 
available for offer will give rise to greater underpricing, as rationing will occur when demand 
150 
·i 
r 
~i 
I 
(1 
! 
li 
li \, 
;\ 
rl ~ 
!1 
ii I•\ 
li 
li1 l 
~I ~ 
exceeds supply. Thus, it can be argued that the available shares, and thus the size of the issue, 
are more appropriate proxies for firm size in an IPO setting.1 
5.8 Additional Analyses 
Two additional analyses are performed. First, the model is tested on the firms 
partitioned on the basis of the periods in which they went public. It has been shown that a 
significant difference in the variation of initial returns exists between IPOs that went public in 
the hot and cold periods. Thus, to test whether the model is sensitive to the period of going 
public, two periods are then considered: the bullish and bearish periods. Second, the external 
validity of Klein (1996) and Kim et al (1995a) is examined. As shown earlier, these two 
studies examined the pricing of IP0s. Klein, in particular, provides evidence that her model is 
successful in predicting the offer price and aftermarket price of an IPO, giving support on the 
assertion that accounting information is value relevant about the IPO. 
5.8.1 Underpricing and the State of the Market 
As shown earlier, the Indonesian IPO market has also experienced the so-called cycle 
in volume (i.e., the year when more IP0s flood into the market). In this section I will conduct 
sensitivity analyses to examine whether the risk associated with the IPO firms is different 
between the two regimes: the bullish and bearish periods. 
The first test I perform is to re-run the multivariate tests by regressing all the 
independent variables over the initial return for each of the state of the market. The market 
1 I also run a regression employing the natural logarithm of the number of shares offered as the proxy for firm 
size. The results suggest that the significance level of this proxy is qualitatively similar to that obtained using the 
gross proceeds. The coefficients of this proxy remain negative in all of the possible regressions. The number of 
shares is negatively related to the degree of underpricing (the correlation coefficient is 24.67% with p < .001 ). 
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condition variable is accordingly eliminated from the regression as it has a single binary 
value. Thus, the regression takes only eight independent variables. Table 5.15 provides the 
results of the multivariate analyses for firms that made IPOs during the bullish periods. 
Because homoscedasticity is rejected at the 1 % level in all regression, White's (1980) 
heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimators are used to estimate the t-statistics 
and standard errors. Altogether there are nine regressions. The coefficients of the accounting 
risk measures are unchanged. The adjusted R2s are considerably higher than the ones obtained 
in the initial model, giving support that the model might have been more robust when it is 
applied to the situation of more firms that made IPOs. 
As shown in the Table 5.15, three accounting variables (that is, FLl; S2; GR02) are 
significantly related to the extent of initial returns. FLl has a consistent and significant 
positive relationship with initial returns, whilst the two other measures do not always have 
significant relationships. For example, FL3 is significant in two of three regressions. None of 
the coefficients of FL2 is statistically significant. 
Consistent with earlier findings, size is negatively related to initial returns. The 
coefficient of operating leverage and growth is negative. The growth proxy is significantly 
related to initial return only when the growth of total assets (GR02) is used in the 
regressions. Profitability measures have a mixed relationship with initial returns. PR03 is 
moderately significant in one of three regressions. 
For the control variables, it is found that only the ownership retention variable is 
statistically related to the extent of initial returns with a positive relationship (p values range 
from .10 to .05), which is consistent with the findings in the earlier section and also in the 
predicted direction. Consistent with the expectation, underwriter quality is negatively related 
to initial excess return. Also the aftermarket standard deviation is, as predicted, positively 
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related to initial returns. The coefficient of the age variable is somewhat unpredictable as it 
has both negative and positive coefficients. 
The overall results reported in Table 5.15 suggest that the selected accounting risk 
measures are considerably related to the extent of initial excess returns giving support to the 
findings shown in the previous section. The higher adjusted R-square values may suggest that 
the model is better fitted during the bullish periods than the whole periods covered in this 
study. However, it is still difficult to make the assertion that initial IPO market investors do 
engage in more realistic valuations. One may argue that investors who crowd into an IPO, 
when more IPOs enter the market, are driven by their desire to obtain abnormal returns 
instead of as a means of making rational investment. 
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Table 5.15 
Multivariate Tests of Raw Initial Returns on Continuous Variables for Firms that Made IPOs during Bullish Periods: 
1989, 1990, 1993, l994(n=96) 
The raw initial return is measured as the difference between the first day closing price and the offer price divided by the offer price. FLl is measured as total debt / 
(total assets + initial market value of equity); FL2 is measured as total debt/ total assets; FL3 is measured as long term debt/ total assets; OLl is measured as the ratio 
of total assets to sales; OL2 is measured as the ratio of fixed assets to total assets; SIZE1 is the natural logarithm of sales for the last fiscal year; SIZE2 is the natural 
logarithm of gross proceeds of the issue; GROI is measured as (sales. - sales..,)/ sales1. 1; GR02 is measured as (total assets. - total assets..,)/ total assets1•1; PROl is 
the ratio of operating profit to sales; PR02 is the ratio of net income after tax to sales; PR03 is the ratio of net income after tax to total assets; UWQ is the measure of 
underwriter quality and takes a value of one for high quality underwriter and zero otherwise; OWN is the retained ownership level and is measured as the portion of 
shares held by the issuer after the issue; LAGE is the natural logarithm of years in operation, SDR is the standard deviation of the first ten days return, excluding the 
first day return. FL is financial leverage; OL is operating leverage; GRO is firm growth; PRO is profitability, UWQ is underwriter quality, OWN is ownership 
retention, SDR is standard deviation of returns, and MC is market condition. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for White's (1980) heteroscedasticity 
consistent covariance matrix. 
Reg. FLl FL2 FL3 OLl OL2 SIZE! SIZE2 GROl GR02 PROl PR02 PR03 UWQ OWN LAGE SDR Const. R2 
F) 
1 .4773 -.0079 -.0098 -.0233 .0196 -.0126 .2433 -.0034 .9892 -.0095 12.54 
(.1700) (.0051) (.0059) (.0289) (.1065) (.0524) (.1721) (.0239) (.9610) (.0665) (2.529t 
2.808b 
-1.561 -1.669d -.806 .184 -.239 1.413 -.143 1.029 -.143 
2 .4326 -.0057 -.0192 -.0559 .1014 -.0151 .3880 .0184 .6549 .0858 17.56 
(.1626) (.0043) (.0078) (.0278) (.1395) (.0501) (.1948) (.0262) (.9053) (.0874) (3.271l 
2.661b 
-1.327 -2.463c -2.009c .727 -.302 1.991c .703 .725 .982 
3 .4706 -.0632 -.0187 -.0533 .4707 -.0157 .3709 .0164 .6949 .0639 18.97 
(.1491) (.0881) (.0073) (.0287) (.2696) (.0473) (.1847) (.0271) (.9516) (.0753) (3.496t 
3.156b 
-.718 -2.570c -1.858d 1.746d -.331 2.008c .604 .730 .849 
4 .1289 -.0071 -.0059 -.0488 -.0896 -.0089 .3950 -.0095 1.0768 -.0792 1.39 
(.0942) (.0047) (.0074) (.0323) (.0148) (.0488) (.2061) (.0262) (1.083) (.1145) (l.151) 
1.369 -1.517 -.796 -1.511 ·-.604 -.183 1.916d -.361 .994 -.692 
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Table 5.15 (continued) 
Reg. FLl FL2 FL3 OLl OL2 SIZE1 SIZE2 GROl GR02 PROl PR02 PR03 UWQ OWN LAGE SDR Const. Rz 
F 
5 .1163 -.0024 -.0240 -.0603 -.1274 -.0177 .6511 .0220 .6548 .1049 9.40 
(.0967) (.0040) (.0089) (.0291) (.1853) (.0462) (.2506) (.0283) (.9580) (.1022) (2.107l 
1.202 -.598 -2.704b -2.075c -.688 -.383 2.599c .779 .684 1.027 
6 .1468 -.0757 -.0224 -.0339 .0221 -.0170 .5950 .0089 1.03 72 .1021 6.69 
(.0934) (.1194) (.0083) (.0344) (.1539) (.0461) (.2430) (.0269) (1.049) (.1014) (1.765/ 
1.572 -.634 -2.712b -.987 .144 -.369 2.448c .334 .989 1.007 
7 .0146 -.0066 -.0033 -.0040 -.0959 -.0083 .3784 -.0121 .9261 -.0754 2.22 
(.0068) (.0059) (.0075) (.0318) (.1345) (.0494) (.2082) (.0261) (1.095) (.1119) (1.242) 
2.138c -1.370 
-.447 -1.265 -.713 -.167 1.814d -.464 .946 -.674 
8 .0097 -.0021 -.0219 -.0580 -.1685 -.0147 .6550 .0195 .6019 .1089 9.943 
(.0075) (.0042) (.0093) (.0288) (.1773) (.0466) (.2583) (.0286) (.9925) (.1051) (2.lll 
1.292 -.496 -2.36lc -2.017c -.951 -.315 2.536c .682 .606 1.036 
9 .0127 -.0879 -.0211 -.0582 .1174 -.0154 .6447 .0146 .6533 .1053 9.55 
(.0073) (.1010) (.0084) (.0309) (.3049) (.0453) (.2500) (.0287) (1.072) (.1034) (2.126t 
1.744d 
-.871 -2.514c -l.887d .384 -.341 2.579c .508 .609 1.019 
Exp. (-) (-) (-) (+) (+) (-) (-) (+) (:+:) (-) (-) (-) (-) (+) (-) (+) 
~ 
a.b.c,d.denote coefficient as being significantly different from zero at the 0.001, 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Unlike the results reported in Table 5.15, which are consistent with the results of the 
full sample, Table 5.16 shows, to a certain extent, an opposite finding. Although all the 
regressions are significant, some of the variables have adverse signs, and some even become 
insignificant. Interestingly, the adjusted R2s are considerably higher than the ones obtained in 
the earlier regressions. The adjusted R2s vary from 13.03% to 19.98%, which means that the 
model explains the variation of initial return better than the initial model of the full sample. 
However, a close examination reveals that the control variables, not the accounting variables, 
are responsible for this high correlation. This indicates that accounting variables do not 
explain much of the variation of initial returns in situations where few firms make an IPO. 
From five accounting risk proxies, only the SIZEl measure is significantly related to 
the extent of initial return, with a positive relationship. The finding of a positive relationship 
of SIZEl is surprising given that earlier regressions find a constant negative and insignificant 
relationship. The financial leverage measures show a mixed relationship. While FLl provides 
a positive relationship to initial return, the other two measures of financial leverage (FL2 and 
FL3) are negatively related. A similar finding is reported for the profitability measures, with 
PR03 as the only proxy that is moderately significant (p < .10). The growth variable is still 
negatively related to initial return, but neither measure is significant. 
For the control variables, two variables (that is, underwriter quality and aftermarket 
standard deviation) are found to be strongly related to the extent of initial excess returns. As 
shown in Table 5.16, the coefficients of underwriter quality are all negative and significant at 
the 5% level. This result raises some questions, namely, whether during bearish periods the 
IPO firms become more selective in choosing the underwriters so as to avoid possible 
underpricing or simply because market participants rely more on signalling variables. Yet, it 
is also unclear whether this incident is purely caused by the IPO issuers' attempt to avoid 
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underpricing by selecting more prestigious underwriters, or it is the low market responses that 
drives the underpricing to a lower level. Note that during these periods the average raw initial 
return is 5.52% compared to 11.66% for the bullish periods (the mean is significantly 
different between each other, t = 2.488, p < .01). 
In contrast to earlier findings, the coefficients of aftermarket standard deviation are 
negative and significant. This suggests that during bearish periods, IPO firms with greater 
aftermarket standard deviation are less underpriced than are the firms with lower aftermarket 
standard deviation. This finding is in contrast to the prediction of a positive relationship. The 
coefficients of ownership retention are mixed. The coefficients are negative when the 
regressions use FLl as the proxy for financial leverage and are positive for other financial 
leverage proxies. The age variable has a negative relationship with initial excess returns, 
which is consistent with the prediction. Yet, none of the coefficients is significant. 
Overall, the results presented in Table 5.16 indicate that during bearish periods the 
control variables appear to explain most of the variation of IPOs initial returns. This finding 
could be interpreted as meaning that the regression model proposed in this study, in particular 
the accounting risk measures, does not fully explain the extent of initial returns in the bearish 
periods. In other words, accounting risk proxies appear to be a noisy, if not a good, proxy for 
ex ante uncertainty, and, thus, the risk of Indonesian IPO firms when fewer firms are making 
IPOs. 
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Table 5.16 
Multivariate Tests of Initial Returns on Continuous Variables for Firms that Made IPOs during Bearish Periods: 
1991, 1992, 1995, 1996, 1997(n=53) 
The raw initial return is measured as the difference between the first day closing price and the offer price divided by the offer price. FLl is measured as total debt / 
(total assets+ initial market value of equity); FL2 is measured as total debt/ total assets; FL3 is measured as long term debt/ total assets; OLl is measured as the ratio 
of total assets to sales; OL2 is measured as the ratio of fixed assets to total assets; SIZEl is the natural logarithm of sales for the last fiscal year; SIZE2 is the natural 
logarithm of gross proceeds of the issue; GROl is measured as (sales1 - sale5i_1) / sale5i_1; GR02 is measured as (total assets1 - total asset5i_1) / total asset5i_1; PROl is 
the ratio of operating profit to sales; PR02 is the ratio of net income after tax to sales; PR03 is the ratio of net income after tax to total assets; UWQ is the measure of 
underwriter quality and takes a value of one for high quality underwriter and zero otherwise; OWN is the retained ownership level and is measured as the portion of 
shares held by the issuer after the issue; LAGE is the natural logarithm of years in operation, SDR is the standard deviation of the first ten days return, excluding the 
first day return. FL is financial leverage; OL is operating leverage; GRO is firm growth; PRO is profitability, UWQ is underwriter quality, OWN is ownership 
retention, SDR is standard deviation of returns. and MC is market condition. Standard errors (in parentheses) and t-statistics are adjusted for White's (1980) 
heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix. 
Reg. FLl FL2 FL3 OLI OL2 SIZE1 SIZE2 GROl GR02 PROl PR02 PR03 UWQ OWN LAGE SDR Const. R"Z 
(F) 
1 .0571 .0069 .0134 -.0031 .0611 -.0674 -.1474 -.0387 -2.7639 .0133 17.86 
(.0727) (.0147) (.0503) (.0309) (.1160) (.0255) (.1722) (.0278) (1.078) (.0212) (2.280t 
.786 .470 2.669c -.101 .527 -2.645c -.856 -1.393 -2.564c .626 
2 .1309 -.0019 .0093 -.0064 .2589 -.0696 -.1001 -.0348 -2.6326 .0428 15.87 
(.0873) (.0183) (.0049) (.0188) (.1845) (.0266) (.1820) (.0281) (1.079) (.449) (2.lllt 
1.500 -.109 1.896d -.341 1.403 -2.612c -.550 -1.241 -2.440c .953 
3 .1583 .0839 .0069 -.0017 .3922 -.0700 -.0910 -.0322 -2.6904 .0359 19.98 
(.0861) (.0569) (.0052) (.0167) (.2341) (.0260) (.1780) (.0292) (1.027) (.0386) (2.462t 
1.837d 1.476 1.338 -.099 1.675d -2.693c -.511 -1.103 -2.619c .930 
4 -.0282 .0088 .0146 -.0047 .0172 -.0645 -.1110 -.0414 -2.7788 .0077 17.37 
(.0704) (.0149) (.0052) (.0306) (.1214) (.0268) (.1587) (.0276) (1.086) (.0178) (2.238l 
-.401 .588 2.830b -.155 .141 -2.403c -.699 -1.500 -2.559c .432 
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Table 5.16 (continued) 
Reg. FLl FL2 FL3 OLI OL2 SIZE1 SIZE2 GROl GR02 PROl PR02 PR03 UWQ OWN LAGE SOR Const. R2 
(F) 
5 .0083 .0068 .0076 -.0115 .1103 -.0697 .0143 -.0337 -2.5582 .0459 13.03 
(.0894) (.0171) (.0045) (.0205) (.1954) (.0285) (.1546) (.0286) (1.124) (.0479) (l.882)d 
.093 .398 1.682d -.561 .564 -2.446c .093 -1.181 -2.276c .958 
6 .0122 .0932 .0058 -.0076 .1149 -.0703 .0435 -.0339 -2.5821 .0404 15.89 
(.0855) (.0597) (.0052) (.0193) (.2453) (.0268) (.1564) (.0289) (1.102) (.0428) (2.112t 
.143 1.562 1.129 -.396 .469 -2.623c .278 -1.172 -2.343c .944 
7 -.0076 .0083 .0144 -.0068 .0072 -.0638 -.0936 -.0435 -2.8136 .0068 17.87 
(.0095) (.0150) (.0049) (.0296) (.1175) (.0257) (.1705) (.0291) (1.063) (.0168) (2.282t 
-.803 .552 2.925b -.230 .061 -2.480c -.549 -1.493 -2.647c .403 
8 -.0063 .0079 .0079 -.0146 .0497 -.0678 .0434 -.0344 -2.6348 .0443 13.34 
(.0124) (.0166) (.0449) (.0202) (.1839) (.0269) (.1698) (.0299) (l.102) (.0463) (l.913)d 
-.503 .475 1.752d -.723 .270 -2.524c .256 -1.150 -2.39lc .955 
9 -.0034 .0912 .0062 -.0104 .0595 -.0691 .0626 -.0345 -2.6377 .0699 15.98 
(.0116) (.0579) (.0049) (.0186) (.2329) (.0262) (.1685) (.0302) (1.078) (.0426) (2.120l 
-.295 1.573 1.254 -.559 .256 -2.638c .371 -1.144 -2.446c .929 
Exp. (-) (-) (-) (+) (+) (-) (-) (+) (+) (-) (-) (-) (-) (+) (-) (+) 
Si 
~ 
a. b.c,d,denote coefficient as being significantly different from zero at the 0.001, 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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5.8.2 Prospectus and the Pricing of IPOs 
As mentioned in Chapter Four, this study will also provide an additional analysis of 
the usefulness of accounting information in the pricing of IPOs. This analysis is important in 
order to understand further the relationship between accounting information and the pricing 
of IPOs. The finding is expected to complement the main issue examined in the current study. 
The analysis is based on the works of Kim et al. (1995a) and Klein (1996) who empirically 
show that accounting information provided in the issue prospectus is related to the offer price 
and market price of an IPO. Thus, this section examines whether information in the issue 
prospectus is value relevant to the IPO. 
Table 5.17 provides the results of the multivariate analysis. For comparison purposes, 
two regressions: the first is equation 4.2 and the second is a modified one, are provided. 
Because White's test rejects homoscedasticity at the 5% level in all four regressions, the 
significance levels of the parameter estimates are adjusted for White's (1981) 
heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix. Panel A presents evidence that the pre-lPO 
accounting information is related to the pricing of IPOs. The IPO issue price is positively and 
significantly related to earnings per share, price to book value of equity, and gross proceeds 
of the issue and is negatively related to the level of financial leverage (as risk measure). The 
signs for all accounting variables are in the expected direction. Thus, IPO firms having higher 
issue prices, on average, tend to have higher earnings per share, price to book value of equity, 
gross proceeds, and lower risk. This finding is qualitatively similar to both Klein ( 1996) and 
Kim et al. (1995a). 
The signals taken by the issuers appear to be impounded into the pricing of the IPO. 
The quality of underwriter is positively and insignificantly related to the price of the issue. 
The prior view was that IPOs underwritten by prestigious underwriters offer relatively higher 
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prices than IPOs underwritten by less prestigious underwriters, and, would be more valued. 
However, the lack of a significant association makes such an assertion unwarranted in the 
context of this study. The evidence also suggests that the higher the fraction of ownership 
held by the initial issuers, the higher is the price of the IPO (p < .001). The positive and 
significant relationship between the level of ownership retention and the issue price found in 
the current study supports the Leland and Pyle's (1977) signalling hypothesis. Industry 
membership does not appear to be an influential variable. The coefficients of IPO age are 
positive, but insignificant, in both regressions. 
The market model generates similar conclusions as the offer price model (Panel B of 
Table 5.17). The market price model is based on the first week's closing price. The only 
difference is that the risk variable is no longer significant. Price differences may have affected 
the influencing factor of risk. The mean aftermarket price of Rp. 5,852.5 is significantly 
higher than the offer price of Rp. 5,336.4 (t=l.2866, p < .10), but the variance difference is 
insignificant (F= 0.8209, p < .1156). Nevertheless, the general conclusion is similar to the 
, off er price model in that accounting information is value relevant in pricing in the new issues 
market. 
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Table 5.17 
Multivariate Tests of Offering Price and Market Price on Continuous Variables (n=149) 
Dependent variables are the offer price measured as the natural logarithm of the offer price and market price measured as natural logarithm of the market 
closing price of week one. The independent variables are EPS which is the pre-offering earning per share for the latest fiscal year and is expressed in 
natural logarithm; PBV is the post-offering book value of equity per share; <X is the percent of equity retained by the initial issuers; underwriter quality 
(UWQ) is a dummy variable and takes a value of one if the issue is underwritten by prestigious underwriter and zero otherwise; industry membership is 
measured according to the firm's industry classification; LGP is the natural logarithm of gross proceeds of the issue; LAGE is the natural logarithm of the 
firm's years in operation; FL is the firm's financial leverage measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets plus initial market value of equity. Standard 
errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for White's (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix. 
Dependant Variable CONST. LEPS PBV LGP FL UWQ OWN LAGE IND R'2" 
(F) 
Panel A: Issue Price 
Regression 1 .6040 .8866 .0479 .0639 -.4452 .0878 1.5289 .0642 .0141 88.27 
(.5175) (.0417) (.0258) (.0205) (.1859) (.0817) (.2943) (.0554) (.0119) (141.216l 
1.167 21.25a 1.857d 3.119b -2.395c 1.075 5.195a 1.161 1.178 
Regression 2 .6325 .8878 .0476 .0635 -.4119 .0869 1.5665 .0642 88.26 
(.5377) (.0420) (.0269) (.0211) (.1875) (.0819) (.2878) (.0552) - (160.988/ 
1.176 21.13a 1.769d 3.010b -2.196c 1.060 5.443a 1.161 
Panel B: Market Price 
Regression 1 .8082 .8894 .1017 .0434 -.2035 .0742 1.7211 .0667 .0177 85.56 
(.6883) (.0501) (.0338) (.0260) (.2123) (.0914) (.3622) (.0642) (.0131) (111.321/ 
1.174 17.74a 3.013b 1.667d -.959 .813 4.752a 1.039 1.348 
Regression 2 .8439 .08909 .0101 .0429 -.1617 .0730 1.7683 .0666 85.51 
(.7134) (.0504) (.0357) (.0267) (.2148) (.0914) (.3517) (.0641) - (126.589t 
1.183 17.68a 2.836b 1.603 -.753 .799 5.027a 1.039 
Expected sign (+) (+) (+) (-) (+) (+) (+) (?) 
a. b. c, d. denote coefficient as being significantly different from zero at the 0.001, 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 5.18 
Pearson Correlation between Offering Price and Market Price and Continuous Variables 
LPR is natural logarithm of the offer price measured; LPW is the natural logarithm of the market closing price of week one; LEPS is 
the natural logarithm of pre-offering earning per share for the latest fiscal year; PBV is the post-offering book value of equity per 
share; OWN is the percent of equity retained by the initial issuers; underwriter quality (UWQ) is a dummy variable and takes a value 
of one if the issue is underwritten by a prestigious underwriter and zero otherwise; industry membership is measured according to the 
firm's industry classification; LGP is the natural logarithm of gross proceeds from the issue; LAGE is the natural logarithm of the 
firm's years in operation; FL is the firm's financial leverage measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets plus initial market value 
of equity. All tests are two tailed-tests. 
LPR 
LPWl 
LEPS 
PBV 
LGP 
RISK 
UWQ 
OWN 
LAGE 
IND 
LPR LPW LEPS PBV LGP RISK UWQ OWN LAGE 
1.000 
0.977a 1.000 
0.892a 0.866a 1.000 
0.240b 0.295a 0.198c 
-0.016 -0.094 0.015 
1.000 
0.098 1.000 
-0.145 -0.075 -0.114 0.085 -0.246b 1.000 
0.360a 0.361 a 0.363a 0.066 -0.188c 0.113 1.000 
0.298a 0.325a 0.229b 0.115 -0.121 0.369a 0.215b 1.000 
0.002 -0.012 -0.016 0.068 0.200c -0.055 -0.059 -0.147 1.000 
-0.002 0.022 -0.020 0.005 -o.201c 0.187c 0.029 0.118 -0.059 
IND 
1.000 
a, b, c, denote coefficient as being significantly different from zero at the 0.001, 0.01, and 0.05 levels, respectively. 
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The results of multicollinearity diagnoses suggest that the models may have been 
affected by the presence of collinearity between independent variables. While the variance 
inflation factors (VIF) diagnoses do not indicate the presence of collinearity among 
independent variables, results based on the condition index and variance proportion 
coefficients strongly indicate the present of multicollinearity. In particular, variable gross 
proceeds and the regression's intercept both have variance proportion coefficients greater 
than 90%, well above the threshold benchmark of 50% (Refer to the multicollinearity 
diagnosis steps in Section 5.5). Condition indexes of 33.9 and 102.0 for rows eight and nine, 
respectively, also indicate the presence of multicollinearity. Although multicollinearity does 
not affect the significance of the coefficients, its presence would affect the interpretation of 
the findings. Thus, the findings of significant relationships between selected accounting 
variables and the pricing of the IPOs must be interpreted carefully. 
To test the predictive ability of the models, fitted values of offer prices and market 
price are estimated for non-sample of IPO firms from the initial sample firms that do not meet 
the selection criteria and are those that went public in period 1992-1995. There are thirteen 
firms with available data that are selected arbitrarily to test the models. Table 5.19 provides 
the results of the forecast error both for the offering price and the market models. The mean 
forecast errors for the offering price and market model (not reported in the Table) are -9.14% 
and -6.94%, respectively. Both means are insignificantly different from zero. The median 
forecast errors for the offering price and the market model are -0.36% and -3.95%, 
respectively. The null hypotheses that the median forecast errors for both models are equal to 
zero can not be rejected at the 5% level (two-tailed) under the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
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Table 5.19 
Comparisons of Predicted and Actual Prices for Non-Sample IPO Firms (n= 13) 
No. Company Name Offering Projected Offer Error Forecast Projected Price at Error Forecast 
Date Price(Rp) Price Error(%) Price (Rp) Week 1 Error(%) 
(Rp) (Rp) 
1 PT. Plaza Indonesia Raya 15-Jun-'92 5,396 4,950 446 09.00 6,477 5,000 1,477 29.53 
2 PT. Barito Pacific T 01-0ct-'93 5,567 7,200 -1,633 -22.68 5,984 7,200 -1,216 -16.89 
3 PT. Mulia Industrindo 17-Jan-'94 4,507 3,800 707 18.59 5,698 3,800 1,898 49.95 
4 PT. Mas Mumi Indonesia 09-Feb-'94 1,401 2,700 -1,299 -48.11 1,497 2,700 -1,203 -44.56 
5 PT. Enseval Putra Mega 01-Aug-'94 5,480 5,500 -20 -00.36 6,508 5,500 1,008 18.32 
6 PT. Indosat 19-0ct-'94 8,210 7,000 1,210 17.29 8,406 7,000 1,406 20.08 
7 PT. Jeewon Jaya Ind. 20-Dec-'94 3,167 4,500 -1,333 -29.62 3,198 4,500 -1,302 -28.93 
8 PT. Citra Marga Nusapala 10-Jan-'95 1,859 2,600 -741 -28.49 2,093 2,600 -507 -19.50 
9 PT. Telaga Mas Pertiwi 26-Jan-'95 1,145 1,350 -205 -15.19 1,135 1,350 -215 -15.89 
10 PT. Hexindo Adiperkasa 13-Feb-'95 2,682 3,900 -1,218 -31.22 2,885 3,900 -1,015 -26.03 
11 PT. B imantara Citra 17-Jul-'95 1,306 1,250 56 4.48 1,508 1725 -217 -12.58 
12 PT. Tambang Timah 19-0ct-'95 3,011 2,900 111 3.81 3,185 2,900 285 9.84 
13 PT. Telekomunikasi Ind. 14-Nov-'95 2,126 2,050 76 3.70 2,041 2,050 -9 -0.45 
Median Forecast Error (%)3 -.36 -3 .. 95 
P-Value (Median FE--O)b 0.05 0.05 
a Forecast error(%) = (PP - AP)/ AP, where PP is predicted price and AP is actual price. AP talces either offering price or market price at week one. 
bThe Wilcoxon signed-rank test was performed to test that the null hypothesis that the median of forecast error is not different from zero (two tailed). 
Industry 
Code 
91-99* 
31-39 
31-39 
91-99* 
91-99* 
71-79 
31-39 
71-79 
21-29 
91-99* 
91-99* 
21-29 
71-79 
The non-sample firms are drawn from the initial sample firms that do not meet the selection criteria used in the analysis. The firms are restricted to those that went 
public during 1992-1995. 
Industry classification is defined as follows: 21-29 for mining, 31-39 for basic industry and chemical, 71-79 for infrastructure, utility, and transportation, and 91-99 
for trade and services. 
* This excludes companies in the 98 code, which is the investment company. PT stands for Perseroan Terbatas (Property Limited or Pty. Ltd.). 
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Table 5.20 provides the test statistics for the accuracy of the predicted prices. 
The correlations between actual and predicted off er prices, and between actual and 
predicted market prices, are 91.26% and 84.59%, respectively. The high correlation 
coefficients for the predicted and actual prices for both models provide further support 
for the accuracy of the models. The predictive ability of the offering price model 
appears to be stronger than for the market price model. The relatively weaker 
predictive ability of the market price model is also indicated by the sum of squared 
forecast errors which is 2.57 times greater than for the offering price. This finding 
confirms the assertion that the models are successful in predicting both the offering 
prices and market prices. 
Table 5.20 
Test Statistics for Accuracy of Predicted Offer and Market Prices 
for Non-Sample Firms as in Table 5.20 (n=13) 
Offering Price Market Price 
Correlation coefficient (PP, APt .9126 .8459 
P-value (Correlation = ot (.001) (.001) 
fJ-Oc 903.13 545.78 
t-statistic (O-O = ot (1.976) (.667) 
<lie .828 .951 
t-statistic (a1 = lt (7.402) (5.261) 
Sum of squared forecast errors 10,390,107 26,715,171 
a PP is projected price and AP is actual price. AP takes either the offering price or market price. 
b P-value for testing the null hypothesis that correlation between PP and AP is equal to zero (two-tailed 
test). 
c Coefficients from equation: PP = °<J + a 1 AP; the model is supported if the hypotheses that °<J = 0 and 
a, = 1 are accepted. 
Two implications germane to this finding are: (l) Information in the issue 
prospectus has implications for the future growth and risk of the firm, and (2) The 
estimated models are indifferent to time and industry membership. They could be 
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applied to a variety of industries and over time. The findings reported in the current 
study support those of Klein (1996) and Kim et al. (1995a). Thus, the proposition that 
accounting information is value relevant in the pricing of IPO is also verified in the 
Indonesian IPO market. 
5.9 Chapter Summary 
This Chapter has provided the empirical findings of the study. The first section 
described the general profile of the sample and the descriptive statistics for continuous 
variables partitioned on the basis of industry classification and year of offering. The 
evidence suggests that Indonesian IPOs are, on average, underpriced by as much as 
9.47%. The extent of IPO underpricing is insensitive to the measures used to calculate 
the initial returns. There appears to be no evidence that industry membership (subject 
to initial sample selection), and differences in time to listing, are related to the level of 
initial returns. 
The second section provided the preliminary results of the analysis of the 
relationship between initial returns and the variables that previous studies suggest 
may have an influence. The results suggest that IPO initial returns are related to 
accounting risk proxies. In particular, IPO firms with a higher level of financial 
leverage tend to be more underpriced than their counterparts with lower levels of 
financial leverage. The univariate tests, as outlined in Section 3, provided further 
support that financial leverage is significantly related to initial returns. 
The fourth section contained the results of the multivariate analyses. The 
section also provided tests of the hypotheses. Three accounting risk measures were 
found to be significant for the full sample: financial leverage, issue size, and growth. 
While the coefficients of financial leverage and issue size are in the expected 
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directions, firm growth is negatively related to initial returns. Operating leverage is 
negatively related to initial returns, which is in contrast to predictions. The negative 
coefficient of operating leverage is predominantly caused by the effect of financial 
leverage, where there tends to be an adverse relationship on the firm's risk between 
financial and operating leverages. Profitability appears to be moderately related to 
initial returns. Among five control variables, only the level of ownership retention, 
and the state of the market, are significantly related to initial returns. The coefficients 
of the other three control variables are in the expected direction, but none are 
significant. 
The multicollinearity diagnoses provided in Section 5 suggest that collinearity 
among independent variables is present. While the presence of multicollinearity does 
not affect the significance level of the coefficients, it does affect the ability to draw 
inferences. The sensitivity analysis contained in Section 6 has provided evidence that 
variable measurements have affected the significance level of some variables. For 
example, the underwriter quality variable became significant in some regressions 
when different measures were used. The exclusion of the firm with an extreme value 
of OLl also affected some of the regression results. However, given that the 
differences between variable measurements are moderate, the results obtained in the 
multivariate analyses are relatively unaffected. 
The seventh section contained discussions of the results. This section 
discussed the finding of a negative relationship between operating leverage and initial 
return as a proxy for total firm risk. As empirically shown by Mandelker and Rhee 
(1984), operating and financial leverages tend to be negatively related because the 
firm's decision on operating leverage can be offset by the decision on financial 
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leverage. The section also showed that the market base measure of financial leverage 
tends to capture better the risk inherent to the firm. 
Additional analyses, which comprise two tests: (1) Tests of the model on two 
states of the market, and (2) Tests on the pricing of IP0s, were provided in Section 8. 
The results of the tests on the effect of the state of the market on the explanatory of 
variables suggested that the model performed better during bullish periods. In the 
bearish periods, the signalling variables (not the accounting risk measures) explained 
most of the variation of initial returns. The test of the pricing of IPOs yielded the 
conclusion that accounting variables available in the issue prospectus are value 
relevant to the IPO. Thus, the IPO price level is a function of its accounting variables. 
In summary, the answer to the primary research question "Is there an 
association between accounting variables perceived to be a measure of total firm risk 
and the magnitudes of the underpricing of new issues of common stocks?" was found 
to be "yes". This is indicated by the finding of a significant relationship between 
some of the accounting risk measures and the initial returns of the IPOs in some 
regressions. 
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CHAPTER6 
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND 
DIRECTION FOR FUTURE STUDY 
6.1 Summary and Conclusions 
It has been widely demonstrated that, on average, the initial public offerings of 
common stocks are underpriced. A number of theories have emerged to explain why 
such a phenomenon occurs. Amongst the existing theories, the one proposed by Rock 
(1986), and its extension by Beatty and Ritter (1986), has empirically been accepted 
as the one that best explains the phenomenon. The implication of this theory is that 
the extent of underpricing is related to ex ante uncertainty surrounding the issue. 
Empirical evidence has generally been in favour of this assertion. 
This study argues that ex ante uncertainty is positively related to the firm's 
total risk, where total risk is defined as the risk inherent to the firm, comprising 
systematic and nonsystematic risk. A review of the literature suggests that accounting 
numbers are known as one of the potential proxies for total firm risk. Empirical 
evidence is generally in support of the assertion that accounting numbers could signal 
elements of the riskiness of a firm. Given the evidence that accounting numbers are of 
potential proxy for total risk, and also that total firm risk is positively related to the ex 
ante uncertainty of the firm making an IPO, this study argues that accounting numbers 
can also be a potential proxy for ex ante uncertainty. Thus, the specific purpose of this 
study is to extend existing studies by examining the factors, with the focus on 
accounting numbers, that determine the degree of underpricing. Moreover, it is 
expected that the evidence provided by this study would enhance our understanding of 
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the determinants of underpricing in general, and more specifically in an emerging 
capital market. 
Five accounting risk proxies are examined: ( 1) financial leverage, (2) 
operating leverage, (3) firm size, (4) firm growth, and (5) profitability. Five control 
variables are also examined: (1) the quality of underwriter, (2) the level of ownership 
retention after the issue, (3) the firm's age, (4) the aftermarket standard deviation of 
return, and (5) the state of the market. Tests are performed on a sample of 149 
Indonesian IP0s that went public during 1989-1997. 
The findings of this study generally allow rejection of the null hypothesis that 
accounting risk measures are not related to the extent of underpricing. In particular, 
this study finds that financial leverage (measured as the ratio of total debt to total 
assets plus initial market value), firm size (measured as the size of the issue), and firm 
growth (measured as the growth of total assets) are highly related to the initial returns. 
Two other accounting risk proxies appear to have been marginally related to the 
extent of underpricing. 
The study also finds that the model appears to explain better the relationship 
between accounting risk proxies and the degree of underpricing in situations where 
there are more firms making IPO, that is, during the bullish or hot periods. 
Application of the model in the bearish periods, suggests that it is the control 
variables that explain more of the variation of initial returns. Thus, it appears that 
fundamental information is more likely to be related to the initial return of Indonesian 
IPOs in periods of heavy IP0s. 
Among the five control variables examined, the level of ownership retention, 
and the state of the market, are found to be consistently and significantly related to the 
extent of underpricing. The coefficients of these two variables are positive and are in 
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the expected direction. Although the direction of the other control variables meets the 
expectation, the lack of significance levels suggest any relationship with the degree of 
underpricing is unwarranted. 
Additional analysis on the pricing of IPOs reveals that the model used by 
Klein ( 1996) explains more than three-quarters of the variation of the offer price and 
the aftermarket prices. Thus, the accounting variables are value relevant to the pricing 
of IPOs. The predictive ability of the market model is weaker than for the offering 
price model. Overall, the findings provide further support that accounting information 
is impounded in the pricing of an IPO. It obviously provides confirmation of 
anecdotal evidence advocated in the literature that accounting numbers are used as 
input into the pricing of IP0s (Perez, 1984; Bloch, 1986; Sutton & Bendetto, 1988; 
Buck, 1990). 
6.2 Limitations and Possible Direction for Future Studies 
There are some limitations identified in this study. The model used in this 
study is not developed through extensive derivation relating to accounting risk proxies 
and the extent of the IPO's initial return. Instead, it is based merely on suggestions 
made in literature coupled with empirical evidence. This study focuses its analysis on 
., 
the role of accounting information in determining the initial return in IPO market-s. It 
has been suggested that accounting information is not the only element in the total 
information system needed to assess the riskiness of a security. Accounting 
information does not have a monopoly in supplying information to the market 
(Dyckman & Morse, 1986). Thus, the selected accounting risk proxies examined in 
this study may not capture all of the effects of company risks. Specification error may 
also be present, and, thus, the exact contribution of each of the accounting risk proxies 
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is not warranted. Therefore, future studies may, firstly, examine the stationary and 
consistency of accounting ratios or accounting numbers in their relationship to 
systematic or total firm risk across industries, and if possible, rank them. This will 
enable us to develop a model that best explains the firm's risk determinants. Given 
that this has been achieved, the next step is to test the model and apply it in an IPO 
market. In addition, as noted by Anderson et al (1995) that the success in testing the 
underpricing equilibrium depends heavily on the success in selecting the proxies, it 
may be argued that the selected accounting risk proxies examined in this study may 
not represent all the possible risks relating to the issuing firm. Thus, another avenue 
for future study would be to test the model in other IPO settings, or the inclusion of 
other accounting risk measures. 
The second limitation of the study is related to the characteristics of the 
market. An emerging market may exhibit different motives for the investors' 
valuation model and their investment decisions. That is, their justification on buy- sell 
decisions might not be driven by their extensive valuation methods, but instead, 
merely by illogical or intuitive reasoning. Yet, this notion might be incorrect, as most 
of the active market players in the Indonesian stock market are foreign investors who 
arguably use more knowledge-based analysis than intuition. 
. , ' 
Moreover, one interesting feature of the Indonesian stock market is that 
foreign investors account for about three-quarters of the active market players despite 
their limited ownership of a maximum of 49% (this figure has been declining in the 
recent years, however). This feature provides a further research avenue, such as 
examining whether there is a significant difference between the level of foreign 
subscribers and the extent of underpricing. Also, as the ownership restriction was 
abolished in September 1997, one may examine the effects of this change on the level 
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of initial returns and make a comparison with periods where the restriction was still in 
place. 
Other research avenues worth considering in the future are (1) the inclusion of 
other types of industries, such as finance and insurance companies, (2) the relation 
between the degree of underpricing and prospectus published in newspapers, (3) 
inclusion of firms with negative growth and the effect of the use of funds, and (4) 
examination on the impact of the requirement of the Indonesian capital market 
regulation that firms must have two years of profit. 
Finally, as this study examines one of the emerging capital markets in the 
Southeast Asian region that has experienced a relatively high growth rate, future 
studies could also examine other capital markets in the region. This will enable us to 
make a judgment on the impact of the nature and the influence of institutional 
differences in explaining the underpricing phenomenon. 
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Exhibit 1 
List of Sample Firms 
NO NAME CODE LISTDATE OFPRC SHR (000) GRO(OOO) 
1 Jaya Pari Steel 33 04-Aug-89 7800 3360 26208000 
2 Hero Supermarket 93 21-Aug-89 7200 1765 12708000 
3 United Tractor 41 19-Sep-89 7250 2700 19575000 
4 Java Comfeed 36 23-0ct-89 7200 4000 28800000 
5 Great River Gar. Ind. 91 03-Nov-89 8700 4900 42630000 
6 Berlina 35 06-Nov-89 7900 1750 13825000 
7 Multipolar 97 06-Nov-89 10500 3428 35994000 
8 Unggul lndah Corp. 34 06-Nov-89 17250 9000 155250000 
9 Dankos Laboratories 53 13-Nov-89 6500 525 3412500 
10 Astra Graphia 91 25-Nov-89 8550 3075 26291250 
11 lndocement 31 05-Dec-89 10000 89832.15 898321500 
12 Lippo Industries 42 05-Feb-90 8900 1250 11125000 
13 Aqua Golden Miss. 51 01-Mar-90 7500 1000 7500000 
14 Rimba Niaga Idola 92 05-Mar-90 3380 1200 4056000 
15 United Sumatra 12 06-Mar-90 10700 11100 118770000 
16 Aster Dharma Indus. 35 26-Mar-90 4500 2000 9000000 
17 Berlian Laju Tanker 74 26-Mar-90 8500 2100 17850000 
18 Tjiwi Kimia 38 03-Apr-90 9500 9300 88350000 
19 Metrodata Epsindo 97 09-Apr-90 6800 1468 9982400 
20 Sudarpo Corp. 97 07-May-90 5000 2600 13000000 
21 Gajah Tunggal 42 08-May-90 5500 20000 110000000 
22 Htl. Sahid Jaya 94 08-May-90 7000 11000 77000000 
23 CP. Prima 36 14-May-90 4000 1000 4000000 
24 Roda Vivatex 43 14-May-90 7500 1000 7500000 
25 Petrosea 21 21-May-90 9500 4500 42750000 
26 Tembaga M.S. 33 23-May-90 14100 3367 47474700 
27 Lion Mesh P 33 04-Jun-90 7200 600 4320000 
28 Hadtex lndosyn. 43 06-Jun-90 11750 7000 82250000 
29 Schering Plough Ind. 53 08-Jun-90 12750 892.8 11383200 
30 Tigaraksa Satriya 92 11-Jun-90 5750 2500 14375000 
31 Cipendawa Farm 13 18-Jun-90 5900 3000 17700000 
32 Inti lndorayon 38 18-Jun-90 9850 27200 267920000 
33 Trias Sentosa 35 02-Jul-90 11800 3000 35400000 
34 Ultrajaya Milk Indus. 51 02-Jul-90 7500 6000 45000000 
35 Mayora Indah 51 04-Jul-90 9300 3000 27900000 
36 Alumindo Perkasa 33 19-Jul-90 9800 1500 14700000 
37 Prima Alloy 42 12-Jul-90 6750 2000 13500000 
38 Indah Kiat Pulp Pap. 38 16-Jul-90 10600 60000 636000000 
39 Dharmala/fjilatjap PF 36 18-Jul-90 8500 5000 42500000 
40 Intan Wijaya Chem. 34 27-Jul-90 8250 4000 33000000 
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Exhibit 1 (continued) 
NO NAME CODE LISTDATE OFPRIC SHR (000) GRO(OOO) 
41 PT. Indorama Synth. 34 03-Aug-90 12500 7000 87500000 
42 PT. Duta Pertiwi Nus. 34 08-Aug-90 8100 3000 24300000 
43 PT. lndospring 42 10-Aug-90 9000 3000 27000000 
44 PT. Ekadharma Tape 34 14-Aug-90 6500 1000 6500000 
45 PT. H.M. Sampurna 52 15-Aug-90 12600 27000 340200000 
46 PT. Pan Brothers Tex 43 16-Aug-90 8700 3800 33060000 
47 PT. Eratex Jaya 43 21-Aug-90 7550 6139.75 46355112.5 
48 PT. Gudang Garam 52 27-Aug-90 10250 57807.8 592529950 
49 PT. Branta Mulia 42 05-Sep-90 9250 12500 115625000 
50 PT. Mayertex Indonesia 43 31-0ct-90 9900 1000 9900000 
51 PT. Great Golden Star 43 03-Dec-90 8800 6000 52800000 
52 PT. ltamaraya Gold 33 10-Dec-90 6950 4000 27800000 
53 PT. Voksel Electric 45 20-Dec-90 6500 3080 20020000 
54 PT. Argo Pantes 43 07-Jan-91 10000 15882 158820000 
55 PT. IKI Kabel 45 21-Jan-91 4950 3500 17325000 
56 PT. Polysindo Eka P 34 12-Mar-91 8900 12000 106800000 
57 PT. Charoen Pokphand I. 36 18-Mar-91 .5100 2500 12750000 
58 PT. Kurnia Kapuas 34 01-Jul-91 5700 4500 25650000 
59 PT. Semen Gresik 31 08-Jul-91 7000 40000 280000000 
60 PT. Modern Photo 92 16-Jul-91 6800 4500 30600000 
61 PT. Nippress 42 24-Jul-91 5000 4000 20000000 
62 PT. Kalbe Parma 53 30-Jul-91 7800 10000 78000000 
63 PT. Dynaplast 35 05-Aug-91 5600 2500 14000000 
64 PT. Suba Indah 51 ll-Dec-91 3700 3700 13690000 
65 PT. Gunung Agung 93 06-Feb-92 5000 1000 5000000 
66 PT. Kabelindo 45 01-Jun-92 6000 3100 18600000 
67 PT. Kabel Metal 45 06-Jul-92 3500 10000 35000000 
68 PT. Sona Topas 95 21-Jul-92 3750 1500 5625000 
69 PT. Sorini Corporation 34 03-Aug-92 6000 3500 21000000 
70 PT. Evershine 43 13-0ct-92 5400 4000 21600000 
71 PT. Jembo Cable 45 18-Nov-92 4750 10000 47500000 
72 PT. SMART Corp. 51 20-Nov-92 3000 30000 90000000 
73 PT. Argha Karya PI 35 18-Dec-92 3800 16000 60800000 
7 4 PT. Matahari Putra P 93 21-Dec-92 7150 8700 62205000 
75 PT. Sekar Bumi 51 05-Jan-93 5000 7500 37500000 
76 PT. Sarasa Nugraha 43 ll-Jan-93 3500 5000 17500000 
77 PT. Texmaco Perkasa E. 41 1 l-Mar-93 4800 1000 4800000 
78 PT. Surabaya AIP 38 03-May-93 3500 20000 70000000 
79 PT. Fast Food Indonesia 94 11-May-93 5700 4460 25422000 
80 PT. Tira Austenite 91 27-Jul-93 3100 2000 6200000 
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Exhibit 1 ( continued) 
NO NAME CODE LISTDATE OFPRIC SHR (000) GRO(OOO) 
81 PT. Ganda Wangsa 44 09-Aug-93 2350 10000 23500000 
82 PT. Lion Metal Work 33 21-Aug-93 2150 3000 6450000 
83 PT. Intraco Penta 91 23-Aug-93 3375 6000 20250000 
84 PT. Sekar Laut 51 08-Sep-93 4300 6000 25800000 
85 PT. Tancho Indonesia 54 30-Sep-93 7350 4400 32340000 
86 PT. Andayani Megah 42 20-0ct-93 4250 20000 85000000 
87 PT. Concord Benefit 43 27-0ct-93 2450 6300 15435000 
88 PT. Kedaung Indah Can 33 28-0ct-93 2600 10000 26000000 
89 PT. lndosepamas A. 44 15-Nov-93 3800 6000 22800000 
90 PT. Anwar Sierad 36 22-Nov-93 4300 18000 77400000 
91 PT. Super Mitory 44 20-Dec-93 2400 6800 16320000 
92 PT. Multibreeder Adhi. 13 28-Feb-94 3600 10000 36000000 
93 PT. TEXMACO Jaya 43 20-Mar-94 4125 20000 82500000 
94 PT. Sumalindo Lestari J 37 21-Mar-94 9000 25000 225000000 
95 PT. Putra Sejahtera P 94 25-May-94 5100 9000 45900000 
96 PT. Super Indah Makmur 35 03-Jun-94 2075 5000 10375000 
97 PT. Ades Alfindo PS 51 13-Jun-94 3850 15000 57750000 
98 PT. Tempo Scan Pacific 53 17-Jun-94 8250 17500 144375000 
99 PT. Ugahari 35 23-Jun-94 2975 5000 14875000 
100 PT. lndofood Sukses M 51 14-Jul-94 6200 21000 130200000 
101 PT. Wicaksana Overseas 92 08-Aug-94 3250 20000 65000000 
l 02 PT. Steady Safe 74 08-Aug-94 3600 11650 41940000 
103 PT. Bintang Kharisma 44 30-Aug-94 2800 10000 28000000 
l 04 PT. Intinusa Selareksa 99 06-Sep-94 3000 5000 15000000 
1 
105 PT. Aneka Kimia Raya 91 03-0ct-94 4000 15000 60000000 
l 06 PT. Medco Energy Corp. 22 12-0ct-94 4350 22000 95700000 
I 
107 PT. Langgeng Makmur PI 35 17-0ct-94 3000 18000 54000000 
l 08 PT. Prasidha Aneka N 51 27-0ct-94 3000 30000 90000000 
109 PT. Asiana Imi Industry 49 20-0ct-94 2900 10200 29580000 
110 PT. Darya Varia Lab. 53 l l-Nov-94 6200 10000 62000000 
111 PT. Suparma 38 15-Nov-94 3500 26000 91000000 
112 PT. Indal Aluminium I 33 05-Dec-94 3950 13200 52140000 
113 PT. Keramika lndo. As. 32 08-Dec-94 2750 25000 68750000 
114 PT. Centris Multi P 74 08-Dec-94 2450 20000 49000000 
115 PT. Fajar Surya 38 19-Dec-94 3200 47000 150400000 
116 PT. Karwell Indonesia 43 20-Dec-94 2900 20000 58000000 
117 PT. Davomas Abadi 51 22-Dec-94 3300 17250 56925000 
118 PT. Bukaka Teknik 75 09-Jan-95 3200 40000 128000000 
119 PT. Budi AcidJaya 34 08-May-95 3000 30000 90000000 
120 PT. Tunas Ridean 91 16-May-95 2700 28000 75600000 
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Exhibit 1 (continued) 
NO NAME CODE LISTDA TE OFPRIC SHR (000) GRO(OOO) 
121 PT. Mustika Ratu 54 27-Jul-95 2600 27000 70200000 
122 PT. Surya Hidup Satwa 91 08-Aug-95 1125 20660 23242500 
123 PT. Perdana Bangun P. 92 22-Aug-95 950 23000 21850000 
124 PT. Miwon Indonesia 51 31-0ct-95 1950 25000 48750000 
125 PT. Komatsu Indonesia 41 31-0ct-95 2100 32000 67200000 
126 PT. Asahimas Flat Glass 32 08-Nov-95 2450 86000 210700000 
127 PT. Citatah Marmer 24 27-Jun-96 2375 44000 104500000 
128 PT. PP. London Sum Ind. 12 05-Jul-96 4650 38800 180420000 
129 PT. Cahaya Kalbar 51 26-Jun-96 1100 34000 37400000 
130 PT. Surya Dumai Ind. 37 27-Jul-96 1000 31000 31000000 
131 PT. Ramayana Lestari S 93 15-Jul-96 3200 80000 256000000 
132 PT. Fiskar Agung P. 51 25-Jul-96 1325 100000 132500000 
133 PT. Kedawung Setia 55 29-Jul-96 800 50000 40000000 
134 PT. Selamat Sempuma 42 09-Sep-96 1700 34400 58480000 
135 PT. Pelangi Indah Can. 33 23-Sep-96 650 27500 17875000 
136 PT. Daya Guna Samudra 14 24-0ct-96 1950 100000 195000000 
137 PT. Siantar Top 51 16-Dec-96 2200 27000 59400000 
138 PT. Sierad Produce 36 27-Dec-96 900 250000 225000000 
139 PT. Alumindo Light MI 33 02-Jan-97 1300 92400 120120000 
140 PT. Alter Abadi 29 09-Jan-97 900 88919 80027100 
141 PT. Mitra Rajasa 74 30-Jan-97 1175 30000 35250000 
142 PT. Daya Sakti Unggul 37 26-Mar-97 950 50000 47500000 
143 PT. Inti Keramik Alamasri 32 04-Jun-97 750 100000 75000000 
144 PT. Asia Intiselera 51 12-Jun-97 950 45000 42750000 
145 PT. Lautan Luas 91 21-Jul-97 2950 50000 147500000 
146 PT. Panasia Filament 43 22-Jul-97 650 50000 32500000 
147 PT. Jakarta Kyoei Steel 33 06-Aug-97 650 50000 32500000 
148 PT. Sunsoon Textile Man. 43 21-Aug-97 850 80000 68000000 
149 PT. Aneka Tambang 23 27-Nov-97 1400 430769 603076600 
Note 
11-19 for agriculture, 21-29 for mining, 31-39 for basic industry and chemical, 41-49 for miscellaneous 
industry, 51-59 for consumer goods industry, 71-79 for infrastructure, utility, and transportation, and 91-99 
for trade and services. 
Offering price and gross proceeds are expressed in Rupiah. 
PT stands for Perseroan Terbatas (Property Limited or Pty. Ltd.). 
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Exhibit 2 
List of Underwriters and Their Frequency of Underwriting Services 
No. Name of Underwriter Frequ- No. Name of Underwriter Frequ-
enc~ enc~ 
1 Danareksa Securities 64 36 Sinarmas Securities 3 
2MERINCORP 50 37 SUN HUNG KAI Securities 3 
3 BAPINDO Securities 39 38 Deemte Arthadana Securities 2 
4 ASEAM Indonesia 36 39 SEAB 2 
5 INDOVEST 35 40 Gadjah Tunggal 2 
6 MULTICOLAR 32 41 DBS Securities 2 
7 FICORINVEST 26 42 Standard Chartered Sec. 2 
8 Jardine Fleming 24 43 DAIWA Indonesia Securities 2 
9MIFC 23 44 Aspoya Indonesia Securities 2 
10 Inter Pacific Securities 20 45 Mashill Jaya Securities 2 
11 IFI 17 46 Deutche Bank Securities 2 
12 Pentasena Arthasentosa 17 47 ADS 2 
13 MAKINDO 16 48 Card Danareksa Sec. Ind. 1 
14 LIPPO Securities 15 49 ASIA Surya 1 
15 NOMURA Indonesia 15 50 OLBC Sikap Securities 1 
16 FINCONESIA 13 51 HG Asia Indonesia 1 
17 P ANIN Securities 11 52 HSBC Securities Indonesia 1 
18 Trimegah Securindo 11 53 ASP AC Uppindo Securities 1 
19 WI CARR Indonesia 11 54 Jade Securities 1 
20 Buanamas Investindo 9 55 Citicorp 1 
21 Bahana Securities 8 56 Niki Securities 1 
22 Wardley James Capital Indo. 8 57 Asian Development Securities 1 
23 Usaha Bersama Securities 7 58 Pratama Panaganarta 1 
24 NIAGA Securities 6 59 Bali Capitalindo 1 
25 PDFCI Securities 6 60 Rekaprima 1 
26 Sigma Batara 6 61 BNI Securities 1 
27 Bhakti Investama 5 62 Pacific Duaribu Securities 1 
28 Credit Lyoness 5 63 BONI Securities 1 
29 Morgan Granfell Asia 5 64 Dongsuh 1 
30 Peregrine Sewu 5 65 Benura Securities 1 
31 Uppindo Securities 4 66 ING Baring Securities 1 
32 Danamon Securities 4 67 Interasia Securities 1 
33 Multinas 3 68 BNP Securities 1 
34 Baring Securities Indonesia 3 69 SBC W arberg lndoensia 1 
35 NIKKO Securities 3 70 BDNI Securities 1 
Note. 
The frequency of underwriting services shown in the Table is based on the frequency of acting as lead 
underwriter either independently or jointly. By 1997 the number of registered underwriters stood at 88. 
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Appendix 1. 
Average and Standard Deviation of Adjusted Initial Return Partitioned on the Basis of 
Median Value for Continuous Variables and on the Basis of the Value Assigned to the 
Variables for Dichotomous Variables. 
FLI is measured as total debt/ (total assets+ initial market value of equity); FL2 is measured as total debt/ 
total assets; FL3 is measured as long term debt / total assets; OLI is measured as the ratio of total assets to 
sales; OL2 is measured as the ratio of fixed assets to total assets; SIZE I is the natural logarithm of sales for 
the last fiscal year; SIZE2 is the natural logarithm of gross proceeds of the issue, GRO I is measured as 
(sales, - sales1_1) / sales,_1; GR02 is measured as (total assets, - total assets._1) / total assets,_1; PROl is the 
ratio of operating profit to sales; PR02 is the ratio of net income after tax to sales; PR03 is the ratio of net 
income after tax to total assets; UWQ is the measure of underwriter quality and takes a value of one for high 
quality underwriter and zero otherwise; OWN is the retained ownership level and is measured as the portion 
of shares held by the issuer after the issue; LAGE is the natural logarithm of years in operation, SOR is the 
standard deviation of the first ten days return, excluding the first day return; MC is market condition and 
takes a value of one for a firm making an IPO during a bullish market and zero otherwise. FL is financial 
leverage; OL is operating leverage; GRO is firm growth; PRO is profitability, UWQ is underwriter quality, 
OWN is ownership retention, SOR is standard deviation of returns, and MC is market condition. Ex ante 
uncertainty, and consequently underpricing, is predicted to increase with financial leverage (FL), operating 
leverage (OL), growth (GRO), ownership retention level (OWN), standard deviation of return (SOR), and 
market condition (MC), and decrease with firm size (SIZE), profitability (PRO), underwriter quality (UWQ), 
and IPO age (LAGE). 
Variablea Partition #Firm Mean UP crUP t-valuejJ" 
(F-value )• 
Panel A: Financial Leverage (%) 
FLl $; 39.60 75 4.82 9.84 3.472a 
> 39.60 74 14.23 21.20 (4.641a) 
FL2 $; 66.17 75 7.34 13.55 1.554d 
> 66.17 74 11.68 19.92 (2.161a) 
FL3 $; 200.00 75 7.41 13.69 1.503d 
>200.00 74 11.61 19.84 (2.100a) 
Panel B: Operating Leverage(%) 
OLl $; 115.71 75 13.59 20.27 3.037b 
> 115.71 74 5.34 11.89 (2.902a) 
OL2 $; 34.38 75 12.49 20.15 3.037b 
> 34.38 74 6.46 12.75 (2.329a) 
Panel C: Firm Size (Natural Logarithm) 
SIZE1 $; 24.8009 75 9.10 13.35 0.283 
>24.8009 74 9.89 20.29 (2.309a) 
SIZE2 $; 24.4121 75 13.38 20.60 2.872b 
> 24.4121 74 5.55 4.25 (3.239a) 
Panel D: Firm Growth (%) 
GROl $; 31.38 75 8.79 14.48 0.500 
> 31.38 74 10.20 19.47 (1.807b) 
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GR02 ~ 33.53 75 11.25 21.67 1.272 
> 33.53 74 7.71 10.50 (4.254a) 
Panel E: Firm Profitability (%) 
PROl ~ 15.95 75 11.48 19.59 1.435d 
> 15.95 74 7.48 13.98 (1.966b) 
PR02 ~7.80 75 12.15 19.94 1.932c 
>7.80 74 6.80 13.22 (2.274a) 
PR03 ~6.26 75 10.75 19.73 0.905 
>6.26 74 8.22 13.96 (1.997b) 
Panel F: The Quality of Underwriter 
UWQ 0 32 10.24 15.13 0.305 
1 117 8.77 17.65 (1.362) 
Panel G: The Level of Retained Ownership (%) 
OWN ~ 76.90 75 7.50 13.29 -l.433d 
> 76.90 74 11.51 20.13 (2.293a) 
Panel H: Age (Operating History) (year) 
AGE ~ 16.00 73 10.24 12.91 0.527 
> 16.00 76 8.77 20.39 (2.496a) 
Panel I: The Standard Deviation of Aftermarket Returns (%) 
SDR ~2.21 75 8.29 10.79 0.859 
>2.21 74 10.68 21.01 (3.8758) 
Panel J: Market Condition (the State of the Market) 
MC 0 53 5.77 10.80 2.329c 
1 96 11.55 19.48 (3.254a) 
Panel K: Offering Price and Number of Shares 
PRICE ~4.750.00 75 9.37 15.57 0.091 
>4,750.00 74 9.62 18.62 (1.431 d) 
#of Shares ~9.300,000 73 13.14 20.37 2.850b 
>9,300,000 76 5.99 12.37 (2.7098 ) 
a.h.c.d.denote coefficient as being significantly different from zero at the 0.001, O.ol, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. 
P t-test values for differences in average of raw initial return between high and low ex ante uncertainty 
subsamples. The subsamples are formed on the basis of the selected proxies for ex ante uncertainty. 
cp F-test values for differences in variance of raw initial return between high and low ex ante uncertainty 
subsamples. The subsamples are formed on the basis of the selected proxies for ex ante uncertainty. 
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Appendix 2 
Simple Regression of Adjusted Initial Returns on Explanatory Variables (n=149) <P 
The adjusted initial return is measured as the difference between the first day closing price and the offer price divided by the offer price and adjusted for market return on the 
corresponding period. FLl is measured as total debt/ (total assets+ initial market value of equity); FL2 is measured as total debt/ total assets; FL3 is measured as long term debt/ total 
assets; OLl is measured as the ratio of total assets to sales; OL2 is measured as the ratio of fixed assets to total assets; SIZEl is the natural logarithm of sales for the last fiscal year; 
S1ZE2 is the natural logarithm of gross proceeds of the issue, GROl is measured as (sales, - sales,_1) / saleSi_1; GR02 is measured as (total assetSi - total assetSi_1) / total assets,_,; PROl is 
the ratio of operating profit to sales; PR02 is the ratio of net income after tax to sales; PR03 is the ratio of net income after tax to total assets; UWQ is the measure of underwriter quality 
and takes a value of one for high quality underwriter and zero otherwise; OWN is the retained ownership level and is measured as the portion of shares held by the issuer after the issue; 
LAGE is the natural logarithm of years in operation, SDR is the standard deviation of the first ten days return, excluding the first day return; MC is market condition and takes a value of 
one for a firm making an IPO during a bullish market and zero otherwise. FL is financial leverage; OL is operating leverage; GRO is firm growth; PRO is profitability, UWQ is 
underwriter quality, OWN is ownership retention, SDR is standard deviation of returns, and MC is market condition. Standard errors (in parentheses) are from ordinary least squares 
regression. 
Coef. 
(SE) 
t 
Cons. 
(SE) 
t 
R2 
F-stat. 
Expected 
Si 
FLl FL2 FL3 OLl OL2 SIZE1 SIZE2 GROl GR02 PROl PR02 PR03 UWQ OWN LAGE SOR MC 
.3245 .1509 .0194 -.0091 -.0851 .0075 -.0426 -.0183 -.0369 -.1727 -.2809 -.0545 .0096 .3437 -.0255 .3110 .0577 
(.0852) (.0831) (.0082) (.0075) (.0707) (.0127) (.0123) (.0289) (.0242) (.1371) (.1788) (.2895) (.0342) (.1570) (.0256) (.6671) (.0289) 
3.811 8 1.815d 2.369c -1.209 -1.203 .591 -3.4538 -.632 -1.524 -1.254 -1.571 -.188 .279 2.189c -.993 .466 1.994c 
-.0351 -.0008 .0489 .1094 .1254 -.0914 .1358 .1025 .1137 .1253 .1219 .0987 .0874 -.1618 .1624 .0861 .0577 
(.0367) (.0545) (.0230) (.0184) (.0289) (.3158) (.3018) (.0184) (.0186) (.0279) (.0221) (.0246) (.0303) (.1209) (.0695) (.0235) (.0233) 
-.958 -.014 2.051c 5.9438 4.3348 -.289 3.7648 5.5588 6.1168 4.4958 5.5108 4.021 8 2.884b -1.389 2.341c 3.6608 2.482c 
8.99 2.19 3.68 .98 .97 .24 7.50 .27 1.56 1.07 1.65 .00 .00 3.16 .67 .15 2.63 
14.5238 3.296d 5.6158 1.462 1.446 .348 11.9208 .399 2.324 1.586 2.467 .035 .078 4.792c .986 .217 3.977c 
(-) (-) (-) (+) (+) (-) (-) (+) (+) (-) (-) (-) (-) (+) (-) (+) (+) 
8
' b, c, d, denote coefficient as being significantly different from zero at the 0.001, 0.01, 0.05, and O. IO levels, respectively. 
q,The adjusted initial return is measured as follows: MAUPi = [(Pi,,- Pi.off) /Pi.off] - [(MRi1 - MRj.,-,) I MRi,t-d, where Pi, is the first day closing price of security j, Pi.off is the 
offering price of security j, MRi1 is market return on the day of the issue of security j, MRi, t-t is market return on the day before the issue of security j. 
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Simple Regression of Average First Week Initial Returns on Explanatory Variables (n=149)<P 
The average first week return is measured as the difference between the average of the first five days closing prices and the offer price divided by the offer price. FL 1 is measured as total 
debt/ (total assets+ initial market value of equity); FL2 is measured as total debt/ total assets; FL3 is measured as long term debt/ total assets; OLl is measured as the ratio of total 
assets to sales; OL2 is measured as the ratio of fixed assets to total assets; SIZEl is the natural logarithm of sales for the last fiscal year; SIZE2 is the natural logarithm of gross proceeds 
of the issue; GROl is measured as (sale5i- sale5i.i) / sales1_1; GR02 is measured as (total asset5i- total asset5i_1) / total asset5i_1; PROl is the ratio of operating profit to sales; PR02 is the 
ratio of net income after tax to sales; PR03 is the ratio of net income after tax to total assets; UWQ is the measure of underwriter quality and takes a value of one for high quality 
underwriter and zero otherwise; OWN is the retained ownership level and is measured as the portion of shares held by the issuer after the issue; LAGE is the natural logarithm of years in 
operation, SDR is the standard deviation of the first ten days return, excluding the first day return; MC is market condition and takes a value of one for a firm making an IPO during a 
bullish market and zero otherwise. FL is financial leverage; OL is operating leverage; GRO is firm growth; PRO is profitability, UWQ is underwriter quality, OWN is ownership 
retention, SDR is standard deviation of returns, and MC is market condition. Standard errors (in parentheses) are from ordinary least squares regression. 
FLl FL2 FL3 OLl OL2 SIZEl SIZE2 GROl GR02 PROl PR02 PR03 UWQ OWN LAGE SDR MC 
Coef. .3641 .1871 .0239 -.0114 -.1046 -.0010 -.0562 -.0206 -.0353 -.2455 -.3216 -.0272 .0189 .3595 -.0261 .4705 .0555 
(SE) (.0869) (.0852) (.0084) (.0077) (.0728) (.0131) (.0124) (.0299) (.0249) (.1406) (.1839) (.2983) (.0352) (.1617) (.0264) (.6869) (.0294) 
t 4.1873 2.195c 2.850b -1.476 -1.437 
-.076 -4.5363 -.694 -1.413 -l.746d -l.749d -.091 .536 2.223c .685 .685 1.855d 
Cons. -.1066 -.0228 .0392 .1140 .1333 .1207 .1468 .1044 .1138 .1390 .1268 .0978 .0810 -.1793 .1649 .0825 .6601 
(SE) (.0374) (.0559) (.0243) (.0189) (.0298) (.3258) (.3028) (.0189) (.0192) (.0286) (.0228) (.0253) (.0312) (.1246) (.0715) (.0242) (.0240) 
t 
-1.337 -.408 1.611 6.0253 4.4863 .370 :4.8493 5.4973 5.9353 4.8643 5.5703 3.8633 2.595b -1.439 2.308c 3.4073 2.013c 
R2 10.66 3.18 5.24 1.46 1.39 .00 12.281 .33 1.34 2.03 2.04 .00 .20 3.25 .66 .32 2.29 
F-stat. 17.5323 4.820c 8.124b 2.180 2.066 .006 20.5813 .482 1.997 3.049d 3.057d .008 .287 4.941c .975 .469 3.442d 
Expected (-) (-) (-) (+) (+) (-) (-) (+) (+) (-) (-) (-) (-) (+) (-) (+) (+) 
Sign 
a. b. c, d. denote coefficient as being significantly different from zero at the 0.001, 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
cp The average first week initial return is measured as follows: UPA5Di = (Pi,• - Pi.off) / Pi.off , where Pi.• is the average of the first five day price after the issue of security j and 
Pi.off is the offering price of security j. 
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Multivariate Tests of Adjusted Initial Return on Continuous Variable (n=l49) 
The adjusted initial return is measured as the difference between the first day closing price and the offer price divided by the offer price and adjusted for market return on the 
corresponding period. FLI is measured as total debt/ (total assets+ initial market value of equity); FL2 is measured as total debt/ total assets; FL3 is measured as long term debt/ total 
assets; OLI is measured as the ratio of total assets to sales; OL2 is measured as the ratio of fixed assets to total assets; SIZEl is the natural logarithm of sales for the last fiscal year; 
SIZE2 is the natural logarithm of gross proceeds of the issue; GROl is measured as (sale5i- sales1_1) / sale5i_1; GR02 is measured as (total assetSt- total asset5t.1) / total asset5t_1; PROl 
is the ratio of operating profit to sales; PR02 is the ratio of net income after tax to sales; PR03 is the ratio of net income after tax to total assets; UW is the measure of underwriter 
quality and takes a value of one for high quality underwriter and zero otherwise; OWN is the retained ownership level and is measured as the portion of shares held by the issuer after 
the issue; LAGE is the natural logarithm of years in operation, SDR is the standard deviation of the first ten days return, excluding the first day return; MC is market condition and takes 
a value of one for a firm making an IPO during a bullish market and zero otherwise. FL is financial leverage; OL is operating leverage; GRO is firm growth; PRO is profitability, UWQ 
is underwriter quality, OWN is ownership retention, SDR is standard deviation of returns, and MC is market condition. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for White's ( 1980) 
heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix. 
Reg. FLl FL2 FL3 OLl OL2 SIZE1 SIZE2 GROl GR02 PROl PR02 PR03 UWQ OWN LAGE SOR MC Const. R! 
(F) 
1 .3211 -.0099 -.0048 -.0073 .0558 -.0282 .1464 -.0113 .1423 .0605 -.0087 7.92 
(.1176) (.0050) (.0045) (.0183) (.0924) (.0324) (.1211) (.0192) (.8865) (.0251) (.0692) (2.282l 
2.731b -1.997c 
-1.064 -.402 .605 -.872 1.209 -.589 .161 2.417c -.126 
2 .2909 -.0077 -.0132 -.0325 .1092 -.0303 .2446 .0049 -.0398 .0603 .1040 10.58 
(.1109) (.0041) (.0064) (.0169) (.1162) (.0315) (.1403) (.0200) (.8608) (.0243) (.0992) (2.762)b 
2.624b -l.876d -2.051c -1.918d .939 -.961 1.743d .243 -.046 2.485c 1.048 
3 .3721 -.0068 -.0073 -.0286 .4212 -.0291 .1545 -.0026 -.0347 .0597 -.0035 10.01 
(.1209) (.0032) (.0047) (.0164) (.2241) (.0314) (.1234) (.0197) (.877) (.0239) (.0671) (2.657)b 
3.077b -2.13lc 
-1.564 -l.743d 1.879d -.929 1.251 -.134 -.039 2.492c -.052 
4 .2847 -.0027 -.0135 -.0037 .0289 -.0254 .2322 .0011 .1778 .0607 .1027 8.82 
(.1118) (.0777) (.0063) (.0176) (.1116) (.0314) (.1337) (.0197) (.9201) (.0251) (.0984) (2.442)b 
2.546c 
-.035 -2.159c -.208 .259 -.809 1.737d .054 .193 2.416c 1.043 
5 .2981 -.0294 -.0049 -.0309 -.0047 -.0233 .1827 -.0105 .1311 .0524 -.0087 8.08 
(.1151) (.0739) (.0047) (.0173) (.1221) (.0314) (.1306) (.0189) (.9151) (.0236) (.0663) (2.309t 
2.590c 
-.397 -1.040 -l.789d -.038 -.745 1.399 -.556 .143 2.225c -.131 
6 .3382 -.0058 -.0146 -.0299 .4699 -.0277 .209 .0082 -.0398 .0609 .0921 11.51 
(.1110) (.0619) (.0059) (.0164) (.2309) (.0305) (.1328) (.0197) (.8898) (.0244) (.0918) (2.937)b 
3.046b 
-.094 -2.446c -l.834d 2.035c -.909 1.663d .415 -.045 2.501c 1.003 
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Reg. FL 1 FL2 FL3 OLl OL2 SIZEl SIZE2 GROl GR02 PROl PR02 PR03 UWQ OWN LAGE SDR MC Const. R! 
(F) 
7 .0809 -.0079 -.0016 -.0134 -.0431 -.0260 .2717 -.0178 .2394 .0477 -.0684 1.27 
(.0672) (.0044) (.0052) (.0179) (.1068) (.0311) (.1378) (.0202) (.9343) (.0244) (.1055) (1.192) 
1.205 -1.794d -.309 -.747 -.404 -.836 1.971 d -.883 .256 1.957d -.648 
8 .0657 -.0039 -.0163 -.0360 -.0489 -.0306 .4362 .0057 .0566 .0474 .1263 5.69 
(.0697) (.0039) (.0072) (.0172) (.1412) (.0304) (.1716) (.0213) (.8940) (.0238) (.1155) (l.899t 
.942 -1.021 -2.270c -2.090c 
-.559 -1.007 2.542c .267 .063 1.991c 1.093 
9 .0750 -.0088 -.0031 -.0342 -.0150 -.0281 .3132 -.0138 .0922 .0460 -.0562 2.38 
(.0621) (.0040) (.0051) (.0177) (.2328) (.0306) (.1455) (.0205) (.9258) (.0235) (.0959) (1.363) 
1.209 -2.181c -.607 -1.932d -.064 -.919 2.152c -.671 .099 1.956d -.586 
10 .0999 -.0005 -.0169 -.0078 -.0156 -.0286 .3946 .0029 .2385 .0486 .1245 3.82 
(.0679) (.0794) (.0069) (.0166) (.1145) (.0302) (.1577) (.0202) (.9504) (.0245) (.1140) (1.592) 
1.471 -.006 -2.429c -.469 -.136 -.949 2.503c .142 .251 1.982c 1.092 
11 .0285 -.0305 -.0019 -.0339 -.2066 -.0216 .3347 -.0168 .2097 .0424 -.0548 2.54 
(.0725) (.0756) (.0053) (.0175) (.1282) (.0297) (.1502) (.0202) (.9582) (.0234) (.0934) (1.389) 
.393 -.403 -.366 -1.944d -1.611 -.729 2.229c -.835 .219 1.813d -.587 
12 .1053 -.0093 -.0182 -.0357 .1607 -.0308 .4254 .0077 .0683 .0456 .1300 5.48 
(.0611) (.0664) (.0068) (.0175) (.2254) (.0299) (.1632) (.0205) (.9271) (.0236) (.1183) (1.864l 
1.724d 
-.140 -2.685b -2.037c .713 -1.030 2.606b .374 .074 1.934d 1.099 
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Reg. FLl FL2 FL3 OLl OL2 SIZE1 SIZE2 GROl GR02 PROl PR02 PR03 UWQ OWN LAGE SDR MC Const. R2 
(F) 
13 .0131 -.0078 .0001 -.0101 -.0286 -.0267 .2449 -.0191 .1371 .0464 -.0659 2.21 
(.0062) (.0045) (.0051) (.0185) (.1031) (.0311) (.1402) (.0200) (.9217) (.0243) (.1038) (1.337) 
2.113c -1.748d .016 -.548 -.278 -.857 1.747d -.955 .149 1.913d -.635 
14 .0094 -.0041 -.0151 -.0351 -.0704 -.0304 .4228 .0047 -.0062 .0463 .1298 6.07 
(.0066) (.0039) (.0074) (.0177) (.1464) (.0303) (.1770) (.0212) (.0896) (.0239) (.1179) (1.963/ 
1.418 -1.034 -2.050c -1.989c 
-.481 -1.002 2.389c .223 -.007 1.934d 1.101 
15 .0133 -.0080 -.0015 -.0318 .0632 -.0286 .2809 -.0148 -.0066 .0443 -.0569 3.30 
(.0064) (.0040) (.0051) (.0182) (.2448) (.0305) (.1505) (.0204) (.9193) (.0234) (.0954) (1.508) 
2.073c -1.991c 
-.287 -l.747d .258 -.938 1.867d -.726 -.007 1.888d -.597 
16 .0121 .0022 -.0153 -.0049 -.0237 -.0275 .3847 .0022 .1502 .0482 .1294 4.24 
(.0060) (.0794) (.0069) (.0169) (.1099) (.0300) (.1628) (.0199) (.9462) (.0244) (.1176) (l.659l 
2.013c .028 -2.184c -.293 -.216 -.917 2.363c .112 .159 1.977c 1.101 
17 .0095 -.0288 -.0010 -.0319 -.1586 -.0235 .3010 -.0178 .1380 .0402 -.0549 3.18 
(.0069) (.0751) (.0053) (.0179) (.1255) (.0298) (.1542) (.0199) (.9551) (.0231) (.0927) (1.490) 
1.373 -.383 -.189 -1.780d -1.264 -.786 1.952d -.895 .145 1.744d -.592 
18 .0130 -.0087 -.0165 -.0348 .1972 -.0295 .4134 .0067 -.0201 .0448 .1354 5.92 
(.0063) (.0669) (.0069) (.0181) (.2381) (.0296) (.1700) (.0204) (.0933) (.0235) (.1220) (l.938/ 
2.063d 
-.130 -2.379c -l.921d .786 -.997 2.432c .331 -.216 1.908d 1.110 
Exp. (-) (-) (-) (+) (+) (-) (-) (+) (+) (-) (-) (-) (-) (+) (-) (+) (+) 
Si 
a. b. c. d. denote coefficient as being significantly different from zero at the 0.001, 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Collinearity Diagnoses Using the Condition Indices and the Decomposition of 
Coefficient Variance Matrix (Regression 11 of Table 5.12)* 
FL3 is measured as long term debt / total assets; OL 1 is measured as the ratio of total assets to sales; 
S1ZE2 is the natural logarithm of gross proceeds of the issue; GR02 is measured as (total assets1 - total 
asset5i_1) / total assets1_1; PR02 is the ratio of net income after tax to sales; UWQ is the measure of 
underwriter quality and takes a value of one for high quality underwriter and zero otherwise; OWN is the 
retained ownership level and is measured as the portion of shares held by the issuer after the issue; LAGE 
is the natural logarithm of years in operation, SDR is the standard deviation of the first ten days return, 
excluding the first day return; MC is market condition and takes a value of one for a firm making an IPO 
during a bullish market and zero otherwise. FL is financial leverage; OL is operating leverage; GRO is 
firm growth; PRO is profitability, UWQ is underwriter quality, OWN is ownership retention, SDR is 
standard deviation of returns, and MC is market condition. Values that are boldfaced indicate the possible 
presence of multicollinearity. The condition index above 30 is indicative of the presence of 
multicollinearity and the variance of coefficient above .90 in at least two variables on the same row is 
indicative of the presence of multicollinearity. 
Row Condi- Inter- Proportion of Variance of Coefficient 
tion cept FL3 OLl SIZE2 GR02 PR02 UWQ OWN LAGE SOR MC Index 
l 1.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.003 o.004 0.000 o_ooo 0.003 0.003 
2 3.650 0.000 0.052 0.009 0.000 0.441 0.023 0_059 0.000 0.000 0_022 0.052 
3 3.919 0.000 0.023 0.027 0.000 0.264 0.094 0-203 0.000 0.000 0_055 0.018 
4 4.588 0.000 0.152 0.003 0.000 0.043 0.149 0.325 0.000 0.001 0.102 0.036 
5 5.015 0.000 0.025 0.004 0.000 0.008 0.007 0.308 0.000 0.000 0.407 0.236 
6 5.454 0.000 0.072 0.139 0.000 0.105 0.022 0.054 0.001 0.001 0.304 0.317 
7 6.536 0.000 0.185 0.370 0.000 0.000 0.435 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.205 
8 8.204 0.001 0.392 0.281 0.001 0.108 0.208 0.005 0.005 0.069 0.014 0.050 
9 17.363 0.003 0.071 0.077 0.003 0.007 0.051 0.002 0.119 0.700 0.026 0.040 
10 34.299 0.032 0.021 0.047 0.060 0.008 0.000 0.022 0.807 0.217 0.001 0.028 
11 105.448 0.964 0.006 0.042 0.936 0.013 0.009 0.008 0.068 0.011 0.058 0.017 
* Details of the process of detecting multicollinearity can be found in Hair et al. (1995, pp. 152-
154). 
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